

Scrapping the missiles - a tipping point?

President Obama's decision announced on 17 September to scrap the plans for a radar installation in the Czech Republic linked to missile defence installations in Poland may herald a tipping point in US and EU relations with Russia. But which way? Will this usher in a new era of genuine cooperation with Russia and strategic matters, or will Russia's geo-political hawks feel emboldened to proceed with new adventures in their quest for hegemonic power in the former Soviet space?

President Obama's short announcement speech should be supported by more detailed information. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution sought to do this a bit in separate articles in the Financial Times on 21st September: the Iranian threat is now more from short to medium-range missiles, rather than long-range, and this justifies a more southern location nearer to Iran, also providing cover for Turkey, which was not the case with the Czech-Polish installations. In addition new defence technologies make for more flexible systems that can be sea-borne. That being so there was no point in going ahead with the Czech-Polish plan, irrespective of the Russia factor.

The plea to look at technicalities rather than geo-political arguments does not seem to be listened to yet, certainly not in Moscow, where commentaries are reporting a great political victory, nor in Washington conservative Republican circles which cry out 'appeasement' and 'weakness'. It is certainly highly desirable that the technical arguments be credibly presented, and so heard alongside the predictable banging of geo-political drums by cold war warriors. Whatever the strength of the technical arguments it is obvious that this reversal of the Bush initiative carries a cost and risk. The original plan may have been both misconceived technically and poorly deployed diplomatically, but its reversal could not be without cost for the US-Central Europe relations, or risk of misinterpretation by Russia. The new member states of NATO already were apprehensive that their Article 5 guarantee was being diluted by the priority of the war in Afghanistan, and the scrapping of the missile defences will only intensify these concerns. Much of old Europe would consider that new Europe, i.e. new NATO and EU member states, is a bit paranoid over Russia as threat, but new Europe feel their instincts confirmed most concretely by what they saw in the

war in Georgia a year ago. And Russia goes on with extraordinarily arrogant initiatives that deepen these concerns further. This August President Medvedev wrote a letter to President Yushchenko of Ukraine announcing Russia's refusal to replace their retiring ambassador until Ukraine showed itself to be more Russia-friendly, a diplomatic stance of semi-non-recognition usually reserved for pariah states. At the same time Moscow is, for example, supporting ultra-nationalist Russian 'patriots' in stirring up inter-ethnic conflict with the Tartars in Crimea. Then Prime Minister Putin on 18 September greeted the Obama decision with the invitation to follow up with more, for example by easing the joint accession into the WTO of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which is itself a highly dubious proposition on technical grounds, quite apart from its politics.

The new NATO Secretary General, Fogh Rasmussen, tries the alternative track of proposing this moment as one to switch NATO-Russia relations back onto a track of deepening cooperation, for example over Iran and Afghanistan. We have to see what this gives.

The EU could also follow through with ideas to test Moscow's preparedness to turn the page on the recent catalogue of mutual irritations¹, and engage in real cooperation in the wider European neighbourhood. There are several domains (energy, transport, environment, border management, crisis management²) where there are or could be opportunities for mutually-beneficial, multi-regional cooperation between the EU and different segments of the post-Soviet space. The EU has been developing its regional policies in the wider Europe quite significantly in the last few years (new Northern Dimension, Eastern partnership, Central Asia strategy). Only one of these, the Northern Dimension, involves Russia. The Eastern Partnership was launched to bolster the six European former Soviet states, including Belarus but not Russia. Only Russia is to blame for this, since it reflects how Russia's 'diplomacy' of recent years has succeeded only in upsetting all its neighbours with crude efforts at pressurization.

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¹ For detail see M. Roth, Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia, CEPS Working Document No. 319, August 2009.
² See for detail M. Emerson, Synergies vs. Spheres of influence in the Pan-European Space, CEPS, 2009.

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However the EU itself would be more than open to turning the page with Russia, if it received a signal of interest in genuine cooperation, seeking synergies between all, rather than intensified competition over spheres of influence. How might this be done? Maybe the EU should think about proposing the missing component of its wider Europe policy, which might be called a 'EurAsia Strategy', and which would overarch the several components of the EU's multiple eastern policies (Russian strategic partnership, Eastern partnership, Central Asia strategy), and go on further to link up with projects in Central Asia of common interest in either China or South Asia as well as Russia. This connects with but goes beyond the idea of a new Ostpolitik that the German EU Presidency of 2007 liked, but never got underway, and got lost in the midst of the tensions of several EU-Russia friction points and then later the war with Georgia. It might be looked at again, and updated for the new situation.

To hammer home the point, NATO and the EU could effectively test Moscow's inclinations in coordinated steps. Is Moscow interested in turning the page, or not?

by Michael Emerson

US President Obama on “Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe”

White House

Washington D.C., 17 September 2009. [Link](#)

As Commander-in-Chief, I’m committed to doing everything in my power to advance our national security. And that includes strengthening our defenses against any and all threats to our people, our troops, and our friends and allies around the world.

One of those threats is the danger posed by ballistic missiles. As I said during the campaign, President Bush was right that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat. And that’s why I’m committed to deploying strong missile defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 21st century.

The best way to responsibly advance our security and the security of our allies is to deploy a missile defense system that best responds to the threats that we face and that utilizes technology that is both proven and cost-effective.

In keeping with that commitment, and a congressionally mandated review, I ordered a comprehensive assessment of our missile defense program in Europe. And after an extensive process, I have approved the unanimous recommendations of my Secretary of Defense and my Joint Chiefs of Staff to strengthen America’s defenses against ballistic missile attack.

This new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems, and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.

This decision was guided by two principal factors. First, we have updated our intelligence assessment of Iran’s missile programs, which emphasizes the threat posed by Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles, which are capable of reaching Europe. There’s no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program, and we, along with our allies and partners, will continue to pursue strong diplomacy to ensure that Iran lives up to these international obligations. But this new ballistic missile defense program will best address the threat posed by Iran’s ongoing ballistic missile defense program.

