

## *Here is your opinion of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*

As announced a month ago we have invited readers to respond to a simple questionnaire on perceptions of the ENP. Here are the summary results (the link to details is given below).

There were 248 valid responses, half of whom were independent analysts from the EU, with fewer but still useful numbers of responses by independents from the ENP partner states, officials of the EU or its member states, and finally from individuals from third countries (Russia, US, rest of the world). More respondents were concerned by Eastern Europe than the South Mediterranean, but many were answering for both regions together. The respondents come from this newsletter's e-mail data base, which consists of people who are in some way involved in or interested in EU external policies, and so are well or even very well informed individuals. So it is an interested elite sample, and not a representative public opinion survey.

The overall summary result about whether the ENP has been successful or not in achieving its objectives of strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of the region was as follows:

Very successful	4.6%
Moderately successful	34.0%
Little or no impact	59.0%
Counterproductive	2.4%

As between the three objectives the results were somewhat more positive for stability, than for prosperity and security.

The results show some interesting differences and similarities by group of respondents. The independents from the EU and the ENP partner states are strikingly similar. In both cases the numbers of outlying and extreme views (very successful and counterproductive) are very small. As regards the predominant results in the two intermediate categories, both groups of respondents are showing a pattern of roughly 1/3rd 'moderately successful' and 2/3rds 'little or no impact'.

Officials from the EU and its member states have a somewhat more positive view, maybe reflecting in many cases their personal professional commitment to the policy, or a case of slightly rose-tinted spectacles. However the difference of view with the independents is only one of degree, with the officials dividing between

the 'moderately successful' (45%) versus 'little or no impact' (55%). The officials are also more restrained in their views since they scored absolutely zero for either the 'very successful' or 'counterproductive' answers.

While these official views are perhaps unsurprising, a more intriguing result comes from the respondents from third countries (Russia, US, and the rest of the world). Here there were considerably larger proportions of views considering the policy to have been 'very successful' on account of the stability (28.6%) and security (22.9%) objectives. We can only speculate why this should be so. Is it because these respondents are less well informed about the policy? Or is it because they have a different and possibly more realistic perspective, noting perhaps that the EU has a very extensive engagement with its neighbours, framed in positive terms, and one that is categorically different from alternative models of really bad neighbourly relations that do exist elsewhere in the world. (e.g. tensions over unresolved territorial border disputes, or politico-economic pressurisation with threats of use of force by regional hegemon).

The reasons for the majority view of 'little or no impact' are not hard to find. At the top of the list, especially for the Eastern neighbours, is likely to be the impact of disappointed aspirations for accession to the European Union, or more precisely the refusal of the EU to grant the magic words 'membership perspectives', even for the long run. Experience of the EU's recent enlargements has shown how the accession process galvanises the whole state apparatus and leading sectors of the economy into adopting EU political norms and technical standards, and in addition the amounts of financial assistance are macroeconomically significant. The ENP has devoted a lot of effort to the progressive adoption of the EU 'acquis', yet the motivating force for doing this in the partner states has been faint, and the amounts of financial assistance are relatively limited.

This obvious point over 'membership perspectives' is the result of political decision at the highest level, and it goes beyond the mandate of the Commission as executors of the ENP to change it. But it is still important to look at the reasons for the perceived 'little or no impact' at the next level down of major policy components. At the political level the objective has been to negotiate new 'advanced agreements', within which two of the most important main lines of action concern the movement of persons and trade, where the keywords from the EU side have been 'visa facilitation' and 'deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA)'.

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While in the South Mediterranean neighbourhood Morocco, which already had a basic free trade agreement, has signed an 'advanced agreement', this has not yet been the case for either Ukraine or Georgia with whom negotiations are ongoing. For these general (political and economic) agreements with the Eastern partners the DCFTA is intended to be the flagship economic component is intended to be. However, it has not yet been possible yet to conclude a DCFTA with Ukraine, whereas the Commission has not yet even agreed to open negotiations for Georgia, despite the fact that Georgia has unilaterally adopted a basic free trade policy with the entire world, including the EU. As regards visa facilitation, the positive innovations under this heading seem to have been slight or invisible to the people concerned, whereas the earlier negative impact of the introduction of visas by the new member states towards the Eastern partner states really hurt. Visa liberalisation (i.e. visa free regimes) are now discussed as a prospect, but are as yet far from a reality. Also, while civil society cooperation has been billed with a high priority, the EU's financial aid instruments to support NGOs remain incredibly burdensome and user-unfriendly. This problem is a well known problem for which solutions have not yet been found.

Finally these survey results are surely influenced by how the ENP is framed in the communications efforts of the EU. While the Commission has been investing in a new and attractive information instrument (the web portal [www.enpi-info.eu](http://www.enpi-info.eu)) there are serious communications problems in the top level political messages. First of all neither the Eastern nor South Mediterranean partners have been happy over being in the same ENP boat together. These regions have nothing in common politically, culturally or historically, or thence in terms of identity. But then this awkward amalgam became additionally confused by the problems of understanding what the ENP to the South is in relation to the Barcelona process and more recently the Union for the Mediterranean, and to the East how the ENP relates to the newer Eastern Partnership initiative. Connoisseurs of EU policy know the bureaucratic answers, but that does not solve the communications problem.

The Commission and High Representative for foreign and security policy have launched a review of the ENP after its first five years. These survey results ([available here](#)) provide a corrective to those in the EU institutions who at times simply proclaim the ENP to be a success, and their interpretation may lead into useful reconsideration of various elements of the policy.

*Michael Emerson*  
*CEPS Senior Research Fellow*

*State of the Union*

By President of the European Commission Barroso  
Strasbourg, 7 September 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

It is a great privilege to deliver the first State of the Union address before this House. From now on the State of the Union address will be the occasion when we will chart our work for the next 12 months. Many of the decisions we will take this year will have long-term implications. They will define the kind of Europe we want. They will define a Europe of opportunity where those that aspire are elevated and those in need are not neglected. A Europe that is open to the world and open to its people. A Europe that delivers economic, social and territorial cohesion.

[...]

Today, I will set out what I see as the priorities for our work together over the coming year. I cannot now cover every issue of European policy or initiative we will take. I am sending you through President Buzek a more complete programme document.

Essentially, I see five major challenges for the Union over the next year:

- dealing with the economic crisis and governance;
- restoring growth for jobs by accelerating the Europe 2020 reform agenda;
- building an area of freedom, justice and security;
- launching negotiations for a modern EU budget, and
- pulling our weight on the global stage.

[...]

The final challenge I want to address today is how we pull our weight on the global stage.

When we deal with our every day problems, we sometimes lose perspective and forget our achievements. A peaceful and successful transition to a European Union that has doubled in size and is negotiating further accessions. A sound currency, the euro, that is a major currency of the world. A strong partnership with our neighbourhood that strengthens us all. If we act decisively, then we have nothing to fear from the 21st century.

As the strategic partnerships of the 21st century emerge, Europe should seize the chance to define its future. I am impatient to see the Union play the role in global affairs that matches its economic weight. Our partners are watching and are expecting us to engage as Europe, not just as 27 individual countries. If we don't act together, Europe will not be a force in the world, and they will move on without us: without the European Union but also without its Member States. This is why, in my political guidelines, I called for Europe to be a global player, a global leader – a key task and test for our generation.

