

From Central Asia into EurAsia

Having recently spent some time in all five states of Central Asia on a project monitoring the EU's strategy there I am persuaded that the regional dimension to this strategy needs reconsideration. The EU wishes to foster enlightened regional cooperation among the five states and allocates 30% of its budget to regional projects. The EU comes to the region with a presumption that regional cooperation leading maybe even to regional integration is a good idea. But has the regional dimension to the EU Central Asia strategy been well conceived for the 21st century when the map of Eurasia is being radically redrawn, after the 20th century when Central Asia was a region integrated into the Soviet Union, sealed off from the rest of the world?

The region has a modest population size of only 67 million people, so regional economic integration between these states does not have much potential if it is not part of a wider economic openness. There are some activities which have intrinsically a cross-border regional cooperative dimension, such as border management itself, transport corridors and above all water management. However all these three items have vital cross-border dimensions linking to neighbours external to the region, and having trans-continental dimensions. Border management concerns above all the trafficking of drugs where Central Asia is just a transit passage between Afghanistan and Europe, Russia and China. Transport corridors are essentially a trans-continental affair, with links from West China to West Europe being developed as well as North-South links down to South Asia. The water issue also, until now viewed as the quintessential Central Asia question with the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers flowing down to the Aral Sea, sees a possible South Asian hydro-electricity link option that might unlock the way for intra-Central Asian cooperation (South Asia has demand for summer electricity, which is when downstream Central Asia wants the water for agriculture).

Look at the current political priorities of the states of the region. Kazakhstan justifiably views its economic modernization ambitions as being in a different league compared to its regional neighbours, and looks West to Europe with its "Path to Europe" programme as a strategic move to avoid exclusive dependence on Russia and China. Turkmenistan, while remaining a completely closed and repressive political system, nonetheless frames its development priority in the

opening of gas pipeline connections towards all points of the compass, North to Russia, East to China, South to Iran, and potentially West across the Caspian Sea to Europe, if the EU were to make a credible and major offer. Kyrgyzstan's economy, which is desperately poor, is now substantially dependent on a transit trade function for Chinese goods to flow through to Kazakhstan and Russia. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are concerned to disenclave themselves to the South with transport corridors through Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to the Gulf and Indian Ocean, and they are now inescapably affected by the Afghanistan drama, with their ethnic brothers forming the most important minorities there.

All these wider regional or trans-continental issues that involve Central Asia are also of concern to the EU, but in a much wider context than just Central Asia. In fact there is a cluster of essentially EurAsian issues here, more than Central Asian issues, with important long-term implications for the EU's relations with Russia, China, and India, as well as the short-term priority of finding some kind of political resolution for the Afghanistan imbroglio. Central Asia features necessarily in these issues, but intra-Central Asian regional cooperation is rarely of the essence. More important would be a concept for Central Asia of an 'extroverted' regionalism, which disenclaves this landlocked territory and opens up different external options for each state. So for both the EU and the states of the region an extroverted regionalism is more interesting than the introverted regionalism that has so far been the main idea in the EU's Central Asia strategy.

Going even wider, the EU foreign policy strategy has now to focus on the issues of the newly emerging multi-polar world, with China, India, Russia, and the EU itself as newly emerging or re-emerging major powers on the Eurasian land mass. This is the No 1 strategic challenge of the 21st century, to find ways to secure some kind of normative cooperative order across a host of economic, political and security issues, based on some mix of multilateralism and cooperative arrangements between the major players. However we can come back still to Central Asia, which is unique as a landlocked region sitting precisely in the middle between the big four of EurAsia - Russia to its North, China to the East, India to the South and the EU to the West.

Table of Contents

EU Enlargement 3

 EC annual strategy on EU enlargement 3

Armenia-Turkey..... 4

 Protocols on Armenia-Turkey bilateral relations 4

 EU Presidency statement on Armenia and Turkey 5

 Russian MFA on Armenia-Turkey Protocols..... 5

 Azeri MFA on Armenia-Turkey Protocols..... 6

 Armenian Presiden address to Armenians 6

Russian Democracy 7

 Results of regional elections..... 7

 Russians’ vision of democracy..... 7

 Mihkail Gorbachov’s views on elections in Russia 7

Moldova..... 8

 EU to negotiatie a new Agreement with Moldova..... 8

 EU Council conclusions on Moldova 8

Uzbekistan..... 8

 EU Council conclusions on Uzbekistan 8

European External Action Service..... 9

 EU Presidency draft report on the EEAS 9

CEPS Publications 10

 Scrapping the Missiles - A tipping point? 10

 Missile Defence: A view from Turkey 10

 Obama’s Missile U-turn..... 10

Info..... 11

 ENPI Info Centre 11

European Neighbourhood Watch Index

editorial continued...