Second, we have made specific and proven advances in our missile defense technology, particularly with regard to land- and sea-based interceptors and the sensors that support them. Our new approach will, therefore, deploy technologies that are proven and cost-effective and that counter the current threat, and do so sooner than the previous program. Because our approach will be phased and adaptive, we will retain the flexibility to adjust and enhance our defenses as the threat and technology continue to evolve.

To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program; it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. homeland against long-

range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO allies.

This approach is also consistent with NATO missile -- NATO’s missile defense efforts and provides opportunities for enhanced international collaboration going forward. We will continue to work cooperatively with our close friends and allies, the Czech Republic and Poland, who had agreed to host elements of the previous program. I’ve spoken to the Prime Ministers of both the Czech Republic and Poland about this decision and reaffirmed our deep and close ties. Together we are committed to a broad range of cooperative efforts to strengthen our collective defense, and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article V that an attack on one is an attack on all.

We’ve also repeatedly made clear to Russia that its concerns about our previous missile defense programs were entirely unfounded. Our clear and consistent focus has been the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program, and that continues to be our focus and the basis of the program that we’re announcing today.

In confronting that threat, we welcome Russians’ cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests, even as we continue to -- we continue our shared efforts to end Iran’s illicit nuclear program.

Going forward, my administration will continue to consult closely with Congress and with our allies as we deploy this system, and we will rigorously evaluate both the threat posed by ballistic missiles and the technology that we are developing to counter it.

I’m confident that with the steps we’ve taken today, we have strengthened America’s national security and enhanced our capacity to confront 21st century threats.

Related Document:

“The new system offers a real missile defence”, by Hillary Rodham Clinton, US Secretary of State. Published in the *Financial Times*, 20 September 2009. [Access here.](#)

“NATO and Russia: A New Beginning”

Speech by NATO SG Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment Brussels, 18 September 2009. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

This is my first major public speech as the new Secretary General of NATO. I have chosen to make this a speech about the NATO-Russia relationship – and I am very happy that we could get the Carnegie Endowment, a think tank with considerable expertise on Russia, to host today’s event.

Why did I choose to focus my first speech on Russia? The answer is quite simple. I believe that of all of NATO’s relationships with Partner countries, none holds greater potential than the NATO-Russia relationship. Yet I also believe that none is so

much burdened by misperceptions, mistrust and diverging political agendas.

We spend too much energy on what divides us. We should instead focus on what unites us.

Let me make it clear right from the outset: I am not a dreamer. There are some fundamental issues on which NATO and Russia disagree, and they will not disappear overnight. However, I do believe that it is possible for NATO and Russia to make a new beginning – and to enjoy a far more productive relationship in the future.

I therefore want to use this opportunity today to make three specific proposals to help us move in that direction.

First, I believe that NATO and Russia should immediately look to reinforce our practical cooperation in all the areas where we agree we face the same risks and threats to our security -- and there are many of those areas.

Second, in order to build confidence and trust, I would like to rejuvenate the NATO-Russia Council, so that we can use it as a forum for open and unbiased dialogue on all issues related to peace and stability in Europe.

And third, I would like to see NATO and Russia agree to carry out a joint review of the new 21st century security challenges, to serve as a firm basis for our future cooperation.

As you can see, these proposals are linked. But before I flesh out my ideas, let me stress that there is one precondition for all this to work, and that is for us all to display greater realism. Because let's be honest; when the Cold War ended twenty years ago, NATO and Russia developed rather unrealistic expectations about each other – and those flawed expectations are still very much alive today and continue to burden our relationship.

Put simply, Russia expected NATO to be dissolved when the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Because it didn't, many in Russia can only find one explanation – that the Alliance still sees Russia as a threat. And every thing we do is seen through that prism: enlargement, missile defence, even our partnerships.

For many in the West, the end of the Cold War seemed to herald a new age, when Russia would see things our way, cooperate with us across the board, and support the membership in NATO of former Warsaw Pact countries.

That was – in retrospect – a little unrealistic. Russia is a great European power, with her own point of view and her own interests. Often, those don't coincide with ours. And when that happens, there is a sense of disappointment and incomprehension among many in the West.

It is no wonder that the NATO-Russia relationship has remained a difficult one. Yes, we found great language for our partnership aims in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration – but we have not been able to translate them into reality. Yes, we cooperated on a number of issues – but this cooperation was always kept hostage to the overall political climate. One major disagreement and it would falter. And last year, following the war with Georgia, when Russia

unilaterally recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we reached that very point. Our relationship went into a freeze – because the foundations of this relationship were not strong enough.

A time-out may have been useful to rethink our relationship. But the international security environment does not wait for NATO and Russia to sort out their act. Quite simply, NATO-Russia cooperation is not a matter of choice – it is a matter of necessity.

But if the relationship is to be successful, then we must not continue to harbour false hopes. I firmly believe that now is the time for us all to be much more realistic. Russia must realise that NATO is here to stay, - not because we think Russia is an enemy. We do not. But because Allies share common values, and a culture of cooperation we want to preserve. And there should be no doubt, anywhere, that this Alliance will continue to make the security of all its members our number one priority.

And why not? I do not believe that the enlargement of NATO and the European Union has created any security problems for Russia. On the contrary: A more stable and prosperous Europe is indeed contributing to the security of Russia.

We also need to be realistic in recognising that NATO will continue its open door policy -- not because of any intention to "encircle" or marginalise Russia, but because respect for territorial integrity and the right of each sovereign state to freely decide its security policy and alignments are fundamental if Europe is to be truly "whole and free".

Finally, we also have to be more realistic in recognising that Russia has security interests which we need to understand and take into account. Many things that NATO Allies may regard as entirely benign can sometimes look very different when seen from Moscow – and vice versa.

I make these points, not in order to engage in some kind of blame game, but to highlight the difficulties of the concrete task before us: Making a new beginning in NATO-Russia relations.

Our ultimate goal must be a relationship that allows us to pursue common interests even when we disagree in other areas. So let me now flesh out my three proposals and explain how they will help us to reach that goal.

My first proposal concerns the short term. I would like NATO and Russia to strengthen their practical cooperation in the many areas where we have a clear common interest.