Together with High Representative and Vice-President Ashton, I will present our vision of how we can maximise Europe's role in the world. With the European External Action Service, we have the means to match our aspirations.

In our globalized world, the relationships we build with strategic partners determine our prosperity. To be effective on the international stage, we need the weight of the European Union. Size matters, now more than ever.

[...]

The next two months will see crucial Summits with strategic partners. The more we are able to establish a common agenda with a clearly defined European interest, the more we will achieve.

[...]

Being a global player also means standing up for our values. Human rights are not negotiable. I am shocked about how the rights of women are being infringed in many countries. I am appalled when I hear that Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani is sentenced to death by stoning. This is barbaric beyond words. In Europe we condemn such acts which have no justification under any moral or religious code.

Our values also mean that we must come to the aid of those facing a crisis situation, anywhere around the world.

*EU President Van Rompuy: «We have strategic partners, now we need a strategy»*

Brussels, 14 September 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

I strongly believe that coordination is also the keyword in the field of Europe's external relations. Europe is acting in a rapidly changing world. We are confronted with new and pressing challenges: global security, environment, migration... The economic crisis has shown us how dependent we are on external developments to preserve the quality of life of Europeans.

These challenges need effective and coordinated response. Europe must act as a strong global actor on the international scene. And it must cooperate well with other global players. Our Member States have in the past often proven to be able to do this. But the world is changing every day. The Copenhagen summit on climate change was an eye-opener: power is shifting, new players are emerging, with new interests, features and worldviews. It's not enough to have a common message, we also have to deliver it effectively. We are punching now below our weight of 500 million people and 22% of world GDP.

I want the European Council to play a major role here. It should define the Union's strategic objectives and interests. The Treaty of Lisbon offers us some tools. The new External Action Service will help us a lot. We will have, as a Union, our own embassies all over the world. I convened Thursday's European Council to discuss our external relations and our strategic partnerships, which we have with the United States, Russia, our Asian partners and others, based on reciprocity.

Until now, we had strategic partners, now we also need a strategy!

On Thursday, we will look how upcoming summits and international meetings with third countries can be as fruitful as possible. For instance the summit between the EU and China in October, or the G20 summit in November. The European Council has to provide clear messages or some kind of mandate for each Summit with third countries to the President of the EC and of the Commission.

We will also discuss how we can make our external policy as effective and coherent as possible. We will define the internal arrangements that we need here.

I see Thursday's meeting as the beginning of a process, with many actors involved. As the world changes rapidly, the European Council will continue to give guidance to make sure that the Union asserts its interests and values in the world. Foreign policy will be from now on on the agenda of almost every European Council. Thursday's Council will be the first in a long row.

*European Council Conclusions on EU relations  
with Strategic Partners*  
Brussels, 16 September 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

I. RELATIONS WITH STRATEGIC PARTNERS

A changing world: a challenge for the EU

1. Europe is facing many challenges in a rapidly changing world, which all require a concerted international response. The recent economic and financial crisis has dramatically shown the extent to which the well-being, security and quality of life of Europeans depend on external developments. The emergence of new players with their own world views and interests is also an important new feature in the international environment.

2. The European Union must be an effective global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security and to take the lead in the definition of joint responses to common challenges. A strong economy and internal cohesion will strengthen the Union's ability to project its influence in the world. The Union can draw on its firmly-rooted belief in effective multilateralism, especially the role of the UN, universal values, an open world economy and on its unique range of instruments. It remains the largest donor to countries in need, it is the first trading power in the world, and it has developed a common security and defence policy supported by crisis management tools which should be further reinforced. It also plays a major stabilizing role in its neighbourhood. The Union has secured stability in the Western Balkans particularly through the European perspective given to that region; the European Council will revert to this at a subsequent meeting.

3. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, and in line with the European Security Strategy, the European Union and

its Member States will act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true weight to bear internationally. This requires a clear identification of its strategic interests and objectives at a given moment and a focused reflection on the means to pursue them more assertively. The European Council calls for improving synergies between the European Union and national levels, consistent with the provisions of the Treaties, for enhancing coordination between institutional actors, for better integrating all relevant instruments and policies and for using summit meetings with third countries more effectively, as set out in more detail in Annex I.

4. The European Union's strategic partnerships with key players in the world provide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests. This will only work if they are two-way streets based on mutual interests and benefits and on the recognition that all actors have rights as well as duties. The full participation of emerging economies in the international system should allow its benefits to be spread in a balanced manner and its responsibilities to be shared evenly. In this context, enhancing trade with strategic partners constitutes a crucial objective, contributing to economic recovery and job creation. We must take concrete steps to secure ambitious Free Trade Agreements, secure greater market access for European businesses and deepen regulatory cooperation with major trade partners.

Orientations for upcoming events

5. The European Union will hold a number of important international meetings in the coming weeks. The European Council lays out initial orientations today with a view to these meetings. It will in future regularly discuss external relations in order to set strategic orientations in advance of key events, in particular with a view to defining key messages on our objectives and on the means to achieve them. This requires clear strategic guidance by the European Council on the basis of an effective preparation by the High Representative and by the Council.

6. October will see summits with China and the Republic of Korea and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), followed later in the year by a summit with India. They are a good opportunity to engage with key partners in a very dynamic part of the world. Issues such as the respective roles in achieving a sustainable recovery from the economic crisis and in seeking global solutions to universal challenges will be on the agenda. Concrete steps should be taken in priority areas of cooperation between Europe and Asia, such as cooperation on climate change, including on the promotion of effective and verifiable reductions in emissions, as well as on renewables and energy efficiency; pressing security issues, such as proliferation, terrorism, cybersecurity and piracy; cooperation on regional issues such as Iran and North Korea as well as on global issues such as migration, energy and access to raw materials; working together on development policies and the promotion of good governance, labour standards and human rights and developing people-to-people relations. In view of the EU/China summit in particular, the European Union should actively pursue its strategic interests, including as regards the promotion of bilateral trade, market access for goods and services and investment conditions; the protection

of intellectual property rights and the opening up of public procurement markets; stronger discipline in the field of export subsidies; and the dialogue on exchange rate policies.

7. Over the coming months there will be a number of other important external relations issues which will have to be addressed by the European Council.

a. The G20 Summit in Seoul will allow a review of the global economic recovery and the commitments made by G20 members. In particular, it will allow the Union to stress the importance of maintaining strong momentum in the area of financial reform; in this respect, the recent agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the financial supervision package and the completion of the reform of the regulatory framework by the end of 2011 strengthen the EU's hand. It should also serve to send a clear signal on the need to conclude the WTO DDA negotiations and implement the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. The European Council will discuss the detailed preparation of Seoul at its October 2010 meeting and set the Union's position. The G8 and the G20 will remain important fora for the definition of global responses to many of the challenges facing us, to which the EU must actively contribute through coordinated positions. The European Council therefore welcomes the ambition of the incoming French chairmanship in 2011 to fully use the G20 and G8 to that end.

b. The transatlantic relationship is based on common values and constitutes a core element of the international system. The present circumstances call for fresh impetus to be given to this relationship and for renewed reflection on ways of creating a true partnership based on our respective strengths and specificities. The November 2010 summit with President Obama will constitute a real opportunity in this respect and will require careful preparation. The October 2010 European Council will agree on the key political messages the European Union representatives will bring to this major summit. Based on a good understanding of mutual interests and the respective contributions, the transatlantic partnership should concentrate on maximising the potential benefits of our economic relationship, on working more closely on major international issues and on confronting global economic and security challenges together in a concerted manner. In this connection, the High Representative is invited to develop ideas on how EU/NATO cooperation in crisis management, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, could be further strengthened. This should be done in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and in respect of their decision-making autonomy, further to the recommendations on concrete measures transmitted by the EU to NATO in February 2010.