Central Asia is going to be involved in many of these issues, and centrally in the geographic sense, but obviously not with regard to the main weight of the issues.

The conclusion that seems due is that the EU should make an addition to its conception of the multiple regional dimensions of its foreign policy, which already has the Eastern Partnership, Northern Dimension, Union for the Mediterranean, Black Sea Synergy and now the Central Asia strategy. Each of these initiatives has its rationale, although some may fail to get real momentum. But what is missing now is an overarching EurAsian dimension, looking for the ways to devise major cooperative ventures for the multi-polar world, and in particular for the Eurasian landmass. This would be, inter alia, a constructive move towards Russia after the awkward period in which the launch of the Eastern Partnership has been seen as deepening the segmentation of the post-Soviet space in EU policies. But back to Central Asia: the introverted regionalism of the Central Asian strategy should be allocated a more modest role or even virtually dissolved, with the major issues finding their place in an extroverted regionalism that could be framed within a EurAsian strategy.

by Michael Emerson

EU Commission annual strategy on EU enlargement

EU press release

Brussels, 14 October 2009. [Link](#)

Today the Commission adopted its annual strategy on EU enlargement. The communication highlights the progress the Western Balkans and Turkey made towards European integration during a difficult year of global economic crisis, and spells out the main challenges facing them in the months and years to come. In the light of the progress achieved, the Commission decided to recommend the opening of negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In a major step forward for the region, visa liberalisation for the Western Balkans will progress substantially in 2010.

2009 marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and 5 years since the enlargement of the EU to central and eastern Europe. The prospect of EU accession continues to provide strong encouragement for political and economic reform and reinforces peace and stability. It is in the EU's strategic interest to keep up this momentum, on the basis of agreed principles and conditions.

The EU enlargement process currently takes place against the background of a deep and widespread recession, which has affected both the EU and the enlargement countries. Bilateral disputes should not hold back the accession process. They should be resolved by the parties concerned.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made important progress and has substantially addressed the key accession partnership priorities. The Commission considers that the country sufficiently fulfils the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the Stabilisation and Association Process and therefore has decided to recommend the opening of accession negotiations.

Presenting the enlargement package, Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn said: "The enlargement strategy we present today is a demonstration of our commitment to the European future of the Western Balkans and Turkey. In these difficult times of economic crisis, the membership applications of Albania and Montenegro highlight our Union's continued power of attraction and our role in promoting stability, security and prosperity. Iceland's application adds a new dimension to our enlargement agenda."

Visa-free travel for citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia at the beginning of 2010 will bring tangible benefits for citizens. The Commission will table proposals for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina by mid-2010, provided these countries meet the conditions set.

Concerning Turkey, Commissioner Rehn went on to say:

"Turkey has shown renewed political reform efforts. Progress with its accession negotiations hinges on this momentum, especially the consolidation of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. We welcome the recent consultations on an important Kurdish initiative which, I hope, will result in concrete actions for the rights of all Turks."

"I'm encouraged by the historic steps Turkey and Armenia have just taken towards normalising their relations. This process should now lead to full normalisation as soon as possible."

Croatia has made good progress in meeting the benchmarks set in the accession negotiations and negotiations have now formally resumed following the political agreement between Slovenia and Croatia over handling the border issue. Croatia will need to pursue its reform efforts, in particular on the

judiciary and public administration, the fight against and organised crime, and minority rights. If Croatia meets all outstanding benchmarks in time, the accession negotiations could be concluded next year.

Montenegro applied for EU membership in December 2008 and the Commission is currently preparing an Opinion as requested by the Council. Parliamentary elections met almost all international standards. Strengthening administrative capacity and consolidating the rule of law remain major challenges.

Albania applied for EU membership in April. The Commission stands ready to prepare its Opinion, once invited to do so by the Council. Parliamentary elections met most international standards. Strengthening the rule of law and ensuring the proper functioning of State institutions remain major challenges.

Bosnia and Herzegovina urgently needs to speed up key reforms. The country's European future requires a shared vision on the overall direction of the country by its leadership, the political will to meet European integration requirements and to meet the conditions which have been set for the closure of the OHR.