Key among these areas is the fight against terrorism.

[...]

Another shared interest is preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Many international experts believe that we are at a nuclear tipping point. If North Korea stays nuclear, and if Iran becomes nuclear, some of their neighbours might feel compelled to follow their example.

Such a multi-nuclear world is not in NATO's interest – and it's definitely not in Russia's interest either. And so I believe we need to take a much more thorough look at the available options: at arms control as well as at non-proliferation efforts, and at means to protect ourselves against Weapons of Mass Destruction. And here as well, we can build on work that we have already initiated in the recent past, such as our joint assessment of proliferation trends, risks and challenges.

This brings me to another area where Russia and NATO can and should work together, which is missile defence. Yesterday, the US announced its plans with regard to a missile defence which can include and can protect all European allies. These plans will involve an even greater role for NATO with regard to missile defence in Europe – and I welcome that as a positive step.

In my view, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is of concern not just to NATO nations, but to Russia too. Our nations, and our forces deployed in theatre, will all become increasingly vulnerable to missile attacks by third parties.

Studying ways to counter this threat is in NATO's and Russia's fundamental strategic interest. We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defence systems at an appropriate time. And I believe that the work that we have already done on Theatre Missile Defence under the aegis of the NATO-Russia Council, including joint exercises, clearly demonstrates the potential for cooperation in this area.

Both NATO and Russia have a wealth of experience in missile defence. We should now work to combine this experience to our mutual benefit.

[...]

my second proposal, which is to re-vitalise the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for serious dialogue.

I firmly believe that we should use the NATO-Russia Council again in the way it was originally intended -- not as a fair-weather forum, but as a forum where we can all air our differences openly and transparently, and where all our security concerns are discussed – including Russia's.

Take for example President Medvedev's ideas on a new European security arrangement. I am aware that the OSCE is the primary forum for such a discussion, and I am also aware that President Medvedev's ideas have not yet turned into concrete proposals. But to the degree that these ideas demonstrate Russian concerns about being marginalised in European security, I believe that a NATO-Russia dialogue could provide real added value. We must all aim for a Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which Russia sees herself reflected.

As many of you are aware, NATO has just started the process of drafting a new Strategic Concept. I plan to make this the most open, the most inclusive process in the history of NATO – or any other organisation. A process in which we will thoroughly engage the strategic community, and use new media in ways we have never done before. It goes without saying that this open process offers an excellent opportunity for the Russian strategic community to make its voice heard.

Now to my third proposal. When I look at the recent "Russian Security Strategy Until 2020" I realise that Russia, very much like NATO, is grappling with the new and rapidly evolving security environment. This environment confronts us with challenges that have little in common with those of the past. But I also firmly believe that it offers an ideal opportunity for enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia. We should use the NATO-Russia Council to identify those areas where our interests converge and where further cooperation would be beneficial.

This is why I propose that we undertake a joint review of NATO's and Russia's common threats and challenges. We need an agreed analytical basis which we can then use to further enhance our practical cooperation.

We don't have to start from scratch. NATO and Russia have already conducted several joint assessments on specific threats. And we have agreed on an Action Plan on Terrorism. What we need to do now, in essence, is to broaden this work.

The agreement to conduct such a review would provide the NATO-Russia Council with an unprecedented high-level political profile. And it would also be an unambiguous signal of our intention to work more closely together and to put our past differences behind us – it would represent a genuine new beginning for the NATO-Russia relationship.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I am perfectly aware that the proposals I have just laid out are ambitious. The historical baggage of the relationships between NATO and Russia and between the West and Russia cannot simply be ignored. And not all our disagreements are simply based on misunderstandings. Some of them are of a fundamental nature and, hence, will not disappear quickly.

I am also keenly aware that NATO-Russia relations can quickly become hostage to domestic politics – in Russia as well as in Allied nations. After all, the state of NATO-Russia relations is very much a reflection of the state of bilateral relations between individual Allies and Russia.

So my proposals will require realism, but also considerable political will – not just to launch them, but particularly to prevent them from getting derailed by possible disagreements in other areas.

Carnegie's Dimitri Trenin once described Russia as being merely the planet Pluto in the "Western solar system". In other words, while it is formally part of the system, it is located out on the fringes where it is lonely, cold and frustrated. This situation is neither in Russia's own interest nor in NATO's interest.

NATO wants Russia to be a real stakeholder in European and international security. We need Russia as a partner in resolving the great issues of our time. And although many in Russia may still hesitate to agree, I predict that Russia – sooner rather than later – will also come to realise that a more cooperative relationship with NATO is very much in its own self-interest.

[...]

Russian MFA on speech by NATO SG Rasmussen on Building a Strategic Partnership with Russia
Moscow, 21 September 2009. [Link](#)

[Extract]

No one can disagree with the words of Fogh Rasmussen that today we should focus on what unites us. Our cooperation, in particular via the Russia-NATO Council (RNC), should not become hostage to issues on which we continue to have serious disagreements with NATO.

Indeed, the common tasks in the fight against modern threats to security in the Euro-Atlantic region objectively require increasing the efficiency of the RNC. And such tasks before Russia and NATO today are indeed quite a few. They are about global counterterrorism cooperation and about (particularly antidrug) collaboration in Afghanistan and about joint analysis of WMD proliferation threats and about counter-piracy. Prospects also exist for making use of the RNC's missile defense potential, but they will largely hinge on how the new approaches of the Obama administration to missile defense in Europe are concretely fleshed out. Good conditions are now shaping up for resuming joint work to assess global missile proliferation risks.

Today there is a great need for a transparent and meaningful dialogue on security strategies, in particular, as regards devising a new strategic concept of NATO. We look forward to a substantive discussion in the RNC of President Medvedev's initiative for adapting the European security architecture to modern realities. The willingness of NATO members for a serious and keen exchange of views will be a major test of how the ideas for building a Russia-NATO strategic partnership will actually be implemented.

We are realists; the RNC going into full operating mode and further prospects of cooperation will depend primarily on the overall backdrop of our relations with NATO, on trust restored, on a willingness to consider Russia's concerns, on the vector of NATO's further evolution and on the goals and objectives that will be set for the organization.

