

# The Future of the Eastern Partnership Seen from a German Perspective

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Eastern Partnership, a Polish-Swedish proposal, was adopted as an EU strategy on 28 May 2008. This was restated on 7 May 2009 at the founding summit in Prague. The purpose of the Eastern Partnership was to redefine relations between the enlarged EU and its eastern neighbouring states in conceptual terms. The war in Georgia broke out in August 2008 whilst the strategy was still being formulated, and this changed the whole framework of the EU's Eastern Policy. In January 2009 Russia interrupted gas deliveries to Ukraine, which led inexorably to a freeze in relations with the EU. The latter reacted by adopting the Eastern Partnership at the summit in Prague. However, a year later the situation has changed completely, and relations with Russia are improving steadily, albeit rather slowly. In Ukraine there were democratic presidential elections, and a few months after the elections the new incumbent concluded a treaty with Russia which will lead to greater links with the Russian Federation. There do not seem to be measures in the offing in any of the other neighbouring states, with the exception of Moldova, which seem to point to a greater degree of interaction with the EU. Under these circumstances it is legitimate to try to ascertain the status of the Eastern Partnership in future EU foreign policy.

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## **Adoption of the Eastern Partnership**

The purpose of the Eastern Partnership, which has been given financial resources of only €600 million, is to support the reform-oriented countries to the east of the EU in the introduction of reforms designed to promote democracy and the market economy. It was also the price that had to be paid for the adoption of the Mediterranean Union, which was initiated by French President Sarkozy in Paris on 13 July 2008. The Swedish and Polish proposals envisaged greater cooperation with the EU's eastern neighbouring states that was based on and went beyond the familiar strategy of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

[http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=5163](http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5163)

In the long term the Eastern Partnership even envisages the abolition of visa requirements. Since the accession to the Schengen accords by the central European states in December 2007, this has been one of the most contentious issues along the EU's eastern border. Apart from this there are proposals for a "multilateral" committee which can discuss disputed points and the demarcation of borders. It contains the option for EU involvement in intra-state conflicts in the Caucasus. And finally, the proposals envisage cooperation in a number of different areas such as the promotion of democracy, support for the rule of law, preventive action against migration, the stimulation of trade and tourism, the improvement of transportation links, cooperation on environmental issues, and student exchange programmes. On top of this there are special measures for Belarus which circumvent government controls and are aimed directly at Belarus citizens. Russia is also invited to participate in certain projects.

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1858&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&quiLanguage=en>

The Eastern Partnership is compatible with the Central Asia Strategy, which was adopted during the German EU Presidency in 2007 and, together with the mandate to renegotiate the partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia, forms the basis of the EU's new Eastern Policy.

[http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Engl\\_spotlight\\_EU%20Eastern%20Partnership\\_09-05-28.pdf](http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Engl_spotlight_EU%20Eastern%20Partnership_09-05-28.pdf) and  
[http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Spotlight\\_07\\_2008\\_Neighbours.pdf](http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Spotlight_07_2008_Neighbours.pdf)

## **German Eastern Policy is a Balancing Act**

Before the Eastern Partnership strategy was adopted by the EU, certain decisions were made. They will be explained in some detail in order to make it possible to understand the ramifications of the whole issue.

German reactions to French President Sarkozy's proposals to establish a Mediterranean Union were very muted. A speech on EU Eastern Policy given by German foreign minister Steinmeier on 4 March 2008 was an indirect response to the French plans.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html> However, policy on Russia was at the heart of Steinmeier's proposals, which were reminiscent of Willi Brandt's Eastern Policy. Egon Bahr, the architect of Brandt's Eastern Policy, emphasized on several occasions that there was a link between German Eastern Policy of the 1960s and the 1970s and current EU Eastern Policy. "Moving closer together through change" had

to be supplanted by “moving closer together through interaction.” At the time Steinmeier was foreign minister of the grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD, and SPD candidate for the office of chancellor. However, his proposals for European Eastern Policy did not play a role in the election campaign, though most of the political elite in Berlin concurred with his views.

