

## *Dignity, Democracies and Dynasties*

In 2009 CEPS published a book about democracy in the European neighbourhood with the sub-title 'Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties'. Although the geographic fit was not perfect, broadly speaking the East Europeans were struggling with their democratic transitions while the Arab world and Central Asia were seeing the consolidation or even proliferation of dynasties. These dynasties could be graded in several categories: the formal royal monarchies (Jordan, Morocco, Arabian Gulf), the father-to-son successions (Azerbaijan, Syria), the presidents whose sons were being groomed for succession (Egypt, Libya), the presidents without effective term limits (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and now soon Kazakhstan), and finally the case where the spirit if not the letter of the constitution was abused to a similar end (the Putin-Medvedev tango in Russia).

Tunisia and now Egypt now disrupt this pattern. Dynasty is discredited. Ben Ali and his wife are out. Mubarak may not yet be out, but his son as successor is surely so. A new word is introduced in the Arab street, 'dignity', preferred it seems to - or at least accompanying - democracy. For democracy has all too often become a debased currency, and it is very Western. Dignity is the Arab choice, but we all want our democracies to be dignified, and we can think of some in Europe that are not. At least the time may now have come at last when the whole of Europe and its wider European neighbourhood can openly discuss democracy, and indeed dignified democracy, on the same terms. Gone now, hopefully, is the time when officials of the EU and its member states were not allowed to pronounce the word democracy in the Southern neighbourhood, but instead had to speak through euphemisms about good governance.

Tunisia has now joined the club of colour revolutions, and maybe Egypt is about to join them (at the time of writing today, 31st January 2011, it is not yet clear). However, what we do know are some sobering lessons learned from the colour revolutions of the mid-2000s. Ukraine's Orange revolution became a sad spectacle. Its foundations in a vibrant civil society were real. It foundered on irreconcilable competition and disagreement between its two leaders, Yushchenko and Timoshenko, and on their refusal to do anything about endemic corruption. It is replaced now by a regime that reverts towards authoritarianism and seems even more corrupt if that is possible. Georgia's Rose revolution saw its champion Saakashvili push through economic reform and an impressive de-corruption policy, although he

has hardly been a model democrat. Kyrgyzstan's Tulip revolution saw one corrupt autocratic clan replaced by another one, until last year when Rosa Otunbayeva has struggled to do better. To say the very least, these colour revolutions did not switch into instant democracy.

The new member states of the European Union may have done better in their revolutions that threw out communism in 1989-91. The combinations of the EU anchor and a certain pre-communist democratic history surely explain this. However in South-East Europe the democratic model has been often deeply flawed by state capture, namely the ability of democratically elected leaderships to appropriate for their parties or cronies large shares of the state's economic assets. Somehow the electoral processes could not stop this, with democracy degenerating into switches between different leadership groups, each manipulating the rent from state assets. This manipulation of state assets to reward and preserve ruling elites is rife too in the Arab world. But only in the oil rich states could this extend to rewarding the entire population. For the others, including Tunisia and Egypt, the rewards could not go that far. However the new leaderships of Tunisia and Egypt will surely still be subject to these same temptations, which mean dysfunctional or perverted democracy.

How far-reaching will the discrediting of dynasties be? The royal monarchies seem not to be threatened. But they need to think about making their monarchies more credibly constitutional. If in 2012 Putin becomes President of Russia again, and his dynastic tango with Medvedev goes on, this will be without dignity.

The street revolutions are exhilarating and inspiring. But next comes the long haul of struggling democratic transitions. The more or less failed colour revolutions showed that successful democracy has to rely upon a deep institutional structure, political culture and civil society, rather than instant results from fresh, free and fair elections. In Western Europe this took centuries to develop. Let us not exaggerate. History has surely been accelerating, and the time scale may be that of a generation or two.

*by Michael Emerson*

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**EU Council conclusions on Egypt**  
Brussels, 31 January 2011. [Link](#)

1. The Council recognizes the legitimate democratic aspirations and grievances of the Egyptian population. These should be listened to carefully and addressed through urgent, concrete and decisive measures.
2. The Council deeply regrets the considerable loss of life during demonstrations in Egypt over the last few days. It also notes with deep concern the high number of people injured and arrested as well as the use of violence. The Council calls on all parties to show restraint and avoid further violence. It urges the Egyptian authorities to immediately release all peaceful demonstrators who have been detained. The Council also calls upon the Egyptian authorities to restore all communication networks without delay and to guarantee unhindered access to all media, including the Internet.
3. The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to respect and protect human rights including freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. It urges them to take appropriate measures to assure the security of all citizens and their property and to protect the cultural heritage. It calls for an immediate end to looting.
4. The Council urges the authorities to seek a peaceful and constructive way forward based on a serious and open dialogue with all political forces ready to abide by democratic norms and with civil society.
5. The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to embark on an orderly transition through a broadbased government leading to a genuine process of substantial democratic reform with full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, paving the way for free and fair elections.
6. The Council reiterates its support for a democratic, pluralist and stable Egypt as a key partner of the EU, mindful of its important regional role, and sharing the goal of building stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East region. The EU is committed to accompanying, through a partnership, the Egyptian transformation process by mobilising, reviewing and adapting existing instruments to support political, economic and social reforms. The EU stands ready to assist the Egyptian people in this transformation process, taking into account future developments.

**Joint UK-France-Germany statement on Egypt**  
London-Paris-Berlin, 29 January 2011. [Link](#)

We are deeply concerned about the events that we are witnessing in Egypt. We recognise the moderating role President Mubarak has played over many years in the Middle East. We now urge him to show the same moderation in addressing the current situation in Egypt.

We call on President Mubarak to avoid at all costs the use of violence against unarmed civilians, and on the demonstrators to exercise their rights peacefully.

It is essential that the further political, economic and social reforms President Mubarak has promised are implemented fully and quickly and meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people.

There must be full respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, including freedom of expression and communication, including use of telephones and the internet, and the right of peaceful assembly.

The Egyptian people have legitimate grievances and a longing for a just and better future. We urge President Mubarak to embark on a process of transformation which should be reflected in a broad-based government and in free and fair elections.

### *US Secretary of State Clinton on Egypt*

Interview With Chris Wallace of Fox News Sunday  
Washington D.C., 30 January 2011. [Link](#)

QUESTION: Joining us now from the State Department, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Secretary, President Obama on Friday called on Mubarak to recognize the rights of the Egyptian people. Are you satisfied with the steps that Mubarak has taken so far?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, I don't think anyone is satisfied, least of all the Egyptian the people, who have legitimate grievances and are seeking greater political freedom, a real path to democracy, and economic opportunity. And for 30 years, the United States, through Republican and Democratic administrations, has been urging the Mubarak government to take certain steps. In fact, we've been urging that a vice president be appointed for decades, and that finally has happened.