The Russia-NATO Council could become an effective organ of political dialogue and practical cooperation only on a bloc approaches free foundation of strict adherence to the principles that were laid out in the Rome Declaration at the founding of the RNC: work on an equal basis, and indivisible security – when no one secures himself at others' expense.

We are convinced that this will contribute significantly to a better security climate in the Euro-Atlantic area and greater mutual trust. This will benefit all regional states.

Remarks by US President Obama to the UN General Assembly
New York, 23 September 2009. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

Good morning. Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor to address you for the first time as the 44th President of the United States. [...] I took office at a time when many around the world had come to view America with skepticism and distrust. Part of this was due to misperceptions and misinformation about my country. Part of this was due to opposition to specific policies, and a belief that on certain critical issues, America has acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others. And this has fed an almost reflexive anti-Americanism, which too often has served as an excuse for collective inaction.

[...]

We have set a clear and focused goal: to work with all members of this body to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies -- a network that has killed thousands of people of many faiths and nations, and that plotted to blow up this very building. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we and many nations here are helping these governments develop the capacity to take the lead in this effort, while working to advance opportunity and security for their people.

In Iraq, we are responsibly ending a war. We have removed American combat brigades from Iraqi cities, and set a deadline of next August to remove all our combat brigades from Iraqi territory. And I have made clear that we will help Iraqis transition to full responsibility for their future, and keep our commitment to remove all American troops by the end of 2011.

I have outlined a comprehensive agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In Moscow, the United States and Russia announced that we would pursue substantial reductions in our strategic warheads and launchers. At the Conference on Disarmament, we agreed on a work plan to negotiate an end to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. And this week, my Secretary of State will become the first senior American representative to the annual Members Conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Upon taking office, I appointed a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, and America has worked steadily and aggressively to advance the cause of two states -- Israel and Palestine -- in which peace and security take root, and the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians are respected.

To confront climate change, we have invested \$80 billion in clean energy. We have substantially increased our fuel-efficiency standards. We have provided new incentives for conservation, launched an energy partnership across the Americas, and moved from a bystander to a leader in international climate negotiations.

To overcome an economic crisis that touches every corner of the world, we worked with the G20 nations to forge a coordinated international response of over \$2 trillion in stimulus to bring the global economy back from the brink. We mobilized

resources that helped prevent the crisis from spreading further to developing countries. And we joined with others to launch a \$20 billion global food security initiative that will lend a hand to those who need it most, and help them build their own capacity.

We've also re-engaged the United Nations. We have paid our bills. We have joined the Human Rights Council. (Applause.) We have signed the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. We have fully embraced the Millennium Development Goals. And we address our priorities here, in this institution -- for instance, through the Security Council meeting that I will chair tomorrow on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and through the issues that I will discuss today.

[...]

First, we must stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them.

This institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man's capacity to kill had to be contained. For decades, we averted disaster, even under the shadow of a superpower stand-off. But today, the threat of proliferation is growing in scope and complexity. If we fail to act, we will invite nuclear arms races in every region, and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine.

A fragile consensus stands in the way of this frightening outcome, and that is the basic bargain that shapes the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It says that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have a responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them. The next 12 months could be pivotal in determining whether this compact will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.

America intends to keep our end of the bargain. We will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers. We will move forward with ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, and work with others to bring the treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited. We will complete a Nuclear Posture Review that opens the door to deeper cuts and reduces the role of nuclear weapons. And we will call upon countries to begin negotiations in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons.

[...]

Address by Russian President Medvedev to to the UN General Assembly

New York, 24 September 2009. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

Another aspect of my address relates to disarmament.

A highly challenging task is to move forward the process of multilateral disarmament under the auspices of the UN. You

are aware that positive trends have emerged in overcoming the protracted crisis in this area. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has adapted its program of work. I would like to mention the Russian-Chinese initiative to sign a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space as well as our proposal to universalise the Russian-American Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Russia will steadily follow the path of verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons as an essential element of the reset in our relations with the United States. President Obama and I signed a relevant document in Moscow last July. A mandate for further negotiations was agreed upon - to elaborate a legally binding treaty. This treaty should replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires this December.

I would like to emphasise the objective relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. There is another aspect to it relating to the recently announced adjustments in the US plans of antimissile defense system development. As I said to President Obama at our meeting earlier today and as I would like to reiterate now, such decision was, in our view, a constructive step in the right direction, one that deserves a positive response from the international community. Russia is prepared to engage in a thorough discussion of the US proposals and relevant Russia's initiatives regarding cooperation in this area to reach generally acceptable arrangements.

Unless we address problems such as anti-missile defence and the creation of strategic nuclear forces in non-nuclear armament plans, we cannot make any real progress in disarmament. I expect that the work on a new treaty will be fully consistent with relevant provisions of the joint document endorsed by the US President and myself during our meeting in Moscow.

We believe that other nuclear states should join the disarmament efforts of Russia and the United States. It is not necessary for them to wait for further progress in the Russian-American disarmament process. We can already begin to discuss acceptable and practical arrangements that take into account the differences in the size of nuclear potentials. For instance, we can use as an example the decisions of the 1921-1922 Washington Conference on the naval armaments when the participants agreed on the maximum size of their fleets without trying to achieve their equal levels. If we use the same approach today, based on the actual volumes of nuclear arsenals, we will give the rest of the world a necessary signal of certainty that the unaccounted numbers will be added to the "equation" of strategic stability.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference will focus on the issues of nuclear disarmament, the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and peaceful atom. We are looking forward to its success.

The Global Nuclear Security Summit scheduled for next April will provide a good opportunity for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

We have also agreed with the US Administration on joint steps to further progress in such aspects of nuclear security

as prevention of nuclear terrorism, and the expansion of access for all good faith NPT Members to the achievements of peaceful atom.

We call for collective cooperation on these matters.

In order to reach a common understanding on these important issues, we must engage all nations and influential international organisations in the above-mentioned negotiation processes.