Serbia has demonstrated its commitment to moving closer to the EU by building up a track record in implementing the provisions of the Interim Agreement with the EU and by undertaking key reforms. In light of sustained cooperation with ICTY, the Commission considers that the Interim Agreement should now be implemented by the EU. Serbia needs to demonstrate a more constructive attitude on issues related to Kosovo.

In Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244/99), stability has been maintained but remains fragile. The EU's rule of law mission EULEX has been deployed throughout Kosovo and is fully operational. Kosovo faces major challenges, including ensuring the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, the strengthening of administrative capacity, and the protection of the Serb and other minorities.

In a separate document, the Commission proposes to bring Kosovo's citizens closer to the EU, including through a visa dialogue with the perspective of eventual visa liberalisation when the necessary reforms will have been undertaken and the conditions met.

The Commission also proposes to extend the preferential trading regime ("autonomous trade measures") that Kosovo currently benefits from and will propose negotiating directives for a trade agreement once Kosovo meets the relevant requirements.

Related Documents:

Enlargement Strategy 2009-2010 and Progress Reports.

[Access here.](#)

Protocols on establishing bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey

Signed in Zurich, 10 October 2009. [Link](#)

PROTOCOL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey,

Desiring to establish good neighborly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples, as envisaged in the Protocol on the development of relations signed on the same day, Referring to their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Reconfirming their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, nonintervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, Bearing in mind the importance of the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of trust and confidence between the two countries that will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security and stability of the whole region, as well as being determined to refrain from the threat or the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law, Emphasizing their decision to open the common border. Reiterating their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations, Condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate in combating against them, Affirming their willingness to chart a new pattern and course for their relations on the basis of common interests, goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony, Agree to establish diplomatic relations as of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange Diplomatic Missions.

This Protocol and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between The Republic of Armenia and The Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

PROTOCOL ON DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey,

Guided by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey signed on the same day, Considering the perspectives of developing their bilateral relations, based on confidence and respect to their mutual interests, Determining to develop and enhance their bilateral relations, in the political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical,

cultural issues and other fields, based on common interests of both countries,

Supporting the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries in the international and regional organizations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC,

Taking into account the common purpose of both States to cooperate for enhancing regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of the region,

Reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of international law,

Reaffirming their readiness to actively support the actions of the international community in addressing common security threats to the region and world security and stability, such as terrorism, transnational organized crimes, illicit trafficking of drugs and arms,

1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol,

2. Agree to

conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;

implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;

make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard; develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;

cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;

establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;

take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries; engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.

3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol.

Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates. Where appropriate, international experts shall take part in the sub-commissions.

The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is an integral part of this Protocol.

This Protocol and the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Signed in (date, place) in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail

Annexed document: Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia the and the Republic of Turkey

Russian MFA Sergey Lavrov on signature of Armenian-Turkish protocols
Zurich, 10 October 2009. [Link](#)

We have just witnessed a landmark event: the signing by Armenia and Turkey of the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations, which determine the subsequent actions of the two sides to move towards a comprehensive normalization of interstate ties.

I will not hide – we are sincerely glad of this. Armenia and Turkey are countries friendly to Russia.

The operative part of the signed documents evidences the firm resolve of both countries to cover their part of the journey. It is noteworthy that none of the steps provided may be construed as prejudicial to a third party.

Improved relations between the two neighboring countries will liven up economic and trade contacts and have a positive impact on the socioeconomic situation in Armenia and Turkey.

The Russian Federation stands ready to support this process via the further implementation of cooperation projects with Armenia and Turkey, particularly in electricity and transport and communications. Russian company OJSC Inter UES is involved in the supply of electricity from Armenia to Turkey. OJSC Russian Railways is ready to ensure the establishment and smooth functioning of a rail link between the two countries through the border crossing Dogukapi-Ahuryan. There are other promising projects that will positively affect the daily lives of people.

We welcome the pragmatic and businesslike joint work of the Armenian and Turkish partners to resolve complicated issues. Today's accords are the result of concerted efforts by the Armenian and Turkish leaders to bring the two countries closer together. Much credit also belongs to Foreign Ministers Edward Nalbandian and Ahmet Davutoglu. We feel their firm resolve to work towards the establishment of good-neighborly relations between Armenia and Turkey, which should objectively contribute to further steps promoting peace and security in the region.