[...]

d. The upcoming reflection on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy will provide an opportunity to deepen relations with the Union's eastern neighbours through the Eastern Partnership as well as with its southern neighbours. The smooth implementation of projects launched within the Eastern Partnership constitutes an outreach of EU values and promotes the legal, economic and social approximation of the concerned countries to the EU. The second summit of the

Union for the Mediterranean will provide a timely opportunity to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and support the resumption of direct negotiations between the parties in the Middle East Peace Process.

e. EU/Africa relations have taken on a new dynamic in recent years. The EU/South Africa Summit on 28 September 2010 and the EU/Africa Summit on 29/30 November 2010 should serve to further deepen relations. The EU, in partnership with African countries, will continue to pursue the objectives of economic development, good governance, transparency and accountability in the context of the joint EU/Africa Strategy.

[...]

g. The upcoming summits with Ukraine, in November, and Russia, in December, should be used to deepen cooperation on areas of mutual benefit, so as to bring more stability and predictability to those two important relationships, as well as to promote human rights.

In particular, the summit with Ukraine should bring progress to the negotiations on the Association Agreement, including the deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, and highlight the role of the EU in the economic and democratic reforms of this important neighbour.

The summit with Russia will provide an opportunity to enhance cooperation with Russia and to discuss in particular its modernization agenda. Cooperation should be enhanced on economic issues such as energy, investment and innovation, on security issues, including frozen conflicts, the combat against terrorism and organized crime, and on environmental issues, including climate change.

The October European Council will come back to the key messages of the European Union in these summits so as to ensure a fruitful outcome.

### MEP's want more stringent budget control on EEAS

European Parliament press release  
Brussels, 28 September 2010. [Link](#)

European External Action Service (EEAS) budgeting rules were beefed up by the Budgets and Budgetary Control committees on Tuesday, to ensure transparency and financial accountability. MEPs inserted a provision requiring a "working document" to detail external action spending, and new rules on conflicts of interest. They also stipulated that heads of EEAS delegations must complete specific budget training courses before taking up their duties.

Before the European External Action Service (EEAS) is launched, several legislative changes are needed for the service to function, including changes in budget and staff rules.

The amendments inserted in the financial regulations by Budgets and Budgetary Control committees on Tuesday include stringent provisions on traceability and budgetary and financial accountability. Ingeborg Gräßle (EPP, DE) and

Crescenzo Rivellini (EPP, IT), who steered the draft legislation through Parliament, also want to ensure that Parliament has its say, in order to ensure democratic scrutiny of how the EU budget is implemented.

In budgetary terms, the EEAS will be treated as an EU institution, i.e. will enjoy the budgetary autonomy afforded by having its own section in the EU budget. Like all other institutions, it will implement its own administrative expenditure. It will also require a discharge from the European Parliament for its implementation. Parliament will therefore exercise its full budgetary and control powers vis-à-vis the EEAS. The Commission will remain in charge of the service's operational budget.

#### Transparency

To ensure budgetary transparency, the Commission must supply the European Parliament and the Council with a working document presenting all administrative and operational expenditures relating to EU external action, along with the draft EU budget, say MEPs.

This working document should include, for instance, EEAS overall administrative expenditure for the previous year by delegation, expenditure by the EEAS central administration and operational expenditure by geographical area (regions, countries), by thematic area, by delegation and by mission.

A detailed picture of all staff in place in the delegations should also be provided at the time of presenting the draft budget, including a breakdown by geographical area, individual country and mission, MEPs add.

Within the EEAS, a director general for budget and administration should be responsible to the High Representative for the administrative and internal budgetary management of the service.

#### Accountability and training for heads of delegations

The Commission may delegate its budget implementing powers to heads of delegations for operational appropriations.

Before taking up their duties, heads of delegations "must complete specific training courses on the tasks and responsibilities of authorising officers and the implementation of the budget", MEPs insist.

The heads of delegations' annual activity reports, as well as the statements of assurance on the internal management and control systems within their delegations, should be transmitted to the European Parliament, say MEPs, adding that upon request, heads of delegations will also have to report on the execution of their budgetary duties to the EP's competent committee.

#### Conflicts of interest

Heads of delegations acting as authorising officers by sub-delegation must take the measures necessary to prevent "any conflict of priorities which is likely to have an impact on

the implementation of the financial management tasks sub-delegated to them".

Where such a conflict arises, they shall inform the responsible directors-general of the Commission and of the EEAS "without delay" and the latter "shall take appropriate steps to remedy the situation", says the amended text.

#### Next steps

The Legal Affairs Committee vote on changes to the Staff Regulations, for which Bernhard Rapkay (S&D, DE) is rapporteur, is scheduled for 6 October.

MEPs are negotiating with the Council, with a view to achieving a first-reading agreement on both the financial and the staff regulations, to be approved by Parliament at the 18-21 October plenary session.

Thereafter, Parliament and Council will still need to amend the 2010 budget, to make budgetary room for the new service. The EEAS is expected to start work on 1 December.

In the chair: Alain Lamassoure (EPP, FR), Luigi de Magistris (ALDE, IT)

#### Related Documents:

- Amending letter n° 1 to the draft general budget 2011: Statement of Revenue and expenditure for the European External Action Service. [Access here.](#)
- Draft Opinion by the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities. [Access here.](#)

#### *EUHR Ashton appoints new Heads and Deputy Heads of EU Delegations*

EU press release

Brussels, 15 September 2010. [Link](#)

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President has decided to appoint 27 new Heads of EU Delegation and 1 Deputy Head of EU Delegation, subject to the necessary requirements.

The High Representative said following her decision:

"As promised to member states, the European Parliament and EU citizens, I have appointed the best people for the right jobs. I am extremely pleased by the calibre of those who applied for the posts.

I have consistently asked member states and the EU institutions to put forward the brightest and best that Europe has to offer and I hope this will continue to be the case as we build the new

European External Action Service, because EU citizens deserve to be represented by the best that Europe has to offer.

I am pleased that we have made a start to address the important issues of geographical and gender balance.

These appointments show an improvement in both, but there is more to do. I will be discussing with member states how we can continue to improve and achieve my ambition of a service that is truly representative and appointed on merit."

The appointments are part of the wider recruitment exercise for the future EEAS, including the recently published top management positions, permanent chair of the Political and Security Committee and 80 political posts in delegations and other vacant jobs in headquarters.

HR Catherine Ashton is in the process of screening the candidates for the recently published posts for an upgraded Head of Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two Head of Delegation posts in Geneva (WTO and UN).

As soon as the 2010 rotation exercise has been concluded, Catherine Ashton will start work on the 2011 rotation, which is expected to include a comparable number of Head of Delegation posts as in 2010.