The international community has multiple well-tested measures at its disposal for increasing the level of regional and international security, such as nuclear-free zones. In particular, one of our most urgent tasks today is to establish a zone in the Middle East that is free of WMDs and the means to deliver them. This is a long-standing issue. And the 1995 NPT Review Conference had adopted a relevant resolution in this regard.

As a member of the Quartet of international mediators on the Middle East settlement, Russia consistently supports the efforts aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Middle East. Russia has made specific proposals in the framework of the NPT review process to search for generally acceptable ways of implementing the relevant NPT decisions. But in order to progress, all of the region's nations must take an active stance on this issue and demonstrate their willingness to ensure real progress in establishing a nuclear-free zone.

We also need to speed up the work towards a mechanism to ensure peace and security in Northeast Asia. Russia made its proposals in this regard to the participants in the Six-Party Talks. Given the present circumstances this task becomes even more urgent.

Concern number four on our agenda is regional conflicts and regional security.

We intend to continue participating in the search for efficient options for resolving regional conflicts.

We are convinced that the use of force can only aggravate the situation. This was demonstrated by a reckless attempt of the Georgian authorities to resolve the problems in their relations with South Ossetia by military means.

In August 2008, we came very close to seeing a local armed conflict grow into a full-scale war. I am certain that everyone present understands this, and in order to avoid repetition of such developments we need to have clear and effective mechanisms to implement the principle of indivisibility of security. Without it, we will not be able to step over the legacy of the past era, to overcome its instincts and prejudices. Moreover, the irresponsible political regimes should not have any opportunity whatsoever to cause disputes among other countries.

[...]

Russia has come up with the initiative to sign a European security treaty and proposed a fresh look at this problem so as to abandon the outdated policies. The Cold War is over, as we all believe, but the world has not become more secure. Today

we need genuinely modern solutions. We also need clear legal framework for already existing political commitments. We need no declarations, or appeals, or empty talk, but really clear legal frameworks which will, among other points, strengthen one of the principles of the international law, the principle of not ensuring one's own security at the expense of security of others.

Our initiative concerns the Euro-Atlantic space. However, its key provision on indivisibility of security is a universal principle applicable to all regions of the world that is fully consistent with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. The principle of indivisibility of security should become an integral part of international law.

[...]

EU Presidency Statement at the UN General Assembly

New York, 23 September 2009. [Link](#)

[Extract]

To uphold these fundamental values we need security.

We cannot let war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity go unpunished.

Therefore, the work of the International Criminal Court is fully supported by the European Union.

We cannot allow anyone to, by threat or use of force, act against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The rules of international law apply equally to all states, large and small.

The European Union stands ready to continue working with the United Nations in peacekeeping and peace building. We also conduct our own peacekeeping efforts - often in close cooperation with the UN. The transfers of responsibilities in Chad and in Kosovo are examples of this.

Twenty years after the end of the cold war, peace and security is still threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; by the fact that these weapons risk falling into the wrong hands.

We strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and we stand ready to engage in this matter.

We also welcome the Global Nuclear Security Summit which will take place next year.

[...]

*Address by Russian President Medvedev
Ukrainian President Yushchenko
Moscow, 11 August 2009. [Link](#)*

The message from President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev to President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko reads, in part:

“Problems in bilateral cooperation have, of course, existed before. This was natural following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when we had to develop relations between two sovereign states. However, what we have witnessed during the years of your presidency cannot be interpreted as anything other than the Ukrainian party’s departure from the principles of friendship and partnership with Russia, embodied in the Treaty of 1997 [Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine]. I already wrote to you about this in November last year and the situation has not improved, but rather degraded.

Let me cite a few examples that characterise the current state of affairs created by the conscious actions of your administration.

A negative public reaction was caused by Ukraine’s anti-Russian stance in connection with the brutal attack on South Ossetia by Saakashvili’s regime. A year after those tragic events, once again the question of why civilians and Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinval were killed with Ukrainian weapons has arisen. Those in Kiev who supplied the Georgian army with weapons and, by the way, do not intend to stop doing so, fully share with Tbilisi the responsibility for the committed crimes.

Ignoring the views of Ukrainian citizens as well as Russia’s well-known position, the political leadership of Ukraine stubbornly continues to pursue accession to NATO. And as a so-called argument you hint at a “Russian threat” to Ukrainian security, something which, as you are well aware, does not and cannot exist. Unfortunately, the logical continuation of this destructive reasoning is the incessant attempts to complicate the activities of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in violation of the fundamental agreements between our countries governing the parameters of its base in Ukraine.

At the same time, it seems that Kiev has consistently sought to sever existing economic ties with Russia, primarily in the field of energy. These actions threaten the ability of our countries to reliably use what is, in fact, a unified gas transmission system that ensures the energy security of Russia, Ukraine and many European nations.

Despite our repeated appeals at various levels, virtually nothing has been done to stop the violation of property rights of Russian investors in Ukraine. All this has essentially undermined the formerly solid economic foundations of our bilateral partnership.

Russian-Ukrainian relations have been further tested as a result of your administration’s willingness to engage in historical revisionism, its heroization of Nazi collaborators, exaltation of the role played by radical nationalists, and imposition among the international community of a nationalistic interpretation of the mass famine of 1932-1933 in the USSR, calling it the

“genocide of the Ukrainian people”. The ousting of the Russian language from public life, science, education, culture, media and judicial proceedings continues.

In this context, the harmful practices of intervention by the government of Ukraine in the affairs of the Orthodox Church beg attention. The conditions that were created artificially on the eve and during a recent pastoral visit to Ukraine by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia could hardly be described as favourable. Against this background, it is particularly gratifying to see the genuine and broad support for the unity of Orthodoxy demonstrated by Ukrainians who welcomed the Patriarch.

Among the obstacles that authorities accountable to you have devised to hinder the positive development of Russian-Ukrainian relations is the provocation, unprecedented in the entire post-Soviet space, by expelling two of our diplomatic representatives from Ukraine without any justification. This attack – that incidentally, immediately preceded the Patriarch’s visit – conveys the essence of the current Ukrainian authorities’ approach to relations with Russia. Naturally, we could not but retaliate to this unfriendly measure.