I want to note that the signing of the protocols is the first step towards normalizing relations. The sides need to ratify these instruments as soon as possible and to embark on their practical realization.

EU Presidency declaration on Armenia and Turkey
Brussels, 10 October 2009. [Link](#)

The European Union welcomes the signature by Armenia and Turkey, in Zürich on 10 October, of the two protocols relating to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of bilateral relations between the two countries, including the opening of the common border. The European Union encourages Armenia and Turkey to remain committed to the process of normalisation and calls for the ratification and implementation the protocols as soon as possible.

The European Union believes that the full normalisation of bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey would be an important contribution to security, stability and cooperation throughout this crucial region and will continue to offer its political and technical support to this process.

The Candidate Countries Croatia* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

Azerbaijani MFA statement on Armenian-Turkish protocols

Baku, 11 October 2009. [Link](#)

Regarding the signing of protocols on establishing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and on establishment of bilateral relations on Oct. 10 this year in Switzerland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan considers it appropriate to report the following.

Azerbaijan's stance on this issue is unambiguous. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in protest against the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia and aggression towards Azerbaijan. As a result of Armenian aggression 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands were occupied, nearly 1 million citizens of Azerbaijan were victims of ethnic cleansing and have become refugees and internally displaced persons and historical and cultural heritage of Azerbaijan have been destroyed at the occupied territories.

Since then Armenia has ignored numerous documents and resolutions adopted by the Security Council and UN General Assembly, the OSCE, PACE and other international organizations that condemn the aggressive policy of Armenia, demand withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories and return of refugees to their homeland and no progress has been reached to eliminate the results of this aggression.

In connection with this matter Azerbaijani side refers to the numerous statements by senior officials of the Turkish Republic and Prime Minister Mr Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular to his words during a speech made on May 14, 2009 in Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan Republic: "Turkey closed its border with Armenia after its occupation of Azerbaijani lands. The borders can be opened only after the occupation is put an end. As long as the requirements of our Azerbaijani brothers will not be satisfied, we will not retreat one step from this position. It is interconnected and can not be considered separately"

The Foreign Ministry also refers to the statement by the Turkish prime minister made at the September 17 iftar to the Turkish media: "We can not open the borders until the long-drawn conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is resolved ... We can not take this step without solving this problem.

Armenian President address to the people of the Republic of Armenia and to all Armenians

Yerevan, 10 October 2009. [Link](#)

[Extract]

There is no alternative to the establishment of the relations with Turkey without any precondition. It is the dictate of the time. It is not this need that is being debated today. The concern of individuals and some political forces is caused by the different interpretation of certain provisions contained in the Protocols and their historic mistrust towards Turkey.



Having realistically assessed these circumstances and being convinced in the necessity and correctness of the steps undertaken, I insist on the following:

1. No relations with Turkey can question the reality of the patricide and the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian nation. It is a known fact and it should be recognized and condemned by the whole progressive humanity. The relevant sub-commission to be established under the intergovernmental commission, is not a commission of historians.
2. The issue of the existing border between Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of the international law. The Protocols do not go beyond that.
3. These relations cannot and do not relate to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict, which is an independent and separate process. Armenian does not regard the clause of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders contained in the Protocols as in anyway related to the Nagorno Karabagh problem.
4. The Armenian side will give an adequate reaction if Turkey protracts the process of ratification or raises conditions for it. Armenia undertakes no unilateral commitments though these Protocols and does not make any unilateral affirmations. Armenia is signing these Protocols in order to create basis for the establishment of normal relations between our two countries. Hence, if Turkey fails to ratify the Protocols within a reasonable timeframe and does not implement all the clauses contained herein within the provided timeframe or violates them in the future, Armenia will immediately take appropriate steps as stipulated by the international law.

Results of Regional Elections in Russia11 October 2009. [Link](#)

Votes were held in 75 of Russia's 83 regions, for positions varying from mayor to representative in the local legislatures.

United Russia	70%
Independent candidates	24%
Communist Party	2.60%
Just Russia	1.90%
Liberal Democratic Party	0.80%
Other	0.66%
Right Cause	0.02%
Yabloko	0.01%
Patriots of Russia	0.01%

Which of the Following 5 statements Reflects Your Own Beliefs?**Russians' vision of Democracy**The Levada Centre Poll
15 October 2009. [Link](#)**Does Democracy Exist in Today's Russia?****Mikhail Gorbachov on Elections in Russia**Interview with Novaya Gazeta
Moscow, 19 October 2009. [Link](#)


Mikhail Sergeyevich! How do you evaluate the action of three (LDPR, the Communist Party, Fair Russia), Duma factions, which left the hall in protest against the rigged elections on the 11th of October?