For a list of the newly appointed 27 new Heads of EU Delegation and 1 Deputy Head of EU Delegation, [click here](#).

*Draft UN Resolution with EU amendments on «Participation of the EU in the work of the UN»*  
64th Session of the UN General Assembly  
New York, 13 September 2010.

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the role and authority of the General Assembly as a principal organ of the United Nations and the importance of its effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its functions under the Charter,

Recognizing, further, that the current interdependent international environment requires the strengthening of the multilateral system in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the principles of international law,

Acknowledging that, when an organization for regional integration develops common external policies and establishes permanent structures for their conduct and representation, the General Assembly may benefit from the effective participation in its deliberations of that organization's external representatives speaking on behalf of the organization and its member States, [without prejudice to the ability of each organization to define the modalities of its external representation.]

Recalling the long-standing relations between the European Union and the United Nations,

Noting the entry into force on 1 December 2009 of the Treaty of Lisbon, by means of which the European Union has made changes to its institutional system, in particular with regard to its external representation,

Noting that, in the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union reaffirms inter alia its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to the promotion of multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations,

Noting also that, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the States members of the European Union have entrusted the external representation of the European Union, with regard to the exercise of the competences of the European Union provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, to the following institutional representatives: the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Commission and European Union delegations,

Noting further that the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is assisted by a European External Action Service, which includes European Union delegations,

Noting that the representatives of the European Union referred to above have assumed the role, previously performed by the representatives of the member State holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, of acting on behalf of the European Union at the United Nations in the exercise of the competences conferred by its member States,

Recalling that, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union has replaced the European Community, as notified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by a letter dated 30 November 2009,

Noting that the European Union is a party to many instruments concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and an observer or participant in several specialized agencies and United Nations bodies,

Noting that the European Union retains observer status in the General Assembly,

1. Decides that the representatives of the European Union, for the purposes of participating effectively in the sessions and work of the General Assembly, including in the general debate, and its committees and working groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly, as well as in United Nations conferences, and in order to present positions of the European Union, shall be invited to speak in a timely manner, similar to the established practice for representatives of major groups, [without prejudice to the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations,] shall be permitted to circulate documents, to make proposals and submit amendments, to raise points of order, but not to challenge decisions of the presiding officer, and to exercise the right of reply, and be afforded seating arrangements which are adequate for the exercise of the aforementioned actions;

the European Union shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates in the General Assembly;

[2. Decides that when a regional organization representing Member States has reached a level of integration that enables that organization to speak with one voice, the General Assembly may adopt modalities, in the spirit of this resolution, for the participation in its deliberations of that organisation's external representatives speaking on behalf of the organization and its Member States.]

[3.] Requests the Secretary-General to take any measures necessary to ensure the implementation of the present decision.

*The amendments proposed by the EU have been put between square brackets.*

*NATO Secretary General Rasmussen remarks following the informal meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*

Brussels, 22 September 2010. [Link](#)

Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Secretary General of NATO): Thank you for coming. I'm encouraged as chairman of the NATO-Russia Council by the discussions we have had today. They were in the right spirit. They addressed the right issues, and they made it clear that we truly are on a solid path now to improve NATO-Russia relations.

First, all Ministers who spoke made clear their shared desire for us to take concrete and substantial steps to take forward NATO-Russia cooperation. And to focus on practical and pragmatic things we can and should do together.

For example, stepping up our joint support for Afghanistan and our shared fight against narcotics. Fighting terrorism. Fighting piracy.

Second, we discussed how to continue to build security within Europe. On missile defence everyone who spoke shared that view that cooperation between NATO countries and Russia makes sense, and that we need to step it up.

When it comes to conventional arms control as well, there are ongoing discussions in Vienna to take this forward, even if there are areas such as on Georgia or Moldova where we still fundamentally disagree.

But these talks should move forward this year. When it comes to transparency in our security doctrines as well NATO, as you know, we discussed our developing Strategic Concept with Russia already.

And third, we looked forward to a possible NATO-Russia Council Summit in Lisbon. We did have a useful discussion of what the substance might be, and I stress, concrete substance. The joint review of the 21st century's common security challenges; more cooperation on Afghanistan; more practical cooperation in fighting terrorism or piracy; hopefully, from

my point of view, the start of cooperation towards territorial missile defence.

So I think the fundamental message for this meeting was clear, and very encouraging. Today, cooperation with Russia in addressing these challenges is no longer just an opportunity to build better relations with Russia. It has become a necessity if we want to be effective in preserving our common security. And that is a solid foundation from which we can and will move forward.

[...]

Q: Andrew Quinn from Reuters. A follow-up on that. I'm wondering if you can tell us if the Russians have indicated to you that they are open to this idea of cooperating specifically on resuming the theatre missile exercises and on linking the early warning systems? Do they think that in theory or that's a good idea?

And secondly, in your meetings this morning, could you talk a little bit more about the Georgia-Moldova issue as it relates to CFE, and I'm curious whether or not U.S. plans for Bulgaria and Romania also came up? How large an obstacle are these two issues to actually getting the CFE back up and running?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: We have not requested and not got a final answer from Russia as regards cooperation on missile defence, but I can tell you that we have already initiated discussions and consultations within the NATO-Russia Council. We have already had two meetings on this and we have scheduled yet another meeting next month. So consultations are ongoing.

So I hope to see further progress, and if NATO allies decided to start the development of a NATO-based territorial missile defence system I think such a decision should be accompanied by an invitation to Russia to cooperation.

And then, of course, next phase will be to work out how exactly could such cooperation take place.

We discussed conventional arms control and in that request also situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria. Obviously without finding conclusions there is no reason to hide that these issues are issues where we do not see eye to eye. But I do hope, despite the fact that we have our disagreements in that respect, that we will move forward and see progress as regards arms control.

I don't think we will have final results by November, but hopefully we could agree on some basic principles for future conventional arms control by November.

Related Document:  
Why Russia needs a strong NATO (The Moscow Times)  
[Access here.](#)



**Russian and Chinese Presidents hold talks**

Russian Presidency press release  
Beijing, 27 September 2010. [Link](#)

The two leaders discussed trade and economic cooperation opportunities, in particular interaction in the energy sector. Mr Medvedev noted that Russia and China signed agreements considerably expanding the horizons for cooperation, which will now extend to energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, and developing electricity networks. Cooperation will also focus on new high-technology projects in the nuclear energy sector.

Cooperation between Russian and Chinese regions was also one of the top items on the agenda, with plans to carry out 205 different projects as part of the cooperation programmes between Russia's Far East and Eastern Siberian regions and China's Northeast region through to 2018.

Mr Medvedev and Mr Hu discussed a broad range of international issues. Mr Medvedev noted that Russia and China hold similar views on global development issues, the UN's role in fighting terrorism, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating climate change, rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Middle East peace process. The two leaders examined the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Iranian nuclear programme, and paid particular attention to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including the joint initiative to strengthen security in the region. Cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was also discussed.

Following the talks, the two Presidents took part in a ceremony inaugurating the Russia-China oil pipeline\*. The two leaders were able to watch live what was happening on the Russian and Chinese sides of the pipeline, and pushed a symbolic button signifying the pipeline's completion.