But there's a long way to go, Chris, and our hope is that we do not see violence; we see a dialogue opening that reflects the full diversity of Egyptian civil society, that has the concrete steps for democratic and economic reform that President Mubarak himself said that he was going to pursue, and that we see the respect for human rights for Egyptian people and the kind of progress that will lead to a much more open, political, and economic set of opportunities for the Egyptian people.

QUESTION: Secretary, all of your answer has been couched in terms of President Mubarak. Does that mean that the Obama Administration still backs Mubarak as the legitimate president of Egypt?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we have been very clear that we want to see a transition to democracy, and we want to see the kind of steps taken that will bring that about. We also want to see an orderly transition. Right now, from everything we know, the army has taken up positions. They are responding very positively thus far to the peaceful protests. But at the same time, we have a lot of reports of looting and criminal activity that is not going to be particularly helpful to what we want to see happen, and that has to be dealt with.

So there are many, many steps along the journey that has been started by the Egyptian people themselves, and we wish to support that.

QUESTION: Secretary, you talk about an orderly transition. How concerned are you that if Mubarak were to be suddenly thrown from power that Islamic radicals could fill the void?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Chris, we want to see an orderly transition so that no one fills a void, that there not be a void – that there be a well thought out plan that will bring about a democratic, participatory government. And I also believe strongly that this is in Egypt's long-term interests, it's in the interests of the partnership that the United States has with Egypt. So that is what we are attempting to promote and support, because clearly, what we don't want is chaos. I don't think the Egyptian people want that. They want their grievances to be addressed. We also don't want to see some takeover that would lead not to democracy, but to oppression and the end of the aspirations of the Egyptian people.

So this is an intensely complex situation. It does not lend itself to quick yes-or-no, easy answers, but instead, I think the path that President Obama has charted, that we are pursuing, that calls for no violence, that supports the aspirations and human rights of the Egyptian people, that stands behind concrete steps toward democratic and economic reform is the right path for all of us to be on.

QUESTION: Secretary, on Tuesday, after the protests had already started in Cairo, you said this:

SECRETARY CLINTON: Our assessment is that the Egyptian Government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.

QUESTION: A number of protestors in the streets said based on that remark and other actions that the U.S. was acting on the side of the regime, not of the protestors. Was that statement by you a mistake?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Chris, we recognize the volatility of the situation, and we are trying to do exactly what I have just said – to promote orderly transition and change that will respond to the legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people, which is what the protests are all about. I don't think anyone wants to see instability, chaos, increasing violence. That is not in anyone's interest.

So what President Obama and I have been doing is sending a very clear message about where the United States stands. We want to see an orderly transition to a democratic government, to economic reforms – exactly what the protestors are seeking. At the same time, we want to recognize Egypt has been our partner. They've been our partner in a peace process that has kept the region from war for over 30 years, which has saved a lot of lives – Egyptian lives, Israeli lives, other lives.

We want to continue to make it absolutely a American priority that – what we've been saying for 30 years – is that real stability rests in democracy, participation, economic opportunity. How we get from where we are to where we know the Egyptian people want to be and deserve to be is what this is about now. So we are urging the Mubarak government, which is still in power; we are urging the military, which is a very respected institution in Egypt, to do what is necessary to facilitate that kind of orderly transition.

**Related Document:**  
US President Obama on the Situation in Egypt: "All Governments Must Maintain Power through Consent, Not Coercion". [Access here.](#)

**Israeli PM Netanyahu on Egypt**  
Tel Aviv, 30 January 2011. [Link](#)

We are anxiously monitoring what is happening in Egypt and [elsewhere] in our region. Last night, I spoke with US President Barack Obama and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. I also held consultations with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman and with Israeli intelligence officials.

Our efforts are designed to continue and maintain stability and security in our region. I remind you that the peace between Israel and Egypt has endured for over three decades and our goal is to ensure that these relations continue. Of course, at this time, we must show maximum responsibility, restraint and sagacity and, to this end, I have instructed my fellow ministers to refrain from commenting on this issue. Naturally, we are also holding consultations in the appropriate government forums.

**Related Document:**  
Interview with Syrian President Assad. [Access here.](#)

**EU Council conclusions on Tunisia**  
Brussels, 31 January 2011. [Link](#)

1. The Council pays tribute to the courage and determination of the Tunisian people and their peaceful struggle to assert their rights and democratic aspirations. It regrets the violence, repression and loss of life during the recent disturbances. It reaffirms its total solidarity and its support for Tunisia and Tunisians in their efforts to put in place a stable democracy, the rule of law and democratic pluralism with full regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Today, thanks to the process of democratic transition, the partnership between Tunisia and the European Union is set to be strengthened to lend support to the affirmation of democracy and to economic and social reform.
3. The Council welcomes the commitments given by the transitional government and urges it to proceed with implementation of measures for the release of political prisoners, the legalisation of democratic political parties and associations and the widening of the role of civil society and the media, which are the first necessary steps towards democratisation and stabilisation of the country.
4. The Council welcomes the decision to hold democratic, free and transparent presidential and legislative elections as soon as possible. The European Union is ready, at Tunisia's request, to lend its political support and its legal, technical and material assistance in preparing and organising the electoral process, inter alia by sending a preparatory mission and by observing the elections.

5. In the context of greater regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Council also welcomes the creation of the High Commission for Political Reform and the national commissions set up to investigate the violence which took place during the demonstrations, as well as corruption. It stresses the importance of the integrity and independence of these commissions and is ready to offer them its assistance if required.
6. In consultation with the Tunisian authorities, the Council has adopted restrictive measures against individuals responsible for misappropriation of State funds.
7. The European Union is also ready to mobilise every instrument at its disposal to help ease the passage of political, economic and social reform in Tunisia, to strengthen its democratic institutions and to give greater support to civil society in the country. At the same time, the European Union intends, under the European neighbourhood policy, to update its strategy and assistance for Tunisia to reflect the new context and the aspirations of the Tunisian people, inter alia by bringing the talks on advanced status to a conclusion with the government that emerges from the forthcoming democratic elections, since such status constitutes a fundamental instrument for fully enhancing political, socio-economic and sectoral cooperation between the EU and Tunisia.