- It is very serious. If such disciplined and cautious people who are so close to power decided to undertake such a demarche, it means that faith in the political institution of elections is definitively lost. This is - a complete failure of political strategists who were guided by the wretched principle- "how people vote is not important, what is important is how the voices are counted". In the eyes of everybody, elections have been turned into a mockery of people and a symbol of disrespect for their choices. The result, desired by the party in power, has been achieved by discrediting political institutions and the party itself.

- In the absence of a parliamentary multiparty system what methods of political competition remain?

- The field for the expression of views and interests, of course, has sharply narrowed.

Those parties which did not get into the legislative assembly, have to lead non-parliamentary struggle in order to defend their views. Something will probably happen in court as well, where many are intending to challenge the results of the elections.

Does Russia Need Democracy?

EU to negotiate a New Agreement with Moldova

EU press release
Brussels, 16 October 2009. [Link](#)

Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt announced today that the European Union is now ready to start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a New Agreement. This message was conveyed during the visit of the EU Ministerial Troika in Chisinau. The agreement will replace and go beyond the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which has been in place since 1998. A mandate has already been given to the European Commission and negotiations will be launched shortly.

“The New Agreement is a powerful tool to promote deeper cooperation and approximation between Moldova and the EU”, says Foreign Minister Bildt. “The EU decision to start negotiations testifies to the progress made by Moldova in implementing reforms and its commitment to continuing on the reform path. The New Agreement will help Moldova realise these goals”.

“I am delighted that the EU and the Republic of Moldova are taking the next steps towards political association and economic integration” said Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy.” The agreement will bring tangible benefits to the citizens of Moldova and the EU notably in the fields of the economy, business and the rule of law”

Moldova is one of six Eastern European countries within the Eastern Partnership which was launched in May 2009 and holds out the perspective of political association and economic integration with the EU.

The EU Troika visited Chisinau on 16 October and had meetings with Prime Minister Vlad Filat, Foreign Minister Iurie Leanca, the speaker of the Parliament Mihai Ghimpu, Deputy Speaker Serafim Urechean and former President Vladimir Voronin. The EU was represented by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, accompanied by the EU Special Representative to the Republic of Moldova Kálmán Mizsei and representatives of the European Commission and the incoming Spanish Presidency.

EU Council conclusions on Moldova

Brussels, 27 October 2009. [Link](#)

The Council discussed the situation in the Republic of Moldova, following a briefing by the presidency on a EU troika visit to the country on 16 October.

It expressed commitment to supporting the Republic of Moldova’s reform efforts and reiterated the EU’s readiness to start negotiations on a new EU-Moldova agreement, replacing and going beyond the current partnership and cooperation agreement. The negotiating mandate was adopted in June, and the Commission is preparing to launch negotiations shortly.

EU Council Conclusions on Uzbekistan

Luxembourg, 27 October 2009. [Link](#)

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council notes that since the adoption of the EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia in May 2007, the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan have acquired a new scope and quality. The EU reiterates its readiness to continue to engage comprehensively with Uzbekistan and recalls its position to that effect as set out in previous Council Conclusions. At the same time, the EU remains seriously concerned about the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, and encourages the Uzbek authorities to implement fully its international obligations in this area.

2. The Council recalls that restrictive measures were originally imposed on Uzbekistan following the Andijan events of May 2005. Bearing in mind its Conclusions of 13 October 2008, the Council urges Uzbekistan to release all imprisoned human rights defenders and prisoners of conscience, to allow unimpeded operation of non-governmental organisations in the country, including Human Rights Watch, to cooperate fully with all relevant UN Special Rapporteurs, to guarantee freedom of speech and of the media, to proceed with the implementation of conventions against child labour, and to fully align its election processes with OSCE commitments, ODIHR recommendations and other international standards for democratic elections, especially with a view to the Parliamentary elections on 23 December 2009.