The outcome of the talks was reflected in a joint statement on all-round deepening of the Russian-Chinese partnership and strategic cooperation.

*\* Construction of the 999-kilometer pipeline began last year. Some 927 kilometers of the pipeline is in China while 72 kilometers of it is in Russia. The pipeline starts in the Russian town of Skovorodino in the far-eastern Amur region and enters China at Mohe County before continuing to Daqing, a petrochemicals hub in northeastern China. The pipeline is part of a bilateral loan-for-oil deal reached in February 2009 between the two countries. Under the deal, China makes a \$25-billion-long-term loan to Russia while Russia supplies China with 300 million tons of oil through pipelines from 2011 until 2030. (Source: China Daily)*

**Statement by European Council President Van Rompuy on EU-Ukraine relations following meeting with Ukrainian President Yanukovich**

European Council press release  
Brussels, 13 September 2010. [Link](#)

I am pleased to welcome President Yanukovich back to Brussels. Our regular meetings demonstrate the continued dynamism of the EU - Ukraine relationship.

We have continued our discussion on issues of fundamental importance for the EU - Ukraine relationship, ranging from the status of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, through a broad range of reforms.

Ukraine is seeing a period of political stability, based on a strong parliamentary majority. This enables Ukraine to move forward with important reforms. The agreement found between Ukraine and the IMF on a new Stand-by Arrangement demonstrates the government's willingness to find solutions. Fulfilment of the criteria of the Stand-by Arrangement will enable the EU to move forward with the disbursement of our Macro-financial Assistance to Ukraine.

With Ukraine moving forward in her reform process, the EU stands by her side, to support and assist with both advice and financial resources.

Ukraine is a European country, and we share basic core values, on which we build our societies.

Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the core values we share and strive to implement in practice. We also discussed the importance of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media.

Over the past years, Ukraine has received considerable respect for the consolidation of democracy and the freedom of speech. Ukraine's legacy as an open society is an important one, and needs to be further built upon.

The local elections of 31 October are important for Ukraine. Their conduct should demonstrate that Ukraine's tradition of good elections, in line with international standards, continues. I commended President Yanukovich for having sent the new election law for amendments to the parliament, and stressed the importance of the legal framework providing a level playing field for all political forces and candidates.

In terms of regional developments, we discussed the importance of close EU - Ukraine co-operation in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. We also noted the importance of the Russian Federation as a strategic partner for both the EU and Ukraine.

Finally, In our talks, we both looked forward to the EU - Ukraine Summit of 22 November. I welcome President Yanukovich's commitment to the on-going negotiations on the EU - Ukraine Association Agreement. It will include the most developed Free Trade Agreement the EU has ever concluded. Not only will it provide market access, but is also a fundamentally important tool for modernisation and approximation of Ukrainian laws

and standards to the ones applicable in the European Union. It is important that these negotiations proceed as fast as possible.

*Statement by European Commission President Barroso on EU-Ukraine relations*

European Commission press release  
Brussels, 13 September 2010. [Link](#)

It is indeed a pleasure to welcome President Viktor Yanukovich back to Brussels. Our regular meetings reflect the importance and dynamism of the EU-Ukraine partnership – which has only gained in importance in these testing times.

We just had a very productive, open, wide-ranging discussion: We spoke about Ukraine's reform agenda, the next steps to deepen our relationship and also the reforms in Ukraine concerning democracy and fundamental rights.

I congratulated President Yanukovich on the achievements of his first months in office. We discussed the next priorities of Ukraine, for instance efforts to improve economic governance and other important aspects of Ukrainian reforms.

We are both committed to deepening our relationship. We want to achieve that together through the new, ambitious Association Agreement currently under negotiation. It will cement our political ties and lead to a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), offering Ukraine access to the world's largest market – EU - and giving it the perspective of doubling its exports to the EU.

A more dynamic Ukrainian economy is in our mutual interest. We agree to speed up negotiations and conclude the Agreement rapidly. Nonetheless there are still some major issues to be tackled here, in particular trade aspects such as tariffs.

We have also discussed the reform of the Ukrainian energy sector. I am pleased to note that since we last met there has been real progress, particularly with the adoption of a new gas law. We now expect Ukraine to move forward on the implementation of the gas sector reforms.

In this respect I would like to congratulate President Yanukovich for the decision to sign the Accession Protocol to the Energy Community already in the next ministerial meeting which will be held in Skopje.

As regards the modernisation of the Ukrainian Gas Transit Network, we also made progress. I am happy to mention that we are financing two feasibility studies starting in the coming weeks. Ukraine will remain a key transit country provided long-term and stable transit conditions can be found, which reflect the interest of all parties: Ukraine, EU and also Russia. The EU also stands ready to promote a trilateral dialogue with Ukraine and Russia on energy issues.

Finally, we also spoke of the importance of up-holding common values: respect for human rights, democratic principles and

the rule of law. Ukraine has a strong record of democratic development. President Yanukovich has publicly stressed the importance of human rights.

We therefore look to the Ukrainian authorities to ensure full respect of these values, in particular the freedom of the media, the independence of the judiciary and regarding the forthcoming local elections. I trust that, under President Yanukovich's leadership, these values will be further consolidated.

The EU and Ukraine share a very substantive agenda. We stand by Ukraine's side to help promote reforms. And there is a great deal of work ahead of us, in the run-up to our Summit on 22 November. I am confident we will be able to welcome further progress by then.

As you know we have also adopted a Joint Statement (MEMO/10/405) that reflects the very important substantive agenda that we are developing. I would like to thank President Yanukovich again for the spirit with which he came to Brussels, which enabled us to discuss these issues in such a deep way.

*Comments by Ukrainian President Yanukovich on meeting with European Council President Van Rompuy*

Ukrainian Presidency press release, 13 September 2010.  
[Link](#)

[Extracts]

The key issues of our meeting were Ukraine's integration into the European Union and signature of the Association Agreement.

We are trying to prepare the document, which has no analogues in the practice of the European Union.

We promote a free trade zone, which would involve gradual economic integration of Ukraine into the EU market.

We agreed to go through compromises and mutual concessions. I am grateful to Mr. Van Rompuy for the understanding.

Preparation of a visa-free travel action plan has already started, and we expect that it will be prepared by the time of Ukraine - EU summit in November. We have a common vision of the process.

*Cooperation of Ukrainian NGOs and the International Renaissance Foundation has caught the interest of the State Security Service (SBU) of Ukraine*

International Renaissance Foundation, press release  
Kyiv, 7 September 2010. [Link](#)

Several NGOs of Kyiv Oblast, which carry out projects financed by the International Renaissance Foundation, were requested by the SBU officials to provide information about the goals and tasks of the projects, their financial component and evaluation of their impact on the pre-election situation in Ukraine. Since none of the project contains a political component, the meeting was over.

In this regard, Administration of the International Renaissance Foundation asks relevant authorities to take into account that, according to its Statute, the International Renaissance Foundation cannot support initiatives of any political party.

We also ask to note the fact that the Foundation has never supported initiatives aimed at something other than fair and free elections. If we support non-governmental organizations during the autumn elections of 2010, this support will be directed just for such non-party initiatives.

On this occasion, we would also like to note that if the State Security Service directed their forces, accumulated due to voters-taxpayers, to ensure fair elections, non-use of administrative resources etc, such foundations as ours could put saved financial resources with more use into the development of open, non-corrupt, democratic society in Ukraine.