**Related Documents:**  
Tunisian PM Statement: "Guaranteeing democratic transition and economic relaunch" (in French). [Access here.](#)  
EEAS senior officials' mission to Tunisia. [Access here.](#)  
EU Statement on Tunisia - 10 January 2011. [Access here.](#)  
EU Statement on Tunisia - 14 January 2011. [Access here.](#)  
EU Statement on Tunisia - 17 January 2011. [Access here.](#)  
EU Statement on Tunisia - 28 January 2011. [Access here.](#)  
EP calls for independent inquiry into riots. [Access here.](#)

**Lebanon President Sleiman address to the Diplomatic Corps**  
Beirut, 17 January 2011. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

However, the end of the year 2010 witnessed a blockage of the state institutions' work, particularly that of the Council of Ministers and unfortunately the National Dialogue Committee.

That is mainly due to circumstantial and structural considerations, among which figures the controversy surrounding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon pertaining to politicization and credibility, as well as what naturally occurs within consensual systems governing States characterized by pluralism. All this has led to the Cabinet's resignation and to launching parliamentary consultations to form a new cabinet, in accordance with the democratic process and the Constitution's provisions and spirit.

The Tripartite Baabda Summit and its final declaration dated July 30, 2010, consecrated an approach to ensuring our country's stability and to preventing falling into the trap of



strife that hangs over Lebanon under various forms and aspects. It has thus called to addressing problems through dialogue and resorting, at all circumstances, to the legitimate all-encompassing institutions regulating political activity.

In my recent speech on the Independence Day, I have stated that while we would like to underline our appreciation for the Arab brethren for supporting Lebanon and its civil peace and the potentials of reaping benefits from their good offices, the primary and most important responsibility falls upon our shoulders as Lebanese to bring about the appropriate solutions and adhere to them, and that through resorting to institutions and adopting the approach of a sincere and creative dialogue. We still have the opportunity, despite the current polarizations, to demonstrate our ability to manage our own affairs and take bold and wise choices that would lead us once again to the paths of stability, justice, growth, and economic and social development.

Indeed, we have always considered that the Lebanese system which allows various confessional communities to actively take part in power, and not simply coexist, represents a unique model and a challenge we ought to meet in the face of extremism which incites to violence and terrorism and rejects the Other's opinion. It is a model that contradicts states and societies that seek to perpetuate racism, dictatorship, or isolation such as closed rule systems. Meanwhile, we are fully aware of the necessity to pursue efforts aiming at promoting citizenry as a noble goal and at combating confessionalism and fanaticism, but not at the detriment of the system allowing confessional communities to participate in power that Lebanon adopted and agreed on in 1943 until concord was reached on the principle of equal power sharing. Most importantly, we are to respect Article J of the Constitution's Preamble which stipulates, "There is no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of communal coexistence'".

Your Excellencies,  
The States' stability relies mainly on the nature of the political system they choose and their ability to achieve the pillars of independence, social justice, as well as that of bolstering their national capabilities in the face of any external designs or aggressions.

Therefore, in addition to our efforts to overcome obstacles and reach rational and reasonable solutions for the difficulties that emerge in our political life and intercept our national course, we will, in parallel, pursue efforts, within the framework of our national constants and commitments, aiming at reinforcing our national unity and defending our sovereignty and natural resources, including our oil and gas fields across our coasts. We will also strive to impose the implementation of UNSC resolution 1701 in all its provisions in collaboration with the UNIFIL Forces, the role of which we strongly appreciate, to face the threat of terrorism and spying networks through which Israel tries to sow seeds of strife in Lebanon in addition to its violations of the telecommunication networks. Furthermore, we will persevere in reinforcing our national deterrent forces and work towards liberating or retrieving all our occupied territories through all legitimate and available means, including our legitimate right to resist occupation.

It is also necessary to work on completing the implementation of the Taif Accord, drafting a new law for the Lebanese nationality and parliamentary elections, examining further the draft law of administrative decentralization, devising suitable plans to develop the productive and services sectors, and clarifying how to address issues pertaining to constitutional ambiguities and distribution of responsibilities in order to ensure the proper functioning of institutions.

As for the situation in the Middle East, the year 2010 ended with a great disappointment as to the possibility of making significant progress in the peace process because of the intransigence of the Israeli Government of and its rejection of the Arab Peace Initiative and of any other initiative aimed at restoring rights to their rightful owners and finding a just and comprehensive solution to all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We cannot forget to mention Israel's continued occupation of territories, its siege on Gaza, its Judaization of Jerusalem, its construction of settlements and its rejection of the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees while seeking to permanently settle them in Arab host countries, which is what Lebanon totally and legitimately rejects.

Additionally, during the past weeks, terrorists heinously desecrated places of worship and claimed the blood of innocent peaceful civilians targeting the tolerance and coexistence spirit which has characterized the Arab region for centuries. This calls for further efforts to promote and protect religious freedom and to consolidate a culture of dialogue and peace that cannot be separated from that of political and social justice.

#### *EUHR Ashton on Lebanon*

Brussels, 25 January 2011. [Link](#)

President Sleiman has tasked Mr. Najib Mikati to form a new government in Lebanon. I trust that the formation of the government will take place in full compliance with the constitution. The Prime Minister designate should seek the broadest possible consensus in forming his government, which is in the interest of the Lebanese people. I expect that the new government will continue to respect Lebanon's international obligations. I am concerned about the violent protests which have erupted and call on all parties to show restraint. All parties should cooperate in a spirit of dialogue. I want to assure the Lebanese population that the EU will continue to support a sovereign, independent, democratic and stable Lebanon.

## EU Council conclusions on Belarus

Brussels, 31 January 2011. [Link](#)

1. Recalling its previous conclusions on Belarus and in particular its Conclusions of October 2010 and the Statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton on 20 December, as well as other EU statements regarding the Presidential elections of 19 December 2010 and its violent aftermath, the Council deeply regrets that, according to OSCE/ODIHR, the Presidential elections demonstrated that Belarus still has a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments. In particular the electoral process deteriorated significantly during the vote count, undermining the steps taken to improve the conduct of the elections.

2. The Council particularly deplores that the election night was marred by violence by the Belarusian authorities. It strongly condemns the arrest of many presidential candidates, hundreds of activists, journalists and civil society representatives, as well as the ensuing detention and harassment of the opposition, independent media and civil society on political grounds.

3. The Council reiterates its demands for the immediate release of those detained on political grounds following the elections on 19 December, and their rehabilitation. The Council urges Belarus to respect the rights of detainees and their families, paying particular attention to detainees' children, and the right to legal representation. Furthermore, it underlines the need to ensure the access of family members to the detainees. The Council calls on the Belarusian authorities to end the persecution of democratic forces, independent media and representatives of civil society, and students, and to end any penalisation or discrimination against those exercising their right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, including the leaders of the opposition parties.