Steinmeier was confronted with the Polish plans for an Eastern Partnership in the course of a private visit to Polish foreign minister Sikorski at the beginning of April 2008. However, a month after his keynote speech on EU Eastern Policy he was not in a mood to support the Polish proposal. Steinmeier had given pride of place to relations with Russia, and believed that the Polish proposals constituted a threat to German interests in Russia. “During our presidency we developed an EU strategy for this region which will facilitate a broad range of cooperation in many areas: the energy partnership, enhanced trade links, the joint fight against narcotics and terrorism, the promotion of the rule of law, education and training, and the effective use of water resources,” Steinmeier pointed out in his keynote speech. He added that “a modern European Eastern Policy – today that means drawing Ukraine towards the EU, a partnership with Russia, the democratization of Belarus, cooperation with Central Asia, and a fruitful spirit of coexistence around the Black Sea and in the Caucasus. It also entails close cooperation with the US and our other allies so that we can attain these common goals. Above all it means a common space of peace and prosperity from the Atlantic coast to Siberia, or, to go even farther, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html>

However, the primary focus on Russia elicited a report from the proponents of a more pro-active neighbourhood policy. Politicians from the CDU and the Greens in particular tend to include other states under the term “European Eastern Policy” in addition to Russia. The most important member of this group is the Chancellor herself, who was the sole representative of a European “heavyweight” to attend the Prague summit. “The Eastern Partnership is a project which serves the cause of peace, development and the exchange of people and ideas.” This is how Chancellor Merkel defined the new EU strategy for the neighbouring states to the east of the EU. [http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/nn\\_700276/Content/DE/Artikel/2009/05/2009-05-07-eu-oestliche-partnerschaft.html](http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/nn_700276/Content/DE/Artikel/2009/05/2009-05-07-eu-oestliche-partnerschaft.html) The Eastern Partnership received robust support in the German parliament. Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Parliament, emphasized on 30 April 2009 that “The EU Eastern Partnership is not the same as substitute membership.” <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4219286,00.html>

At the same time German perceptions of Russia have changed. An examination of the media coverage demonstrates that over the last few years attitudes to the transformation processes in eastern Europe have become more varied. This has also changed the way in which politicians look at Russia and the post-Soviet space. At the beginning of the 1990s President Putin was invited to speak to the German Parliament, whereas today there is a predominantly critical attitude to his presidency, as is demonstrated by a speech given by the coordinator for German-Russian relations, Andreas Schockenhoff:

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2009/090121-SchockenhoffKAS.html>

After the elections to the German Parliament in September 2009, the FDP and Guido Westerwelle assumed control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hitherto the new minister has not been an outspoken supporter of the Eastern Partnership, although other members of his party and sympathizers have made positive remarks about this issue.

[http://www.freiheit.org/webcom/show\\_article.php?wc\\_c=617&wc\\_id=15024&wc\\_p=1](http://www.freiheit.org/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=617&wc_id=15024&wc_p=1)

<http://fdpbundestagsfraktion.wordpress.com/tag/russland/>

On the other hand policymakers, and above all the Office of the Chancellor, cannot afford to ignore the patent interests of German industry, which have been clearly articulated by the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations of the Federation of German Industries. Russia is one of the most important export markets for German industry, especially for the automotive and engineering sectors. In 2008, the best year to date, the exchange of goods with Russia amounted to more than €68 billion, and the whole of Germany's trade with eastern Europe to €84 billion. Today as much as 50 percent of Russia's trade is with the EU. 80 percent of Russian energy exports are purchased by the EU. And more than 75 percent of foreign investment in Russia comes from the EU. Germany takes pride of place with regard to exports and imports to and from Russia.

[http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/pm\\_pdf/26\\_02\\_2009\\_pm\\_handel\\_uebersicht.pdf](http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/pm_pdf/26_02_2009_pm_handel_uebersicht.pdf)

### **The Change of Strategy after the War in Georgia**

German policy towards neighbouring states in Eastern Europe consists of two components. On the one hand the German government is concerned to maintain good relations with Russia, i.e. to secure a new partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) between the EU and the Russian Federation. On the other hand, relations with other neighbouring states have been redefined within the framework of the Eastern Partnership strategy. In addition to Germany, Poland plays a key role in determining the shape of the two elements of the EU's Eastern Policy, not only on account of its subject-related competence and the government resources earmarked for this purpose, but also because of the consensus with regard to this important policymaking issue which exists among the country's political elite. This was clearly apparent both in the postponement of negotiations on a new PCA with Russia at the end of 2006 and in the establishment of the Eastern Partnership in 2008.