Yevhen Bystrytsky,

Executive Director of the IRF

*Ukraine signs the Energy Community Accession Protocol*

Energy Community press release  
Skopje, 24 September 2010. [Link](#)

This morning Mr. Yuriy Boyko, Minister of Fuel and Energy Ukraine, and Mr. Fatmir Besimi, Minister of Economy of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in his function as the Energy Community Presidency in Office, signed a Protocol on the accession of Ukraine to the Energy Community. Representing the Vice- Presidency, Mr. Fabrizio Barbaso, Deputy Director General for Energy at the European Commission also took part in the ceremony.

“Today’s signature signals our political will to align the principles of Ukrainian energy policy with that of the EU. I expect the Ukrainian parliament to ratify the Treaty very quickly within the coming months,” stated Mr. Boyko. “Ukraine’s accession is a major milestone in the Energy Community process. It is evident that the geographical reference to the Western Balkans in the Energy Community context is history. Today we witness the deepening of the EU energy policy and extension of its borders”, noted Minister Fatmir Besimi. “I am impressed by

the dynamics of the Energy Community process. Just five years ago nine Contracting Parties signed the Treaty establishing the Energy Community. In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria matured from a Contracting Party to a fully fledged EU member. Now in 2010 we are welcoming Moldova and Ukraine as new members of the Energy Community. Today’s signing ceremony adds force to the ultimate objective of creating a pan-European energy market on the ground of the EU principles and rules”, Mr. Barbaso added.

The Ministerial Council of the Energy Community approved the accession of Ukraine in December 2009. The signature of the Accession Protocol was, however, made subject to the adoption of a gas law in compliance with EU relevant rules. Today’s signature follows the enactment of the new Ukrainian gas law and publication in July 2010. As a next step, the Ukrainian Parliament is now expected to ratify the Treaty establishing the Energy Community as soon as possible.

As a Party to the Treaty, Ukraine has a binding obligation to implement the core EU energy law and thereby put in place a sound and transparent market structure. The alignment with the EU legal framework will, additionally, result in improved investment climate and higher financial stability. With its legal obligation to increase usage of renewable energy and energy efficiency, Ukraine will also contribute to tackling of climate change.

The signing ceremony took place in the morning of the 8th Energy Community Ministerial Council. The 8th Ministerial Council is expected to adopt on detailed recommendations concerning the future implementation of the Third Energy Internal Market Package and the new EU renewable energy Directive. Also, the two recently recasted energy efficiency Directives are expected to become applicable to the eight Contracting Parties.

CHRONOLOGY: The 1st Energy Community Ministerial Council accepted Ukraine as Observer to the Treaty in November 2006. In June 2007, the Energy Community Ministerial Council mandated the European Commission to lead the accession negotiations. Starting November 2008, three negotiation rounds took place. The technical negotiations were concluded with the signature of a Memorandum in October 2009. In December 2009, the Ministerial Council agreed on the accession of Ukraine under the terms and conditions set out in the relevant protocols.

**Related Document:**

EU insists on ‘unbundling’ Ukraine’s Naftogaz (Euractiv).  
[Access here.](#)

### *Gazprom and SOCAR sign addendum to Azerbaijani gas purchase and sale contract*

Gazprom press release

Moscow, 3 September 2010. [Link](#)

Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee attended in Baku an extended meeting with Ilkham Aliiev, President of Azerbaijan within the official visit of the Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The meeting participants emphasized that Russia and Azerbaijan had a long track record of cooperation, which evolved rapidly and had a great development potential for the future. The meeting resulted in signing an addendum to the effective gas purchase and sale contract for Azerbaijani natural gas between Gazprom and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). Pursuant to the addendum, the annual volumes of gas purchase will grow to 2 billion cubic meters starting from 2011 and to more than 2 billion cubic meters from 2012.

“At today’s meeting with our Azerbaijani counterparts and Rovnag Abdullayev, President of SOCAR we analyzed the implementation of the contract for gas supply from Azerbaijan to Russia over the period from January to August 2010, looked at the ways of the cooperation deepening between our companies and resolved to further increase the gas purchase amount. This is fully in line with our basic contract, which doesn’t limit the maximum volume of gas supply from Azerbaijan. Owing to territorial proximity, transit zones absence and existing gas transmission infrastructure availability, the cooperation deepening in the gas sector between Azerbaijan and Russia is considered the most economically beneficial option for both partners. It is absolutely clear therefore, that Azerbaijan gives priority to increasing its export volumes particularly for Russia. It is widely known that the Russian direction is the most reliable and secure transmission corridor for Azerbaijani gas,” stated Alexey Miller.

#### *Background*

*On October 14, 2009 Gazprom and SOCAR signed the purchase and sale contract for Azerbaijani natural gas. Starting from January 1, 2010 Azerbaijani gas has been supplied to Russia in the amount of up to 1 billion cubic meters per annum.*

### *Signing ceremony on implementation of AGRI Project between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania*

SOCAR - State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, press release

Baku, 14 September 2010. [Link](#)

Energy Ministers of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania have signed a number of documents on implementation of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector Project (AGRI) at SOCAR Head Office within the summit on support to the project held in Baku. By opening the ceremony, Azerbaijani Minister of Industry and Energy Mr. Natig Aliyev expressed his gratitude to welcome the guests at State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic and mentioned the importance of the project. Romanian Minister of Economy, Trade and Business

Climate Mr. Ion Arition and Georgian Energy Minister Mr. Alexander Khetaguri pointed out that AGRI project creates new opportunities for Azerbaijan on gas supply of European countries and praised the support of the three countries’ presidents. Afterwards, a draft statute for AGRI LNG project and memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the creation of a joint venture were signed by Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Romanian companies. The documents were signed by SOCAR President Mr. Rovnag Abdullayev, Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation General Director Mr. Zurab Janjgava and Romgaz President Marcel Adrian Piteiu. The signing ceremony was followed by short briefing for journalists.

#### *Background*

*SOCAR, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation and Romania’s Romgaz will each hold a 33 percent stake in the venture, which is expected to cost two to four billion euros (2.6-5.1 billion dollars).*

*Called the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI), the project is expected to supply up to eight billion cubic metres of gas to Europe per year.*

*An initial memorandum of understanding on the project was signed in Bucharest in April.*

*The project is aimed at diversifying energy routes to Europe, which relies on Russia for a quarter of its gas supplies.*

*The European Union has been seeking alternatives to Russian gas following a number of disputes that disrupted Russian supplies to some countries in eastern and central Europe.*

*Officials have described the AGRI project as complementary to the EU’s flagship Nabucco pipeline project, the key component in the bloc’s Southern Corridor plan to bypass Russia in bringing Caspian Sea gas to Europe.*

*Nabucco, a 3,300-kilometre (2,050-mile) conduit between Turkey and Austria, is estimated to cost 7.9 billion euros (10.1 billion dollars) and is scheduled to be completed by 2014. It aims to transport up to 31 billion cubic metres of gas annually. (Source: Eubusiness)*

### *EUHR Ashton on the Middle East peace talks*

EU press release

Brussels, 27 September 2010. [Link](#)

I have spoken with Senator George Mitchell and Quartet Envoy Tony Blair today on the latest developments regarding the Middle East peace talks and I will speak shortly to President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

I regret the Israeli decision not to extend the moratorium on settlements. We are examining the consequences of this decision and consulting with the parties and our Quartet and Arab partners.