3. The Council welcomes the commitment of Uzbekistan to work with the EU on a range of questions relating to human rights and the rule of law, and notes the positive steps taken in Uzbekistan over the last years. These include the release of some human rights defenders, the resumption of ICRC prison visits, the abolition of the death penalty, efforts to improve detention conditions, the introduction of habeas corpus, the ratification of conventions against child labour, progress in the implementation of certain OSCE commitments as well as Uzbekistan’s stated willingness to work more closely with that organization, continuation of judicial reform, the active participation of Uzbekistan in the EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia and the consolidation of the dialogue on human rights between the EU and Uzbekistan.

4. The Council encourages Uzbekistan to continue its reforms in the fields of human rights, democratisation and the rule of law, and remains ready to assist the Uzbek authorities in their efforts through cooperation programmes and dialogue, in particular in the framework of the Cooperation Council, the dialogue on human rights and the Rule of Law Initiative.

5. With a view to encourage the Uzbek authorities to take further substantive steps to improve the rule of law and the human rights situation on the ground, and taking into account their commitments, the Council decides not to renew the remaining restrictive measures set out in the Common Position 2008/843/CFSP.

6. The Council will closely and continuously observe the human rights situation in Uzbekistan. Within a year, the External Relations Council will discuss and assess progress

made by the Uzbek authorities and the effectiveness of EU-Uzbek cooperation. While reaffirming the EU's readiness to strengthen its relations with Uzbekistan, the Council notes that the depth and quality of the dialogue and cooperation will depend on Uzbek reforms and progress in the areas mentioned above.

EU Presidency Draft Report on the European External Action Service

Brussels, 23 October 2009. [Link](#)

THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

1. Article 27(3) TEU constitutes the legal basis for the Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS.

"In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission."

2. In the light of the above, the Presidency, the Member States, the Commission and the Council Secretariat undertook preparatory work on the EEAS. The present document sets out the results of this work as European Council guidelines for the High Representative in the preparation of the draft Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS.

SCOPE

3. The scope of the EEAS should allow the HR to fully carry out his/her mandate as defined in the Treaty. To ensure the consistency and better coordination of the Union's external action, the EEAS should also assist the President of the European Council and the President as well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations as well as closely cooperate with the Member States.

Single desks

4. The EEAS should be composed of single geographical (covering all regions and countries) and thematic desks which would continue to perform, under the authority of the HR, the tasks currently executed by the relevant parts of the Commission and the Council Secretariat.

5. While the EEAS will have geographical desks dealing with the candidate countries from the overall foreign policy perspective, enlargement will remain the responsibility of the Commission.

6. Trade and the development policy as defined by the Treaty, should remain the responsibility of relevant Commissioners and DGs of the Commission.

ESDP and crisis management structures

7. In order to enable the High Representative to conduct the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS as defined in paragraph 16 while taking full account of the specificities of these structures and preserving their particular functions, procedures and staffing conditions. The Situation Centre (SitCen) should be part of the EEAS, while putting in place the necessary arrangements to continue to provide other relevant services to the European Council, Council and the Commission. These structures will form an entity placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative in his/her capacity of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This arrangement will fully respect Declaration n° 14 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon.

8. To enable the HR to fulfil his/her tasks in the crisis management area, preparations of actions related to the CFSP budget and the Instrument for Stability (Exceptional Assistance Measures and Interim Response Programmes) should be handled by the EEAS. The decision-making process will remain as today, with decisions taken by the Council (CFSP) and the Commission (IfS). The technical implementation of these instruments should be managed by the Commission.

Programming and implementation of financial instruments

9. In order to enable the High Representative to assume his responsibility of ensuring the coordination and consistency as well as strategic direction of external policies of the EU, the EEAS (single geographic desks) should play a leading role in the strategic decision-making. The EEAS will thus be involved in the whole programming chain. The specific division of labour for programming the geographical and thematic instruments (the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Development Fund, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument for Stability) between the EEAS and the Commission services will be determined before the end of 2009 taking account of the nature of the instruments concerned.

Other

10. Effective consultation procedures should be established between the EEAS and the services of the Commission with external responsibilities, including those in charge of internal policies with significant external dimensions.

11. The EUSRs or their tasks should be integrated into the EEAS.

12. Once in office, the High Representative should regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/CSDP. Close contacts with the EP will take place at working level. The EEAS should therefore contain functions responsible for relations with the EP.

LEGAL STATUS

13. The EEAS should have an organisational status reflecting and supporting its unique role and functions in the EU

system. The EEAS should be a service of a sui generis nature separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It should have autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff.