A kind of "division of labour" in the shaping of EU Eastern Policy was an important element in the revival of German-Polish cooperation. After the advent of the new government in Warsaw in the autumn of 2007, bilateral relations became less tense, especially since Radek Sikorski could not be accused of pursuing pro-German policies. In the wake of the controversial historical topics the shift to the subject of Eastern Policy gave cooperation a new lease of life. On top of this there was the fact that Poland, despite German reticence, had managed to secure Swedish diplomatic support for the Eastern Partnership, and thus to bridge the divide between the old and new member states. And after the Poles had managed to convince the Lithuanians to stop their obstruction of the negotiating mandate for the PCA with Russia, it was possible to do a deal. A counter-balance to the Mediterranean Union on the one hand, and on the other a mandate for the EU Commission to commence the PCA negotiations with Russia. On 26 April 2008 the EU foreign ministers were able to adopt Poland's proposal for the Eastern Partnership and to give the green light to the EU Commission to begin negotiations with Russia on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

[http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/spotlight\\_EU-Russia.pdf](http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/spotlight_EU-Russia.pdf)

Some members of the German foreign policy community were totally shocked by the outbreak of the war in Georgia on 8 August 2008. Steinmeier's trip to North Caucasus in June 2008 had been a last-ditch attempt to prevent the situation from worsening. At the end of August, after the cessation of hostilities in Georgia, there was a conceptual vacuum both in Berlin and in Brussels. The Chancellor and the foreign minister agreed that it was imperative to send an unmistakable signal to Russia and neighbouring states. At this juncture the Polish-Swedish proposal came in rather handy and was developed on the lines envisaged by its authors. Thus the EU special summit on 1 September 2009 noted the importance accorded to the Eastern Partnership.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Georgien/Aktuell/080901-ratsschlussfolgerungen.pdf>

The position of the EU changed as a result of the war in Georgia, since it enhanced its global significance. For the first time in its history the EU assumed the role of a mediator between Russia and a successor state of the Soviet Union. Russia was forced to accept this fact, even though there were attempts to avoid treating Sarkozy as EU President, and to "downgrade" him to being "no more" than President of France. Sarkozy's role was very important, even though this is a mammoth challenge for the EU, which it has unfortunately not yet been able to master. This was demonstrated by what happened in the months after the end of hostilities in Georgia. The current state in the conflict areas shows that the EU was unable to implement the ceasefire agreement. To this day the representatives of the EUNN mission do not have access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

### **The Change of Strategy in Moscow**

Relations between the European Union and Russia have developed in a negative way in every area since EU enlargement in 2004. Only the greatest of optimists could describe them as being reminiscent of a partnership. The course and the outcome of the Orange revolution in Kyiv led to panic-stricken reactions in Russia. In the eyes of the Russian elite the EU had become an ideological enemy which was seeking to expand its sphere of influence in the name of democracy. Furthermore, energy has become an area of conflict, even though the interests of both parties are compatible. The interruption of gas supplies in January 2005 and in particular in January 2009 has destroyed the image of Russia as a reliable partner. This aspect was initially underestimated in Moscow, which has defined itself uncritically as a growing centre of power in the post-Soviet space. Even after the start of the economic crisis Moscow did not bother to think about the consequences of a reduction of gas supplies in the winter of 2009. This was Russia's strategic mistake. The crisis changed the balance of power in a fundamental manner. In the light of declining exports to Russia, the export industries no longer placed as much pressure on their governments to maintain good relations with the Russia Federation. The adoption of the Third Energy Package by the EU in April 2009 practically dashed Gazprom's hopes of obtaining direct access to the European end user. Furthermore, the war in Georgia put paid to ideas of setting up a joint area of security. Thus it is hardly surprising that Moscow's draft for a new European security architecture elicited no enthusiasm in Europe. A lack of mutual trust means that neither side has made any progress with regard to the abolition of visa requirements.



In Moscow the path that is being pursued by Brussels has come under increasing scrutiny. Thus Sarkozy shocked the political elite in Moscow in August 2008 when he insisted on mediating in the Georgia conflict in his capacity as EU President. The adoption of the Eastern Partnership proved to be yet another surprise that Moscow had not reckoned with, since it had assumed that the important aspects of the EU's Eastern Policy in the post-Soviet space were in the process of being redefined. The Russian elite had paid too much attention to Steinmeier's proposals, and had completely underestimated the Polish-Swedish initiative. To this day sections of the Russian elite believe that the EU is a paper tiger because it does not understand the way in which Brussels functions. However, at the beginning of 2009 it became apparent to Moscow that the EU's policy on Russia is not made by Germany on its own, and that after five years of EU membership Poland is acquiring more and more influence in the EU. This among other things was the reason why Prime Minister Putin decided to travel to the Westerplatte, and to try to reach an accommodation with Poland. Today Russia is far more interested in a partnership with the EU than the other way around. And not only because of economic reform, but also on account of the progress of globalization, which is confronting Russia with completely new geo-political challenges.