The Quartet welcomed Israel’s moratorium and the positive atmosphere it created for the negotiations. Both Palestinians and Israelis have an obligation to act in accordance with previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. The position of the EU is very clear: settlements are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible.

I urge the parties to act responsibly. There is no alternative to a negotiated solution. Therefore, it is in everybody's interest to find a satisfactory way for the negotiations to continue and gather momentum. The EU stands firm on our full support to the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as part of a just and comprehensive peace. We will do whatever is possible to help both parties choose the path of peace and reach a successful outcome.

**Related Document:**

Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance.

[Download here.](#)

*Statement by European Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP, Füle, on the result of the referendum in Turkey*

European Commission press release  
Brussels, 13 September 2010. [Link](#)

The Commission welcomes the approval, by the Turkish people, of the Constitutional reforms in the referendum which took place on 12 September. It demonstrates the continued commitment of Turkish citizens to reforms in view of enhancing their rights and freedoms. As we consistently said in the past months, these reforms are a step in the right direction as they address a number of long-standing priorities in Turkey's efforts towards fully complying with the accession criteria.

However, their impact on the ground will depend on their actual implementation. A number of implementing laws will be needed and we will follow their preparation very closely. Meanwhile, we encourage the Turkish government to show utmost transparency as well as a spirit of dialogue on the substance of this implementing legislation.

We share the views of many in Turkey that the 12 September vote needs to be followed by other much needed reforms to address the remaining priorities in the area of fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. In this respect, we agree with those across the political spectrum in Turkey who believe that a new civilian Constitution would provide a solid base for a sustained development of democracy in Turkey, in line with European standards and the EU accession criteria.

Finally, the Commission emphasises that any future constitutional changes should be prepared through the broadest possible consultation, involving all political parties and civil society in a timely manner and a spirit of dialogue and compromise.

*UN resolution on advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's declaration of independence*  
Brussels, 27 July 2010. [Link](#)

The UN General Assembly,

- a) Aware of the aims and principles of the UN;
- b) Taking into account its functions and powers under the UN Charter;
- c) Recalling its Resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008 requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to give an advisory opinion regarding the following question whether the unilateral declaration of independence by the provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo is in accordance with international law;
- d) Having received the advisory opinion of the ICJ of 22 July 2010 on whether the unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law in the case of Kosovo, and after careful consideration thereof, including the issues that the opinion concerned;
- e) Takes note of the contents of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on whether the unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law in the case of Kosovo, as well as the response to the request of the General Assembly;
- f) Welcomes the readiness of the EU to facilitate the process of dialogue between the parties. The process of dialogue by itself would be a factor of peace, security and stability in the region. This dialogue would be aimed to promote cooperation, make progress on the path towards the EU and improve people's lives.

*UN General Assembly adopts joint Resolution by Serbia, EU*

Serbian Government press release  
Belgrade/New York, 10 Sept 2010. [Link](#)

Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic presented the Resolution to the General Assembly before the voting, stating that the Resolution is a fundamentally status-neutral document.

The Minister stressed the readiness of the Serbian side for dialogue, but underscored that Belgrade does not and shall not recognise the unilateral declaration of the province's independence.

Jeremic stated that this document welcomes EU's readiness to facilitate the process of dialogue between the two sides that would contribute to stability and improving the lives of the people in the province.

He added that with the adoption of the Resolution, an atmosphere would be created in which a lasting solution

would be able to be found through dialogue between Serbs and Albanians.

Do not doubt that Serbia remains adamant and that we will not tire because we cannot fail. Great challenges are ahead of us, but our strength is great as well, Jeremic maintained.

We look to the future, convinced that our stance is just, he concluded.

The text of the Resolution, which Serbia submitted after several days of diplomatic contacts with the EU, calls for dialogue on the Kosovo issue and does not in any way recognise the independence of the Serbian southern province.

This ended the process that began before the ICJ, but it does not mean that the world organisation will no longer discuss this issue.

The UN Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1244 will continue to engage with this issue.

The text of the Resolution was agreed on with all 27 EU member states – 22 that have recognised Kosovo's independence, and five that did not do so.

Jeremic emphasised after the session in a statement to Tanjug news agency that the adopted Resolution in no way confirms the independence of Kosovo or calls into question the territorial integrity of Serbia.

He pointed out that the adoption of the Serbian Resolution on Kosovo-Metohija that Serbia had harmonised on with the EU, is of great importance, because it ends the process before the ICJ with a political conclusion that calls for negotiation.

Most of the speakers in the debate at the UN General Assembly, including some of the most influential states – Russia, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia – advocated in favour of Serbia, Jeremic underlined.

He recalled that two-thirds of UN member states have not recognised the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo and that a solution acceptable to all parties can be achieved only through dialogue.

Jeremic said that the UN General Assembly session was delayed for more than two hours, as the representatives of Kosovo Albanians appeared in the hall uninvited by any UN member states.

The Minister remarked that Serbian representatives demanded that the Kosovo Albanians leave the room, but they did not do so.

The dispute was resolved by the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and France as in the meanwhile they invited representatives of Kosovo Albanians to attend the meeting as their guest.

### *EUHR Ashton on the next steps at the UN concerning the advisory opinion on Kosovo*

EU press release

Brussels, 8 September 2010. [Link](#)

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, made today the following statement after an agreement was reached between the EU and Serbia to cosponsor a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) draft resolution on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on Kosovo:

"I warmly welcome the announcement by the President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, on the next steps at the UN General Assembly concerning the draft resolution on the ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo.

This draft resolution will now be a resolution put forward by 28 European countries. All 27 EU member states and Serbia will be co-sponsoring this draft resolution.

We have been working together with Serbia and this result today is a reflection of our common commitment to Serbia's European perspective.

After the UNGA vote on 9 September 2010 the important thing will be that the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina can start. This dialogue will in itself be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region."

### *«Serbia 10 years after: moving on towards the EU»*

Speech by the European Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP, Füle

Brussels, 16 September 2010. [Link](#)

### **10 years of EU-Serbia relations**

Marking 10 years of EU-Serbia relations allows realising how much ground has already been covered.

10 years ago, the European Union stood aside the Serbian people in their democratic revival. On the eve of the 5th October 2000, as events were unfolding in Belgrade and in the rest of the country, the then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi shared the emotions of the Serbian people and stated:

"I am watching events unfold in Belgrade with concern and hope. It is time to heed the popular will. Time for speedy, peaceful transition to democracy. Europe stands ready to welcome the new Serbia with open arms.[...] Serbia is Europe. The road to peace and reconciliation is now open, leaving violence and hatred behind".

Only a few weeks after that acceleration of history, the EU reaffirmed the European perspective of all Western Balkan countries at the Zagreb Summit; it opened its market to products from the region; and it delivered 200m€ of emergency

assistance, including much needed heating fuel, to the people of Serbia, in order to help stabilise the situation.

This commitment has since ever been present within EU institutions and certainly in the European Commission, as we were conscious of the particular responsibility that the European Union is to assume in the region.