4. The EU regrets the decision of the Belarusian authorities not to renew the mandate of the OSCE Office in Minsk. The EU strongly believes that the mandate of the OSCE Office has not yet been fulfilled and calls for an urgent reversal of this decision by the Belarusian authorities.

5. In view of these recent events and developments, the Council has decided to impose travel restrictions and an asset freeze against persons responsible for the fraudulent Presidential elections of 19 December 2010 and the subsequent violent crackdown on democratic opposition, civil society and representatives of independent mass media. The Council has also decided to reinstate the travel restrictions imposed on certain persons in Belarus in relation to the elections in 2004 and 2006 and the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition, which had been suspended since 13 October 2008 in order to encourage progress. These restrictive measures and the list of persons targeted will be kept open and under constant review. The Council underlines that the release and rehabilitation of all people detained on political grounds would be an essential element in this regard. This, along with progress towards further reforms of the Electoral Code, the freedom of expression and of the media, the freedom of assembly and association, would pave the way for the lifting of the restrictive measures.

6. The European Union remains strongly committed to strengthening its engagement with the Belarusian people and civil society. The EU is therefore working on measures to provide urgent support to those repressed and detained on

political grounds and their families, as well as support to civil society. It will also review its assistance to Belarus which is aimed at addressing the needs of the population, in order to further strengthen support to civil society, targeting in particular NGOs and students, including through the International Donors' Conference in Warsaw on 2 February.

7. The Council recalls the importance it attaches to facilitating people-to-people contacts with Belarus to the benefit of the Belarusian population at large. It looks forward to the start of negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Belarus, once the negotiating directives have been adopted. Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the EU will encourage the optimal use of the existing flexibilities offered by the Visa Code, in particular the possibilities for Member States to waive and reduce visa fees for certain categories of citizens.

8. The EU remains committed to its policy of critical engagement, including through dialogue and the Eastern Partnership, and recalls that the EU has consistently offered to deepen its relationship with Belarus. The Council reiterates that such a deepening is conditional on progress towards respect by the Belarusian authorities for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Union remains open to developing bilateral relations with Belarus, provided the Belarusian authorities prove their willingness to respect these principles. The Council will regularly re-examine the situation in Belarus and stands ready to consider further targeted measures in all areas of cooperation as appropriate.

## Lithuania pleads for facilitated visa regime for Belarusian citizens

Vilnius, 10 January 2010. [Link](#)

President of the Republic of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė wrote a letter to President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, urging them to look for ways to facilitate travelling and visa regime within the Schengen area for Belarusians irrespective of any sanctions that might be imposed by the EU on the Belarusian administration.

According to President Grybauskaitė, it is very important that the conditions of their travelling to the EU should be no less favorable than those of the citizens of other eastern neighbors and that the visa fee they pay should be no more expensive.

The elections held in December of 2010 and the subsequent events in Belarus have demonstrated that the situation of human rights and democratic values in Belarus - an OSCE participating state and EU neighboring country - is among the most urgent issues of today. The European Union has been promoting the democratization of Belarus through different measures of cooperation and impact. Some of them, regrettably, have failed and encouraged the isolation of its citizens. Therefore, we need to search for new forms of cooperation with this country, the President writes in the letter to the EU leaders.

The President also underlines that the liberalization of Belarus may only be ensured by facilitating the travel of the majority of the citizens of Belarus and by easing their contacts with EU citizens.

The President suggests discussing these issues at the forthcoming meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council.

### *Belarus on Polish initiative to issue free national visas*

Minsk, January 2011. [Link](#)

I would like to note in the first place that the Polish decision concerns only the national visas issued for over 90 days within six months.

Such visas are issued to a limited group of citizens who are able to confirm additionally the valid reason for their lengthy stay in Poland. Therefore, not each and every Belarusian citizen may make use of the opening opportunity.

As a matter of fact, we welcome this decision. The Belarusian side has always advocated the simplification or complete cancellation of visa formalities. We believe Poland's decision is a step in the right direction.

We are confident that open direct contacts between citizens of our countries will be instrumental to a better mutual understanding and prompt the development of co-operation between our countries.

We are also certain that those processes will help our partners better understand political and social processes unfolding in Belarus and develop more adequate and rational approaches to bilateral co-operation.

We trust that Poland's example will contribute to the launch of negotiations between Belarus and the European Commission to simplify the issuance of Schengen visas which our country has initiated for years now.

### *Belarus on Polish ban on Belarus officials entry*

Minsk, January 2011. [Link](#)

With deep regret, we have learned about Poland's move to introduce visa restrictions. That is an opportunistic and rash decision which is evidence of Poland's choice to take the confrontational track.

The punitive mentality makes dividing lines deeper and ruins trust.

The past decades' experience has made it conspicuous how futile this track is.

The decision of the Polish authorities leaves no choice to us. The Republic of Belarus will be forced to reciprocate adequately.

However, we are still confident that we and our European partners are in a position to drop confrontational scenarios and return to substantive and practical interaction in the interests of all parties.

The Belarusian side stands for equal and open dialogue on all issues of mutual interest. We are certain that only such an approach will lay a basis to obtaining mutual understanding.

### *Belarus on planned EU sanctions or restrictions*

Minsk, January 2011. [Link](#)

We observe that a number of our European partners have a warped picture of the real political and social situation in Belarus.

This prompts them to make decisions detrimental to normal co-operation and those values towards which they say they are committed.

That is a counter-productive stance which proved to bear no fruit in the past decade.

On our part, we assert there's a need to make a sober assessment of the situation and continue a constructive dialogue at all levels. Only this approach meets the interests of the united Europe and strengthens pan-European values.

### *European Commission President Barroso statement in Azerbaijan*

Baku, 13 January 2011. [Link](#)

[Extract]

I am very pleased to be in Baku today. I had an excellent meeting with President Aliyev. We covered the full range of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, which are growing in importance and depth by the day.

The European Union supports the reforms efforts undertaken under the leadership of President Aliyev. The President stressed to me today that he sees the EU values enshrined in the Eastern Partnership as an inspiration for the development of his country.

This includes the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights as well as the principles of a market economy, sustainable development and good governance.

A key tool for the implementation of our bilateral partnership is the new Association Agreement.

The talks on this Agreement were launched half a year ago and are progressing well. The purpose is to deepen our strategic links and bring Azerbaijan closer to the EU's market of half a billion people.