I would like to inform you that in view of the anti-Russian position of the current Ukrainian authorities I have decided to postpone sending a new Russian ambassador to Ukraine. Specific dates will be determined later in light of the future development of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

For Russia, from time immemorial Ukrainians have been and remain not just neighbours, but also a fraternal people for whom we will always cherish the very best feelings, with whom we share a common history, culture and religion, ties stemming from close economic cooperation, and strong kinship and human relations.

I am convinced that the leadership of Russia and Ukraine is obliged to cherish these neighbourly feelings, this wealth that is also our common competitive advantage in a globalising world. The challenge of responsible public figures is to resist the temptation to artificially divide our peoples for any geopolitical projects or political machinations, but rather safeguard the friendship between Ukrainians and Russians in every possible way, strengthen the foundations of our cooperation for the mutual benefit and prosperity of our countries. It is unacceptable to subject centuries-old relations to such serious tests for the sake of short-term developments, thereby encouraging younger generations to harbour a mutual grudge by playing with nationalist complexes.

In Russia we hope that the new political leadership of Ukraine will be ready to build relations between our countries that correspond to the genuine aspirations of our peoples and help strengthen European security.”

Letter of Ukrainian President Yushchenko to Russian President Medvedev

Kyiv, 13 August 2009. [Link](#)

Respected Dmitry Anatolyevych,

I have perused your letter of 6 August 2009. Straightforwardly speaking, I am very disappointed with its unfriendly nature.

I agree that there are serious problems in the relations between our countries, but your absolute denial of Russia's responsibility for them surprises me.

Our state has never betrayed the principles of friendship and partnership fixed in the Agreement of 1997, was doing its best to ensure fruitful and mutually beneficial development of bilateral relations. Moreover, in accordance with the abovementioned agreement our countries were to build up relations with each other based on principles of mutual respect and sovereign equality.

Yet, I would like to set aside the emotions and proceed to the objective analysis of the state of bilateral relations.

Ukraine's position on last year's events in Georgia is well known and coincides with positions of almost all other countries of the world. Its core is indisputable respect towards sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Georgia or any other sovereign state.

The accusations of supplies of weapons to Georgia are groundless. It's a shame that despite numerous clear and comprehensible explanations of the legality of its activity at arms market from the Ukrainian side, the Russian side continues the consecutive campaign aimed at shaping image of Ukraine as a state that does not obey international regulations and regimes in the sphere of military technical cooperation. In this regard I would like to remind that Georgia has never been and is still not a subject to any international sanctions or embargo on supplies of arms, military equipment and dual use goods imposed by either the UN Security Council, OSCE, European Union or other international organizations. Moreover, the proposition to impose such restrictions within the framework of the OSCE, made by Russia after the Russian-Georgian conflict, found no support.

Ukraine's NATO integration course may not be subject to Russia's political criticism either. It forces us to again repeat the common truth that the right to choose international means of ensuring one's national security, including the participation in military-political alliances, is an integral part of national sovereignty of any state and Russia has to respect that. I would like to remind you that the Law of Ukraine "On foundations of national security of Ukraine" approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2003 with support from leadership of current opposition provides for integration of Ukraine with NATO up to full-fledged membership. The President of Ukraine follows that.

Also would like to once again emphasize that the desire of our country to gain membership in NATO is in no way aimed against Russia and that final decision on accession of Ukraine to NATO will be made only after a national referendum.

I would like to point out separately that Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine prohibits deployment of foreign states' military bases at the Ukrainian territory. Yet, our state keeps up to its international treaty obligations on the temporary deployment of Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until May 28, 2017 and fully complies with provisions of the relevant basic agreements of 1997. On the other hand I am forced to admit serious problems in compliance of the Russian side with the basic agreements regarding use of land, real estate, radio frequencies, navigation equipment, etc. Throughout the period of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in Ukraine its command has been rudely and systematically violating the bilateral agreements and legislation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian side has been constantly informing the Russian side about that.

Ukraine consistently supports the development of pragmatic economic relations with Russia, especially in energy field. Ukraine has started a program of modernization of its gas transport system to bring it to the highest international standards and is ready to invite the potential of European countries and of other parties to the process. Our country has many times proved in practice its reliability as a partner in the transportation of energy resources: gas, oil and nuclear energy fuel. Ukraine was one of the few countries in the world, which in June this year welcomed the initiative of the Russian Federation to start a multilateral dialogue on improving international legal framework in energy security that in our opinion should be based upon the Energy Charter and other relevant documents.

Your letter also repeats regular and well-known accusations aimed at depriving Ukraine of its view of its own history, our own national interests, foreign policy priorities. I am convinced that such questions as history, along with native language, culture, and family ethics are fundamental principles for development of the state and identification of the Ukrainian nation.

By raising the question of recognition of the Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933 at the international scene the Ukrainian people also pays tribute to millions of Russians, Belarusians, Kazakhs and representatives of other nationalities, who died of starvation in the Volga region, Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan and other parts of former USSR. It is known that during the "Light the candle" campaign dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor in Ukraine burning candles in hundreds of cities worldwide, including in Russia, proved multi-ethnic solidarity with Ukraine in recognition of the fact.

In no way I can agree with the allegation about ousting of Russian language from public life in Ukraine. Elementary impartial evaluations of the language situation in Ukraine and Russia show completely opposite facts. It is in the Russian Federation, where members of Ukrainian minority have virtually no ability to realize the right to fulfill their national and cultural needs. The well-known findings of international organizations prove that.

Responding to concerns about alleged intervention of the Ukrainian government in the affairs of Orthodox Church, I would like to note the following. The Ukrainian leadership respects canons and traditions of churches and religious

organizations. Church in Ukraine is separated from the state; each citizen has the right to profess any religion. However, no one may prohibit the citizens to freely express their position on any issues, including those religious.