[http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Engl\\_spotlight\\_EU%20Eastern%20Partnership\\_09-05-28.pdf](http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-61EF00BD-3622CD41/bst/Engl_spotlight_EU%20Eastern%20Partnership_09-05-28.pdf)

### **The Implementation of the Eastern Partnership in the EU and the Partner States**

The EU summit adopted the Eastern Partnership on 7 May 2009. From the very beginning it was compared with the EU summit for the Mediterranean Union, which took place on 13 July 2008. It is immediately noticeable that in Prague the political representation of the EU member states left much to be desired. Of the important heads of state and government, only Chancellor Merkel came in person. France, the UK, Italy and Spain were represented on a lower level.

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/09/st08/st08435.de09.pdf>

After the EU summit in Prague it proved possible to take a series of measures which gave concrete shape to the Eastern Partnership. First and foremost was the fact that the EU Commission managed to determine the financial framework.

[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/eastern/docs/eap\\_vademecum\\_14122009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf)

The next step was the establishment of the Civil Society Forum, which will coordinate the civil society activities in the partner states. The first meeting took place in Brussels in November 2009.

[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/eastern/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm)

In this area the EU's Eastern Partnership will be able to seize numerous opportunities if it turns its back on highfalutin politics and concentrates on the individual citizen. Since we are dealing with a region which in the next few decades is almost certainly not going to be joining the EU, the societal dimension will turn out to be the most important strategic element. The issue must be the long-term incorporation of the Eastern Partnership states into pan-European projects, debates and procedures. This is a long-term process, and it is the purpose of the Eastern Partnership to tell people that they are part of the European family, even if they are not members of the EU.

After the adoption of the Eastern Partnership the situation in the partner states developed in a negative direction. Thus Ukraine did a great disservice to the new EU strategy in that it criticized the proposals vehemently and rejected them before the Prague summit had actually taken place.

Unfortunately the EU was unable to offer Ukraine anything else at the time. In Berlin Ukraine's critical stance was considered to be Warsaw's fault, and it became apparent that Warsaw had not explained the strategy properly to the partner states. The problem was sorted out during a joint visit of foreign ministers Steinmeier and Sikorski to Kyiv.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2009/Ukraine/090616-vorab.html>

In the summer of 2009 Ukraine was paralyzed by the election campaign. The outcome of the presidential elections changed the situation to the disadvantage of the EU. After the elections newly elected President Yanukovich travelled to Brussels and demonstrated that he was interested in maintaining relations with the EU. However, subsequent developments rocked the foundations on which fruitful EU cooperation with Ukraine was based. The treaty on the stationing of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in Crimea, and on gas deliveries, which was signed on 21 April 2010 by Presidents Medvedev and Yanukovich, calls into question the links between the EU and Ukraine. The treaty states that Ukraine, which is on the verge of a state of insolvency, will receive a discount of about €30 billion from Russia via changes in the gas treaties. The price for this is that the Russian Black Sea Fleet can retain its bases on the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea until at least 2042.

<http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E5B500A0E9E7D4EAE BF85E2BA570AAE9F~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> Ukraine has not yet joined the customs union organized by Russia, but pressure is mounting for it to do so. If Gazprom were to take over the Ukrainian gas monopolist Naftohas Ukarainy, this would put an end to the European dream of an independent Ukraine.

[http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=6595](http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6595)

In Belarus the situation looks just as bad. The local elections held in April 2010 suggest that the democratization of this country, in which the EU placed such high hopes, still has a long way to go. Minsk is not making much progress when it comes to greater openness. The disagreements between Lukashenko and Moscow will probably ensure that relations between the EU and Belarus will not become totally moribund in the coming months, but a breakthrough cannot be expected.