I am also pleased to announce that we will start negotiations on a Visa Facilitation Agreement in the near future. This will make it easier for the Azerbaijani people to travel to the EU.

The EU is deeply committed to helping Azerbaijan's political and economic reforms. A more efficient administration and

a more performing economy are in the interest of us all. We are also actively contributing to that through financial cooperation.

Europe's overall aid package for the next three years is worth EUR 122.5 million. Today, we agreed to earmark EUR 19 million under the Comprehensive Institution Building Program.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A driving force of our bilateral relations is the well-established energy cooperation. Azerbaijan is a strategic partner and ally in this field. We appreciate the key role it plays as a producer and transit country.

Azerbaijan was a pioneer in energy diversification when back in the nineties it decided to initiate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Now it is time to turn to gas.

We made great progress in this area today. We signed a Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor, through which the EU will directly receive Azerbaijani gas.

Realizing this corridor is in our shared strategic interest. It is vital for the security and diversification of our energy supply and demand. Azerbaijan wants to diversify its exports as much as the EU wants to diversify its imports. The Southern Corridor will give Azerbaijan reliable, physical access to the EU energy market – which is the world's largest. It therefore provides a long-term perspective for its development.

In the same vein, we look forward to a swift allocation process for the Shah Deniz II gas field. I hope this will enable us to announce the Azeri-EU deal of the 21st century.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We also discussed regional and international issues. I expressed my appreciation for Azerbaijan's role on the global stage, including its support for peace in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

Looking at the immediate region, I shared my concerns on the lack of progress in Nagorno-Karabakh. I expressed my deep sympathy to the families and communities who suffer from it. It is high time for all parties to make further efforts for a swift peaceful solution. The work of the OSCE Minsk Group must therefore continue. The EU fully backs its efforts.

The EU stands ready to provide further support if agreed by all parties: political support to the peace process and reconstruction assistance once a settlement has been agreed.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As you see from this fruitful cooperation and from the agreements signed today, the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU is strong and flourishing. But we can and must do more to tap its full potential, especially in the field of energy.

#### Related Document:

EU-Azerbaijan Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor. [Access here.](#)

#### *EU concludes visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Georgia*

Brussels, 18 January 2011. [Link](#)

The Council of the EU concluded today two agreements with Georgia: one on visa facilitation and one on readmission. Both agreements will enter into force on 1 March 2011.

#### Visa facilitation agreement

The visa facilitation agreement makes it easier and cheaper for Georgian citizens, in particular those who travel most, to acquire short stay visas for travels to and throughout the EU. A short stay visa is a visa for an intended stay of no more than 90 days per period of 180 days. EU citizens are already exempt from the visa obligation when travelling to or transiting through Georgia since 1 June 2006.

The agreement substantially simplifies the necessary supporting documents for a visa application for certain categories of persons, e.g. close relatives who are visiting Georgian citizens residing in the EU, businessmen, scientists, students and journalists. For some categories of frequent travelers and under certain conditions, member states are supposed to issue multi-entry visas with long periods of validity. Holders of diplomatic passports are exempted from the visa obligation.

As a general rule, the agreement stipulates that a decision upon the request to issue a visa must be taken within 10 calendar days. The agreement also reduces the visa handling fee from EUR 60 to EUR 35 for all Georgian citizens and provide a total exemption from the visa fee for certain categories of applicants, e.g. close relatives who are visiting Georgian citizens residing in the EU, pensioners, children below the age of 12, disabled persons, scientists, students and journalists.

On 28 November 2008, the Council gave the European Commission the mandate to start the negotiations of the visa facilitation agreement with Georgia. They were concluded in the first half of 2010 and the agreement was signed in June 2010. The European Parliament gave its consent in December 2010.

It must be noted that the United Kingdom and Ireland are not taking part in the agreement.

#### Readmission agreement

Visa facilitation agreements go usually hand-in-hand with readmission agreements between the EU and third countries. Readmission agreements set out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of EU member states and the third countries concerned as to when and how to take back people who are illegally residing on the territories of the parties. They cover not only the illegally staying nationals of both parties but also third country nationals and stateless persons being in an irregular situation provided they have



a clear link with the requested party (e.g. visa or resident permit).

The agreement also includes a number of other procedural rules, such as the time-limits for the readmission applications, the modalities for the transfer of the returnees, the cost of the transfer and the protection of personal data of the returnees.

A Joint Readmission Committee is established so as to monitor the application of the agreement and decide on certain technical arrangements.

Full respect of Human Rights as provided by the European Convention of Human Rights is guaranteed during the application of readmission agreements.

On 28 November 2008, the Council gave the European Commission the mandate to start the negotiations of the readmission agreement with Georgia. They were concluded in the second half of 2010 and the agreement was signed in November 2010. The European Parliament gave its consent in December 2010.

It must be noted that Ireland and Denmark are not taking part in the agreement.

Visa facilitation and readmission agreements with other third countries

So far, the EU has signed visa facilitation and readmission agreements with eight countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.

A readmission agreement also exists with Pakistan, Hong-Kong, Macao and Sri Lanka. Besides that, negotiations are ongoing with Cape Verde (on visa facilitation and readmission), Turkey (readmission) and Morocco (readmission).

*EU Commissioner Füle on the Kacin Report and the European integration process of Serbia*  
European Parliament, plenary session  
Strasbourg, 18 January 2011. [Link](#)

[Extract]

The Stabilisation and Association Agreement sets up a comprehensive institutional framework, through the SAA Council and SAA Committee, a renewed framework for political dialogue and a web of subcommittees covering extensively most EU policy areas. And, naturally, it also establishes a specific body between your Assembly and the Serbian parliament, the Joint Parliamentary Committee.

From an economic standpoint, the SAA foresees the gradual establishment of a free trade zone and the gradual integration of Serbia into the EU's internal market, thus bringing economic benefits to both the EU and Serbia. Like in Central Europe in the 90', the agreement will boost investment, in particular Foreign Direct investments. It will make a key contribution

to the growth of the Serbian economy and help Serbia move towards a functioning market economy.

The benefits for the EU of this agreement are equally significant. Serbia's market is now open up to EU exporters. Previously relatively high tariffs will be totally dismantled within 6 years, with the exception of a few very sensitive agricultural products. Furthermore, by gradually integrating Serbia into the internal market, conditions for investors become more stable and predictable. Rules on competition and state aid are aligned to those of the EU. Protection of intellectual property rights is gradually also brought up to EU standards. Progressively, the sizable Serbian public procurement market is also opened up to European bidders.