Regarding the visit of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Cyril to Ukraine it is worth mentioning that he expressed words of gratitude to the leadership of our nation for the high level of organization of his stay in Ukraine. And of course, the Russian Orthodox Church Prior did not make any negative or critical remarks similar to those contained in your letter and discrediting the very spirit of the visit. Generally speaking, we consider the connections between the visit of Patriarch Cyril and bilateral political relations to be wiredrawn and irrelevant.

Speaking about the forced decision of the Ukrainian side regarding the two diplomatic representatives of Russia, it should be emphasized that before making such a step we have three times officially argued to the Russian side about the wrongful actions of the abovementioned senior diplomats. The Ukrainian party has provided sufficient evidence of their activities in Ukraine, which harmed national interests of Ukraine. On the other hand, the responsive actions of the Russian side against the Ukrainian diplomat were totally unjustified and baseless. I hope that in the future our two countries will manage to avoid recurrence of such unfortunate situations, which cast shadow over bilateral relations.

Summarizing the listed, I would like to express my conviction that solving current problems in Ukrainian-Russian bilateral relations requires intensive work. Therefore the decision to postpone the arrival of the new Russian Ambassador to Ukraine will certainly not contribute to constructive development of our relations.

Ukraine remains a supporter of broad cooperation with the Russian Federation based upon mutual respect and equality, by means of maintaining constructive dialogue, including that at the highest level. At least three times last year I have proved my willingness to engage in dialogue at the negotiating table in my letters to you. Today this call still applies. Unfortunately, in response to that I only received invitations to take part in the race for the prize of the President of Russia or other multilateral arrangements. I hope that this time your response will be constructive.

I believe in good future of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which are based on the deep tradition of friendship and neighborliness between the peoples of our two countries that are stronger than the interests of certain political circles and not influenced by situational conditions of political moment.

Sincerely
Viktor Yushchenko

EU Commission-IFI-Ukraine agreement on reform of the Ukrainian gas sector

Brussels, 31 July 2009. [Link](#)

Joint Statement of Intent regarding Support to Gas Sector Reform in Ukraine and the Purchase of Gas from Russia

Considering Ukraine's intention gradually to integrate into the single energy market of the European Union, in particular via membership of the Energy Community and progress in implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy signed in December 2005, and the EU's readiness to support this;

Considering the undertakings for reform contained in the Joint Declaration agreed at the Joint EU-Ukraine International Investment Conference on the Modernization of Ukraine's Gas Transit System of 23 March 2009 as well as commitments related to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement;

Considering the undertakings made by Ukraine in respect of the International Monetary Fund in the context of the IMF's Standby Loan arrangement with Ukraine;

Given that the European Commission is giving consideration to a large macro-financial assistance programme for Ukraine intended to contribute to covering Ukraine's external financing needs and supporting the authorities' economic stabilization and reform programme, and in particular the reform of the social safety net;

Considering the conclusions of the European Council of 18/19 June 2009 regarding the importance of the security of supply of energy to the European Union, in particular as regards gas transiting from Russia via Ukraine;

Taking into account the agreements reached between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy of 19 January 2009 regarding the supply of gas to Ukraine and transit of Russian gas through Ukraine ;

Conscious of the need to ensure a regular and reliable supply of gas to Ukraine, the European Union and other states in accordance with contractual obligations and commitments under international law;

Recognising that further reforms, based on a broad political consensus, are essential in order to ensure a sustainable, reliable and accountable gas sector in Ukraine operating for the benefit of the Ukrainian public and consumers:

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is ready to consider extending a sovereign-guaranteed loan to Naftogaz which, subject to agreed transition reforms being implemented by Naftogaz and the Government of Ukraine, will provide Naftogaz with working capital for immediate gas storage requirements and longer term finance to support an investment programme for the rehabilitation of the existing gas transit system. Subject to detailed due diligence, funding of up to US\$300 million for immediate working capital and, in 2010, up to US\$450 million for investment could be proposed

for decision to the Board of the EBRD, with no more than US\$450 million to be committed at any one time.

The World Bank will consider providing budget support to the government through a Development Policy Loan (DPL 4) sized preliminary and subject to confirmation up to US\$500 million aimed at supporting cross-sectoral fiscal and structural reforms, including in the gas sector, targeted social assistance for the vulnerable population, and public procurement. The Development Policy Loan (DPL4) will be considered by the management of the World Bank immediately upon the satisfactory completion of all the reform measures agreed with the Government in the matrix of development policy of this operation, and subject to the IMF's SBA being on track.

The European Investment Bank confirms its willingness to consider sovereign guaranteed long-term loans to support and co-finance the rehabilitation and upgrade of the existing gas transit system. The EIB underlines its statutory position regarding financing long-term investments rather than short-term working capital or trade gas. Subject to due diligence, up to \$450 million for long-term investment could be proposed for decision to the Board of the EIB.

The overall package would include technical assistance.

In close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and consistent with the Fund-supported Stand-By arrangement with Ukraine, the European Commission together with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the World Bank ("the International Development Banks") intend, subject to their individual rules, capacities and conditions:

*

To work together in the development of a support package to the Ukrainian authorities designed to assist in developing a sustainable solution to Ukraine's medium-term gas transit and gas payment obligations;

*

To continue to support Ukraine's economic stabilization and reform, including reform of the gas sector and accompanying reform of the social safety net.

In this context, the European Commission and the International Financial Institutions welcome the commitments made by Ukraine in the Prime Minister's letters of 28 July (ref 11271/0/2-09) and 29 July (ref 11271/1/2-09) received by President Barroso. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development would like to recall the particular importance of the commitments of the Ukrainian Government in the context of an eventual release of funds under the ir proposed support programmes.

The European Commission will continue to facilitate discussions between the International Financial Institutions and the Ukrainian authorities regarding this package of support measures concerning reform in the gas sector, including through providing verification of key data.

The European Commission will also facilitate the swift accession process for Ukraine to the Energy Community Treaty.

For their part the International Financial Institutions will continue to develop specific proposals for support with the Ukrainian authorities.

The International Financial Institutions will undertake the necessary due diligence work, recognizing that appropriate confidentiality agreements will need to be signed.