There are no positive developments in the other partner states of the Eastern Neighbourhood. The dialogue between Armenia and Turkey has run out of steam on the governmental level, although the scientific and societal debate continues to move ahead. Opening the border between the two states has been postponed indefinitely. If the dialogue turns out to be a failure, stronger links between Armenia and Russia are fairly inevitable, primarily on account of Armenian security policy considerations. The Armenian-Turkish dialogue is also closely bound up with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is interested in continuing the dialogue with Armenia, but is calling for progress in the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia refuses to link the two issues. [http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/armenien\\_tuerkei\\_1.5514883.html](http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/armenien_tuerkei_1.5514883.html)

Azerbaijani's interest in the EU sinks every time there is another problem with the construction of the Nabucco pipeline. The decision to defer the exploitation of the gas fields for which the Nabucco pipeline is destined until the year 2017 has not improved relations, quite apart from Azerbaijan's lack of progress in the area of democratization. <http://www.gastip.de/News/21979/Nabucco-Vorerst-kein-Gas-aus-Aserbaidtschan.html>



The Eastern Partnership has now been in existence for a year, and at an unofficial meeting in Sopot in Poland on 24 May 2010 the foreign ministers of the EU and the partner countries are taking the opportunity to assess whether or not it has been effective.

## Conclusions

The bilateral relationship between Poland and Russia will play a crucial role when it comes to determining the nature of relations between the enlarged EU and Russia. For this reason Germany has repeatedly sought to support a balanced EU Eastern Policy. A pro-Russian proposal made by the former foreign minister, Steinmeier, spoke of “moving closer together through interaction.” This idea, to which Chancellor Merkel was not opposed, could well be complemented by the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership. Chancellor Merkel demonstrated her support for this complementary approach by attending the summit in Prague.

The balanced and pragmatic policy on Russia pursued by the Polish government under Donald Tusk has led to a thaw in Polish-Russian relations, and has always received the support of German foreign policymakers. Here the turning point was the visit of Russian Prime Minister Putin, who attended the commemoration at the Westerplatte on 1 September 2009. This did much to strengthen Poland’s hand in the shaping of EU Eastern Policy. The catastrophe on 10 April 2010, in which, in addition to Polish President Kaczynski, 95 members of the Polish elite were killed, and the subsequent Polish-Russian rapprochement constitute an opportunity to improve relations between Poland and the rest of the EU with the Russian Federation.

After taking over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the first trip abroad on 30 October 2009 took the new Minister of Foreign Affairs to Warsaw. Here he agreed to support the revival of the Weimar Triangle, a German-Polish-French initiative dating back to 1991, the purpose of which is to coordinate the European policy of these three EU member states. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2009/polen/090131-polen.html>

New ideas designed to strengthen the EU are to be developed within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, and existing challenges such as the EU’s Eastern Policy are to be honed and enhanced. Ukrainian foreign minister Hryshchenko was a guest participant at the last meeting of the foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle on 27 April 2010. Foreign minister Westerwelle welcomed the willingness of the new Ukrainian leadership to adhere to European values and the policy of moving closer to the EU, and promised further support for the implementation of the ambitious Ukrainian reform agenda. The participants put a brave face on it by emphasizing the fact that “recent positive developments in relations between Ukraine and Russia were also in the common European interest.” <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Europa/Aktuell/100427-WeimarerDreieck.html>

Internal developments in the EU, i.e. the Greek crisis and the teething problems of the EU External Action Service, have minimized internal resources and are diverting attention from foreign policy. All this has been compounded by internal developments in the EU’s partner states, especially in Ukraine, which is making it difficult to implement the Eastern Partnership. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Russia is once again in the forefront of German Eastern Policy, as is demonstrated by the statement made by Minister of State Werner Hoyer in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 23 April 2010.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2010/100423-Hoyer-FAZ.html>. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the former foreign minister and current chairman of the SPD parliamentary party in the German Parliament, restated the significance of Russia for German Eastern Policy in an SPD parliamentary party motion tabled on 23 March 2010. It bore the title “Modernization partnership with Russia. Joint security in Europe through greater cooperation and interaction.” <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701153.pdf>

In his latest foreign policy speech foreign minister Westerwelle did not even mention the Eastern Policy, although he gave it in Bonn on 27 April 2010, directly after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/100427-BM-D-in-Europa.html>

The current low level of interest of EU players in the strategy of the Eastern Neighbourhood and negative developments in the partner states does not signify the end of the Eastern Partnership. However, the partnership will have to be restructured. The changes must lead to a strengthening of civil society activities and fewer official meetings and projects. In this way the Eastern Partnership will be able to provide support for the transformation processes in the societies of the EU’s eastern neighbours.

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