Forging closer ties with Serbia entails a number of other advantages for the EU, in particular as it will facilitate cooperation in the areas of justice, freedom and security, environment, transport and customs just to mention a few. It therefore contributes to making the EU policy in South East-Europe more credible and effective.

Finally, it is particularly noteworthy that Serbia anticipated on the implementation of the Interim agreement, which officially entered into force in February 2010, but which Serbia decided to apply already shortly after its signature in April 2008. Serbia has thereby demonstrated commitment to its economic integration with the EU and has so far established a positive track record.

Since the Council decided on 14 June 2010 to launch the ratification process for the Agreement, 9 Member states have notified their ratification and two more have secured the approval of their Parliament. Today's vote by the European Parliament should therefore bring additional impetus to this process, thanks to the unanimous support across political groups. I therefore hope that ratifications by other Member states will follow soon.

Mr President, Honourable Members of the European Parliament,

Let me conclude my remarks by focusing on the draft Resolution on the European integration process of Serbia, a well prepared contribution to today's political debate for which I am grateful to the Rapporteur, Jelko Kacin. The resolution sends to Serbia both a message of support for the furthering of EU-Serbia relations and one of expectation regarding the key challenges on Serbia's path to the EU membership. This is particularly timely in the context of the preparation of the Opinion on Serbia's membership application.

I was in Belgrade last November to hand over a detailed questionnaire to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister for European integration. The Serbian authorities are currently working hard on their replies, which we expect by the end of the month. I am encouraged by the adoption by the Serbian government on 30 December of an Action Plan as a follow up of the Commission's Progress report. The European Commission will thoroughly analyse the replies to the questionnaire and measures undertaken by the Serbian authorities in the coming months to complete its assessment with a view to issuing the Opinion in the second half of 2011.

Related Document:  
EP adopts resolution on the SAA with Serbia. [Access here.](#)

*European Commission President Barroso statement following meeting with Uzbek President Karimov*  
Brussels, 24 January 2011. [Link](#)

The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, today received the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, for a working meeting. This was in line with the European Union’s established policy as set out in the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 25 October 2010, namely “the willingness of the EU to strengthen relations with Uzbekistan in a comprehensive manner.” The meeting was extremely frank and open. Both President Barroso and President Karimov underlined their willingness to develop comprehensive relations.

Following the meeting, President Barroso said: “The European Union follows a policy of critical, conditional and comprehensive engagement with Uzbekistan. I have raised all key concerns of Europe, notably regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, which stand at the heart of EU foreign policy. I believe it is through such a robust eye to eye dialogue, and not an empty-chair policy, that we can further the EU’s unanimously agreed policy of engagement most effectively.”

President Barroso used this meeting to raise specific human rights concerns, among others the cases of Messrs. Kholdorov, Kholjigitov and Formonov, and pressed for the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. He underlined that a strengthening of relations with Uzbekistan, for which the European Union was ready in principle, is strictly dependent on Uzbek reforms and progress, notably regarding human rights, democratization and the rule of law. President Karimov in reply expressed his commitment to further deepen democratic reforms in Uzbekistan. President Barroso also raised the issue of the accreditation of the Human Rights Watch representative in Tashkent and urged the President to allow an International Labour Organization (ILO) monitoring mission to the country to address the issue of any remaining child labour practices. Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, signed the agreement establishing a European Union Delegation in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This will further strengthen the EU’s voice on the ground.

The Presidents furthermore discussed economic and trade issues. A Memorandum of Understanding regarding energy relations was also signed. Finally, regional issues were raised, including the situation in Afghanistan.

Related Document:  
Uzbek official press release on Barroso-Karimov meeting. [Access here.](#)

*Human Rights Watch - World Report 2011*  
24 January 2011. [Link](#)

This 21st annual World Report summarizes human rights conditions in more than 90 countries and territories worldwide. It reflects extensive investigative work undertaken in 2010 by Human Rights Watch staff, usually in close partnership with domestic human rights activists.

With increasing frequency, governments that might exert pressure for human rights improvement are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments, favoring private “dialogue” and “cooperation” over more hard-nosed approaches. In principle there is nothing wrong with dialogue, but it should not be a substitute for public pressure when the government in question lacks the political will to respect rights. Human Rights Watch calls on governmental supporters of human rights to ensure that the quest for cooperation does not become an excuse for inaction.

[Extracts]

A Timid Response to Repression  
The EU seems to have become particularly infatuated with the idea of dialogue and cooperation, with the EU’s first high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, repeatedly expressing a preference for “quiet diplomacy” regardless of the circumstances.

[...]

One favorite form of cooperation is a formal intergovernmental dialogue on human rights, such as those that many governments conduct with China and the EU maintains with a range of repressive countries, including the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Authoritarian governments understandably welcome these dialogues because they remove the spotlight from human rights discussions. The public, including domestic activists, is left in the dark, as are most government officials outside the foreign ministry. But Western governments also often cite the existence of such dialogues as justification for not speaking concretely about human rights violations and remedies in more meaningful settings—as Sweden did, for example, during its EU presidency when asked why human rights had not featured more prominently at the EU Central Asia ministerial conference.

[...]

The Need for Benchmarks

Moreover, repressive governments have become so adept at manipulating these dialogues, and purported promoters of human rights so dependent on them as a sign that they are “doing something,” that the repressors have managed to treat the mere commencement or resumption of dialogue as a sign of “progress.” Even supposed rights-promoters have fallen into this trap. For example, a 2008 progress report by the EU on the implementation of its Central Asia strategy concluded that things were going well but gave no specifics

beyond “intensified political dialogue” as a measurement of “progress.”

Even when benchmarks exist, Western governments’ willingness to ignore them when they prove inconvenient undermines their usefulness. For example, the EU’s bilateral agreements with other countries are routinely conditioned on basic respect for human rights, but the EU nonetheless concluded a significant trade agreement and pursued a full partnership and cooperation agreement with Turkmenistan, a severely repressive government that cannot conceivably be said to comply with the agreements’ human rights conditions. It is as if the EU announced in advance that its human rights conditions were mere window-dressing, not to be taken seriously. The EU justified this step in the name of “deeper engagement” and a new “framework for dialogue and cooperation.”

Similarly, despite Serbia’s failure to apprehend and surrender for trial indicted war crimes suspect Ratko Mladic (the former Bosnian Serb military leader)—a litmus test for the war-crimes cooperation that the EU has repeatedly insisted is a requirement for beginning discussions with Serbia about its accession to the EU—the EU agreed to start discussions anyway. The EU also gradually lifted sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan after security forces massacred hundreds in 2005 in the city of Andijan, even though no steps had been taken toward permitting an independent investigation—originally the chief condition for lifting sanctions—let alone prosecuting those responsible or doing anything else that the EU had called for, such as releasing all wrongfully imprisoned human rights activists.