EU Declaration on the appointment of a Moldovan Government

Brussels, 25 September 2009. [Link](#)

The European Union welcomes the appointment of a Government in the Republic of Moldova, following the repeat parliamentary elections on 29 July. The European Union notes with satisfaction all political contributions to the democratic process following the elections and trusts that a climate of responsible cooperation will prevail as political developments proceed.

The appointment of a Government is an essential first step, which will enable Moldova to begin to tackle the critical challenges that it faces, in particular in the context of the world economic and financial crisis, and to move forward with reforms. The European Union stands ready to support Moldova in these efforts and reaffirms its commitment to deepen and strengthen its relations with Moldova, including in the framework of the Eastern Partnership. In particular, the European Union looks forward to starting, as soon as possible, negotiations on a new agreement with Moldova that will replace and go beyond the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In this context, the European Union welcomes the decision to abolish the changes to Moldova's visa policies introduced this April, which ensures equal treatment of all EU citizens.

The European Union reiterates its call on all political actors to engage in a constructive political dialogue in order to conclude the post-electoral political process, in particular through the election of a new President.

Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia

EU Council Press release.

Brussels, 30 September 2009. [Link](#)

Today, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFMCG), presented the results of the investigation conducted by the IIFMCG to representatives of Georgia, the Russian Federation, the European Union, the United Nations and the OSCE.

The European Union wishes to express its appreciation to Ambassador Tagliavini, and to the entire staff of the IIFMCG, for the work accomplished under complex and challenging circumstances. The EU welcomes the presentation of this report and takes note of its content. Underlining the independent nature of the report, the EU hopes that its findings can contribute towards a better understanding of the origins and the course of last year's conflict and, in a broader perspective, serve as an input to future international efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy.

The EU also recalls that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflicts in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as recognised by international law, including the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Related Document:

Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.

[Access here.](#)

EU Declaration on Russian Prime Minister Putin's visit to the Georgian Region of Abkhazia

Brussels, 13 August 2009. [Link](#)

The European Union notes with concern that the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has paid a visit to the Georgian region of Abkhazia, without prior consent of the Georgian authorities.

The EU does not consider this visit compatible with the principle of territorial integrity nor helpful for the international efforts to stabilise the region.

The EU reiterates its support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Press Release by the Swiss Fed. Dept. of Foreign Affairs, the Armenian MFA and the Turkish MFA

Berne, Yerevan, Ankara, 31 August 2009. [Link](#)

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey have agreed to start their internal political consultations on the two protocols – the "Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations" and the "Protocol on the development of bilateral relations" – which have been initiated in the course of their efforts under Swiss mediation.

The two Protocols provide for a framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations within a reasonable timeframe. The political consultations will be completed within six weeks, following which the two Protocols will be signed and submitted to the respective Parliaments for the ratification on each side. Both sides will make their best efforts for the timely progression of the ratification in line with their constitutional and legal procedures.

The normalization of bilateral relations will contribute to the regional peace and stability. The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey are committed their joint efforts with the assistance of Switzerland.

Related Document:

Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Armenia and Turkey.

[Access here.](#)

EU Presidency Statement on the joint statement by Turkey and Armenia

Brussels, 1 September 2009. [Link](#)

The Presidency of the European Union welcomes the agreement between Armenia and Turkey to further the process of normalisation of relations between the two countries.

The normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey would be an important contribution to the stability of the South Caucasus and the wider region.

Second Report of the Independent Commission on TurkeySeptember 2009. [Download here](#)

Is Turkey's EU accession process grinding to a halt? Did open opposition to Turkish membership by some European leaders cause the slow-down of Turkey's reform process in recent years, or was it the Ankara government's lack of resolve? Is there a danger of "creeping Islamisation" in Turkish society? What are the chances for solving the Kurdish question, the Cyprus problem and the differences with Armenia? Can Turkey's important new geo-political role in the region be an asset for the European Union? These and other questions are answered in this report of the Independent Commission on Turkey.

The Independent Commission was established by prominent European politicians for the purpose of analysing some of the most pressing aspects of Turkey's accession to the EU. Its first report *Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?* was issued in September 2004.

Members:

Martti Ahtisaari (Chairman)
Former President of Finland
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008

Kurt Biedenkopf
Former Prime Minister of Saxony, Germany

Emma Bonino
Former European Commissioner
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Hans van den Broek
Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
Former European Commissioner

Bronislaw Geremek († 13 July 2008)
Former Foreign Minister of Poland

Anthony Giddens
Former Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science

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Former Foreign Minister of Spain
Former Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Former European Commissioner

Michel Rocard
Former Prime Minister of France

Albert Rohan (Rapporteur)
Former Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Austria

Transatlantic Trends 2009German Marshall Fund
Washington D.C., 9 September 2009. [Download here](#)

Transatlantic Trends 2009 — a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana (Portugal), the Fundación BBVA (Spain), and the Tipping Point Foundation (Bulgaria) — measures broad public opinion in the United States and 12 European countries and gauges transatlantic relations through interviews with more than 13,000 people. For the eighth consecutive year, participants were asked their views on each other and on global threats, foreign policy objectives, world leadership, and multilateral institutions.

Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and RussiaMathias Roth
CEPS Working Document, No. 319, 21 August 2009.
[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

A series of incidents including the Polish agricultural row, the Estonian monument crisis, the Lufthansa Cargo dispute and the Litvinenko affair, have suggested that bilateral disputes between EU member states and Russia have begun to dominate overall EU–Russian relations. This paper employs a case-study approach to provide an in-depth analysis of selected disputes and reviews several questions of importance for EU coherence: What kinds of issues are at the heart of bilateral disputes? What strategies do member states adopt to resolve them? Under what circumstances are disputes raised to the EU level and what measures does the EU take? These questions are examined along with those surrounding EU solidarity in the midst of bilateral frictions. Drawing insights from the case studies, the paper concludes with a set of guidelines for the EU's approach.

Related Websites:

ENPI Info Centre
www.enpi-info.eu
"Your Gateway to the EU Neighbourhood Partnership"

Global Europe
www.globeurope.com
"Monitoring the European Union's Foreign Relations"

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