While the strict application of the conditions attached to the Enlargement process have not allowed for any shortcut, it is equally true that the EU has endlessly strived to support Serbia's reintegration into the European mainstream, helped reconnect its networks to the ones of its neighbours, included Serbia in many of its strategies, the latest of which is the Danube Strategy. And we did again last year when we agreed to use part of our financial assistance as budget support to help Serbia alleviating the impact of the economic crisis.

### Recent developments

In the more recent period we have yet moved a number of steps forward.

- Lisbon treaty and Enlargement policy

Let me first mention, on the side of the EU, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty as I consider it of key importance for the enlargement process.

In the most obvious sense the Lisbon Treaty creates the necessary institutional certainty to allow accession to go ahead. This is important because it is through the Lisbon Treaty that the European Union is able to keep its most fundamental promise to the countries of the Western Balkans made at the Zagreb Summit ten years ago. And the recent Council consensus on the UN General Assembly resolution has to be seen in this context too.

It is also important to note that the Lisbon treaty does not create any new criteria or raise any obstacles to accession. It has, however, placed further emphasis on the key characteristic of the European Union: that it is a Union of shared values, a Union of its citizen's and for its citizens.

Another reason why the Lisbon treaty is important, in our context of enlargement policy, is that it has put the European Foreign policy on new foundations and gives us the right combination of instruments and powers to make a decisive contribution to resolving open issues in the region.

- New steps in the bilateral relations between Serbia and the EU

a) the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues has entered into force and Serbia has started with determination to implement its provisions for more than 18 months now. With his background, Bozidar Djelic is well placed to know how important such a comprehensive framework is for all domestic and foreign economic actors who are active or plan to develop their business in Serbia. In June, the Council also decided to proceed with the SAA ratification and four Member states have already done so. I hope that the European Parliament will also soon be in a position to give its assent.

b) the visa liberalisation was another huge success for the citizens of Serbia – the number of biometric passports delivered up to date, more than two million, is a proof of the fantastic expectation among the people of Serbia we have responded to.

Together with all other policies in place, such as in the areas of Education and youth, Research, Innovation, we are gradually reconnecting large sectors of Serbian society with the EU and counterparts in Member States.

This will without any doubt have a lasting impact and contribute to nurture a new spirit in favour of the European project.

### New prospects for decisive action

We have arrived now at a critical juncture. Serbia applied to join the European Union which was an important manifestation of its commitment to European integration.

It is not difficult to see how beneficial for you and for the EU a move to the next steps of accession can represent. While the road to accession is a long and arduous one, it also entails new opportunities all along its path.

The Commission stands ready as soon as the Council decides it to prepare an Opinion on Serbia's application. As the visa dialogue has shown the way, you must remain fully mobilised and continue to deliver steadily and consistently on reforms as this will pay off for the preparation of the opinion and its findings.

This means, and this largely in your hand Deputy prime Minister, that efforts should without waiting be intensified, on the basis of the National Programme on EU integration. Areas where we have expressed concerns should also be tackled as a matter of priority in order to be recorded in the opinion and favourably prepare the subsequent steps of your European integration. In this regard, preparations of our progress report on this year's progress in Serbia are still underway. The report itself will be published in November. I hope to still see significant improvements materialise until the 1st of October, when we close the report.

### EU relations with FYROM

Statement by European Commission President Barroso following his meeting with FYROM President Gjorge Ivanov  
Brussels, 9 September 2010 . [Link](#)

I'm very pleased to welcome President Ivanov to the European Commission. This was an important meeting because we are now starting to prepare the annual progress reports that we will publish in November.

We have discussed the country's accession process and the need to consolidate the internal reforms. I have also welcomed the President Ivanov's efforts to strengthen relations with key neighbours. This is very important for the stability of the region.

Last year we made a positive recommendation to start accession negotiations and we have granted visa free travel for FYROM citizens. This was a clear recognition of the efforts made, and it was also an encouragement to push ahead for a resolution on the name issue.

Unfortunately this has not yet happened. I know that efforts are being made through the UN process and in direct talks with Greece. I understand the extreme sensitivities of this issue, but I call on all sides to resolve this obstacle as quickly as possible. It's time to decide. We believe now it is time to decide on this issue of the name.

I have also outlined to President Ivanov the need to keep the pace of the reform process. Important measures are needed to consolidate political dialogue, the independence of the judiciary and to reduce corruption and organised crime and I thank President Ivanov for the very comprehensive information that he wanted to share with me regarding these matters.

The Commission remains committed to FYROM's European aspirations and looks forward to open accession negotiations as soon as the Council so requests. I hope to see important decisions taken in the coming months to make that possible. I am confident. I want to underline that I am more confident now than I was some years ago so let's try to see if those who have an interest in this matter can really make a final effort to bridge differences and we can make progress because I think it is indeed time to decide.

### *The same old modernisation game? Russian interpretations of modernisation*

Félix Krawatzek and Roderick Kefferpütz  
CEPS Working Document, No. 337, September 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

The modernisation of Russia has been a topic of vigorous debate for centuries. It has also been an intensely divisive issue among Russia's elite, and since President Dmitry Medvedev came to power, modernisation has become the leitmotif of the presidency. The global economic crisis hit Russia hard, meaning that the status quo in political, economic and social terms is no longer acceptable. However, there are a number of competing visions on modernisation within the Russian political elite and society as a whole. This Working Document aims to illustrate the diversity of and competition for the dominance of views on Russia's future. In a second step, authors Félix Krawatzek, Visiting Researcher at CEPS and Roderick Kefferpütz, Associate Research Fellow, analyse the obstacles to a successful realisation of the ambitious modernisation agenda and outline the implications for the new EU-Russia modernisation partnership.

### *Turkey and the EU: A play in search of a script*

Riccardo Perissich  
CEPS/EuropEos Commentary, 28 September 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

This Commentary warns that by continuing to act as if Turkey's membership of the EU was still a credible prospect, the EU is dodging the critical issue of how to establish friendly and constructive relations with an independent, self-confident Turkey. More importantly, this approach prevents the EU from at last accepting that enlargement is not the only – nor necessarily the best – policy option available to deal effectively with a strategically important country on its borders.

The author, Riccardo Perissich, is Executive Vice-President of the Council for the United States and Italy and former Director General for the Internal Market and Industry in the European Commission. This series of Commentaries are contributed by members of EuropEos, a multidisciplinary group of jurists, economists, political scientists and journalists set up in 2002 with the aim of creating an ongoing forum for the discussion of European policy and institutional issues.

### *Constitutional Referendum in Turkey: Does it really mean more democracy?*

Senem Aydin Düzgit  
CEPS Commentary, 23 September 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

The constitutional package that was approved by Turkey's electorate in the September 12th referendum can decidedly be considered a step forward towards the drafting of a new civilian constitution, which is sorely needed for a rapidly changing, vibrant and dynamic Turkey. Nevertheless, the referendum was bitterly fought between the governing AKP and the opposition parties – CHP and the ultra nationalist MHP – both of which launched a 'no' campaign and some 42% of the population voted against it. This Commentary explores why the initiative continues to be subject to debate and criticism in some segments of the mainstream media.

The author is Assistant Professor, Istanbul Bilgi University and Associate Research Fellow, CEPS.



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