[...]

#### Other Interests at Stake

Sometimes those who promote quiet dialogue over public pressure argue efficacy, although often other interests seem to be at play. In Uzbekistan, which provides an important route for resupplying NATO troops in Afghanistan, the EU argued that targeted sanctions against those responsible for the Andijan massacre were “alienating” the government and “standing in the way of a constructive relationship,” as if making nice to a government that aggressively denied any responsibility for killing hundreds of its citizens would be more successful at changing it than sustained pressure. In making the case for why human rights concerns should not stand in the way of a new partnership and cooperation agreement with severely repressive Turkmenistan, a country with large gas reserves, the EU resorts to similar stated fears of alienation. To avoid public indignation if it were to openly abandon human rights in favor of these other interests, the EU feigns ongoing concern through the medium of private dialogue.

[...]

#### Humanitarian Excuses

Because it would be too callous to say that economic development justifies ignoring repression, the European Commission, the UK, several other EU states, and the US have offered various excuses, from the claim that public pressure will backfire in the face of national pride to the assertion that donor governments have less leverage than one might think.

The result is a lack of meaningful pressure—nothing to change the cost-benefit analysis that makes repression an attractive option. Quiet entreaties are least likely to be effective when they are drowned out by parallel delivery of massive quantities of aid.

[...]

#### Conclusion

Whatever the rationalization, the quest for dialogue and cooperation is simply not a universal substitute for public pressure as a tool to promote human rights. Dialogue and cooperation have their place, but the burden should be on the abusive government to show a genuine willingness to improve. In the absence of demonstrated political will, public pressure should be the default response to repression. It is understandable when governments that themselves are serious human rights violators want to undermine the option of public pressure out of fear that it will be applied to them in turn. But it is shameful when governments that purportedly promote human rights fall for, or endorse, the same ploy.

Defending human rights is rarely convenient. It may sometimes interfere with other governmental interests. But if governments want to pursue those interests instead of human rights, they should at least have the courage to admit it, instead of hiding behind meaningless dialogues and fruitless quests for cooperation.

#### Freedom House – Political Rights and Civil Liberties in EU Neighbourhood

Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy  
Washington D.C., 13 January 2011. [Link](#)

#### Political Rights (PR) Civil Liberties (CL)

##### (POTENTIAL) ACCESSION CANDIDATES +EFTA

Albania	PR3	CL3
BiH	PR4	CL3
Croatia	PR1 +	CL2
Iceland	PR1	CL1
Kosovo	PR5 +	CL4 +
Macedonia	PR3	CL3
Montenegro	PR3	CL2 +
Norway	PR1	CL1
Serbia	PR2 +	CL2
Turkey	PR3	CL3
Switzerland	PR1	CL1

##### ENP SOUTH

Algeria	PR6	CL5
Egypt	PR6	CL5
Israel	PR1	CL2
Israeli Occupied Territory	PR6	CL6
Jordan	PR6 -	CL5
Libya	PR7	CL7
Lebanon	PR5	CL3 +
Morocco	PR5	CL4
Palestinian		

Authority	PR6 -	CL6
Syria	PR7	CL6
Tunisia	PR7	CL5
ENP EAST + RUSSIA		
Armenia	PR6	CL4
Azerbaijan	PR6	CL5
Belarus	PR7	CL6
Georgia	PR4	CL4
Abkhazia	PR5	CL5
South Ossetia	PR7	CL6
Moldova	PR3 +	CL4
Transnistria	PR6	CL6
Russia	PR6	CL5
Ukraine	PR3	CL2
CENTRAL ASIA		
Kazakhstan	PR6	CL5
Kyrgyzstan	PR6 -	CL5 -
Tajikistan	PR6	CL5
Turkmenistan	PR7	CL7
Uzbekistan	PR7	CL7

A “+” indicates an improvement of the rating.  
A “-” indicates a worsening of the rating.

**Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor**  
Michael Emerson, Rosa Balfour, Tim Corthaut,  
Jan Wouters, Piotr Maciej Kaczynski & Thomas Renard  
CEPS Commentary, 25 January 2011. [Link](#)

Globalisation, the rise of the BRICs and the new multipolarity have brought fundamental changes to the nature of international diplomacy for all countries of the world, but most of all for the small and medium-sized member states of the European Union. The national foreign services of the 27 member states now exhibit accelerating obsolescence and waste precious resources, since individually they have little or no chance of having any serious impact on many if not most global affairs. The EU as a single actor could have some such impact, if of course it literally can get its act together. The Lisbon Treaty innovations, with the enlarged responsibilities of the High Representative and establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) come not a moment too soon. The question now is how to make real use of them.

Many people are understandably saying, after the long travails of the Lisbon Treaty, that it is time for the EU to get into the substance of foreign policy, rather than continuing to negotiate internally over who does what. Certainly the issues are both real and pressing, every month or even week – last month it was Cancún, last week Belarus, this week Tunisia ... next week who knows? But still it is too easy and premature to say that institutional issues are sufficiently resolved to be given a long rest.

Three institutional issues need to be sorted out, if the EU is to become a world-class foreign policy actor over the next decade or two.

The first and immediate issue is to tidy up the loose ends of the Lisbon Treaty, which is not sufficiently precise or explicit on who in some circumstances should represent the EU and negotiate on its behalf – the High Representative, the European Commission, the EU delegations or the rotating Council Presidency. In particular in the many fields of ‘shared competences’ between the EU and its member states, there remains an annoyingly extensive grey area, which provokes competition, tension and even inter-institutional conflict mainly between the Commission and member states in the Council. A current case in point is who should negotiate a new international treaty to control the use of mercury. Much of 2010 was taken up in an interinstitutional scrap over this question. In the end a compromise seems to have been arranged by the Belgian Presidency at the end of last year (which in passing we applaud for its constructive and efficient handling of post-Lisbon issues, despite deplorably nihilistic tactics by some foreign ministries). This scrap meant that last year the EU had initially no agreement as to who should present the EU position at the Stockholm international mercury conference, resulting in embarrassing public in-fighting on the conference floor. Moreover, there are still almost daily reports of many more instances of petty tug-of-war displays in diverse international fora, involving the Commission, the Council and its Presidency and the local EU delegations. This kind of institutional disorder has to stop, through some kind of institutional understanding or entente. Neither European public opinion nor the EU’s partners in the world have any patience for this bickering, and Europe only loses from it.

The second and much bigger issue is the status of the EU in multilateral organisations, including the UN system, the IMF and World Bank, and many other bodies or procedures that execute multilateral treaties. The member states are in general full ‘members’ of these organisations, whereas the EU’s status is often just ‘observer’, only sometimes a ‘member’ or full contracting party, and sometimes completely absent even when its legal competences are involved. The UN system has invented the category of ‘regional integration organisation’, which some but far from all of its bodies have agreed to use to justify the presence of the EU. There is now a large collection of institutions in which the EU’s status is not adjusted to the level of the real competences which its member states have delegated to it. In one important case, the UN General Assembly, the Lisbon Treaty has even had the unintended effect of setting the EU back. (Lisbon gives either Van Rompuy, Ashton or the Head of the EU Delegation – according to level of the meeting – the task of representing the EU, but the rules of procedure say the EU now can only speak as observer after the 192 member states have taken the floor, whereas before the rotating Presidency member state could intervene in a timely manner.) A proposal to rectify this situation has been made, but it failed to pass at first discussion in the Assembly and needs now to be re-submitted. But there are many other anomalies. The eurozone should have a single seat at the IMF Executive Board, and the EU should surely at least be observer on the World Bank Executive Board. Many other cases are behind the times, including several sectoral organisations such as for maritime and air transport where the EU’s extensive internal market law sits alongside international law, and often actually leads the latter’s development. But all this is a huge agenda, as the EU has already been party of one kind or another to 249 multilateral treaties. It is an agenda for a



decade or two, but which needs to be engaged resolutely and with diplomatic skill without delay, and with the full backing of the member states (again at times deplorably lacking).

The third issue is the restructuring of European diplomacy. The 27 member states have 3,164 diplomatic missions, employing 93,912 staff (of which 55,441 are full diplomats, which is about twice as many as the US), costing EUR 7,539 million (these figures exclude aid administration and operational expenditures). By comparison, the EU starts its new foreign service with 136 delegations, 3,720 staff (or 1,643 excluding local agents), costing EUR 476 million. The three largest diplomatic corps in the EU, those of Germany, France and the UK have each around 12,000 staff. The member states spend on average about EUR 15 per capita on their diplomatic corps; the new EEAS costs EUR 1 per capita. At the functional level one can envisage a gradual transfer of some functions to the EEAS to cut gross duplication or to achieve more effective impact. The functions could concern political and economic reporting, consular services including the issue of visas for Schengen states, humanitarian and crisis management operations, and also more economical co-locating mini national embassies within the EU delegations. The fundamental change, however, is in the nature of the new global diplomacy, which is increasingly a matter of global regulatory activity (trade, financial markets, transport, energy, environment etc.), and these are within the European Commission's competences rather than the High Representative. For these functions, the delegations in major capitals will have to have sectoral specialists, since the subject matter cannot be competently handled by generalist diplomats, and certainly not 27 times over in the member state embassies. Meanwhile many small bilateral missions in small partner states, including within the EU, can be cut back. Sweden here leads the way although without having a budget crisis to confront, closing its embassies in Slovakia, Slovenia, Luxembourg and even Belgium (where it co-locates an ambassador in its EU mission), and also in several important countries on other continents.

In this context, the declared intention of the member states to set the budget for the EEAS alone 'towards budget neutrality' is the work of small-minded bookkeepers in alliance with those in foreign ministries who want to keep the status quo (a 10% increase in the EEAS budget would amount to 0.03% of the EU budget). 'Budget neutrality' would mean strangling the EEAS at birth, while also missing a chance to achieve real budget savings by combining a steady but moderate growth of the EEAS with a slimming down of national foreign services in an integrated restructuring operation. The present authors have worked out quantified restructuring scenarios for adapting European diplomacy to the new global multipolarity, together with detailed reviews and recommendations also for the other two topics summarised here, in a new book just published.<sup>1</sup> We warn that failure to act along these lines will result in an increasingly irrelevant, obsolete and wasteful European diplomacy.

*This Commentary is a collective effort by a group of EU policy analysts based at research institutes in Brussels and Leuven. Michael Emerson & Piotr Maciej Kaczynski are at CEPS, Rosa Balfour is at the European Policy Centre (EPC), Jan Wouters & Tim Corthaut are at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, and Thomas Renard is at*

*Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. This Commentary summarises their new book *Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor – Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy* (available [here](#)).*

### ***Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy***

Michael Emerson and Piotr Maciej Kaczynski and Rosa Balfour and Tim Corthaut and Jan Wouters and Thomas Renard

CEPS Paperback, 25 January 2011. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

The international order is experiencing fundamental changes driven by globalisation and the multipolarity emerging from the new balance of power. In response, a new book by a team of experts assembled by CEPS argues that the EU should build up a world-class diplomatic corps, capable of becoming a major actor in global affairs, drawing on enabling provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon.

The report investigates two prerequisites for achieving this goal: first, enhancement of the status of the EU in numerous multilateral organisations, international agreements and fora (the UN, IMF, etc.) and second, a restructuring of European diplomacy, involving a reallocation of functions and resources between the new European diplomatic corps (the European External Action Service) and the diplomatic representations of the 27 EU member states worldwide.

Recommendations are formulated on where and how to upgrade the EU's status in the international arena. Scenarios are presented for the build-up of the EU's diplomatic corps, alongside a slimming down of national diplomacies. The authors warn that failure to act along these lines will result in an increasingly irrelevant, obsolete and wasteful European diplomacy.

### ***The Tunisian Revolution: An Opportunity for Democratic Transition***

Rym Ayadi and Silvia Colombo and Maria Cristina Paciello and Nathalie Tocci

CEPS - MEDPRO Commentary, 24 January 2011. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

To help promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Tunisia, a new MEDPRO Commentary by Rym Ayadi, Silvia Colombo, Maria Cristina Paciello and Nathalie Tocci calls upon the EU to act quickly on its declaration of support for "a genuine democratic transition" and to consult with political parties both from the transition government and beyond to prepare for the running of the next elections. A positive resolution of this crisis will only be achieved if the internal and external players follow the lessons of successful democratic transitions elsewhere.

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## *CEPS Neighbourhood Watch Editorial address*

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (CEPS)

Place du Congrès 1,  
B-1000 Brussels, Belgium  
website: [www.ceps.eu](http://www.ceps.eu)

phone: +32 2 229 39 11  
fax: +32 2 219 41 51

e-mail: [neighbourhood@ceps.be](mailto:neighbourhood@ceps.be) *Subscribe*

Editorial team: Michael Emerson and George Dura.