- act as appointing authority for EEAS staff.

STAFFING

14. EEAS staff will come from three sources: relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff from Members States.

15. A balanced representation between the different categories must be ensured. When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States should represent at least one third of EEAS staff (AD level), including diplomatic staff in delegations.

FINANCING

16. The establishment of the EEAS should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality.

EU DELEGATIONS

17. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission's delegations will become Union delegations under the authority of the HR, and be part of the EEAS structure.

18. The Delegations should work in close cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.

19. EU delegations should play a supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries.

20. Further work is needed on the modalities for the EU delegations accredited to international organisations on a case by case basis.

WAY FORWARD

21. There will be several stages before reaching the final shape of the EEAS. The Council will be fully involved throughout the whole process.

22. A first stage from the entry into force of the Treaty to the adoption of the Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. The HR should submit his/her proposal with a view to it being adopted at the latest by the end of April 2010.

- A second stage for setting up the EEAS, from the adoption of the Council decision to full cruising speed. A first status report should be made in 2012.
- When the EEAS has been functioning for some time at full speed, there should be a review of the functioning and organisation of the EEAS followed, if necessary, by a revision of the decision. This review should also cover the scope of the EEAS, including delegations' role in consular affairs. Such a review should take place in 2014.

Scrapping the missiles – a tipping-point?

Michael Emerson
CEPS Commentary, 7 October 2009.
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[Abstract]

President Obama's recent announcement to scrap plans for a radar installation in the Czech Republic linked to missile defence installations in Poland may herald a tipping point in US and EU relations with Russia. But which way? Michael Emerson explores in this commentary whether it usher in a new era of genuine cooperation with Russia on strategic matters, or whether Russia's geo-political hawks will feel emboldened to proceed with their quest for hegemonic power in the former Soviet space.

Missile Defence: A View from Turkey

Piotr Zalewski
CEPS Commentary, 8 October 2009.
[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

On September 9th, the United States announced that it was planning a multi-billion dollar sale of 13 Patriot fire units, 72 PAC-3 missiles and a range of related hardware for ground-based air defence to Turkey. The decision, some commentators reasoned, was evidence that the US was turning to Turkey as an alternative base for the missile defence system (MDS) originally planned in Central Europe. Such assessments proved somewhat off the mark, however. What is on sale to the Turks (a system to protect Turkey against short- and medium-range missiles), it turns out, is different from what had been on offer to the Czechs and Poles, which was a system designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. The announced sale of one system, however, signalled the end of the other. On September 17th, the Obama administration confirmed it would abandon plans for an MDS based in Poland and the Czech Republic.

In this Commentary, journalist and researcher Piotr Zalewski (Istanbul) assesses the implications of this move for Turkish-US relations and their neighbours and allies.

Obama's Missile U-Turn

Roderick Kefferpütz
CEPS Commentary, 8 October 2009.
[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

This Commentary examines the motivations behind President Obama's controversial decision to abandon plans for a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic and assesses its consequences for US-EU relations as well as for relations between Western and Eastern Europe. Roderick Kefferpütz is Programme Coordinator at the European Union Office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, a think-tank and policy network affiliated with the German Green Party.

Related Websites:

ENPI Info Centre
www.enpi-info.eu

"Your Gateway to the EU Neighbourhood Partnership"

The ENPI Info Centre has launched a webportal comprising over 2000 pages of news and information on the Partnership between the EU and the Neighbourhood, in English, French, Russian and Arabic.

The webportal is actually three websites, the 'Gateway portal' and EuroEast and EuroMed, dedicated to each Neighbourhood region.

It is a one-stop shop for all news and developments in the Partnership, and also offers:

- Background information, feature stories, media resources etc. on the ENP, the ENPI, and EuropeAid regional projects;
- Search facility by project or by country;
- An intelligent navigation system that assists users in their search;
- A multimedia library and regularly updated collection of available material;
- Useful links through which journalists can find information instantly;

One tool of particular interest to stakeholders is daily info alerts to which you can subscribe and get everything we produce in your 'inbox' and according to your needs and interests. You only have to visit and fill in a very basic form on: <http://www.enpi-info.eu/join.php>

The website is one of the main tools of the ENPI Information and Communication Support Project, funded by EuropeAid, to increase knowledge on the projects it supports in the region and highlight developments in the European Neighbourhood Policy.

We hope our project will prove to be a useful tool for journalists, and would appreciate any comments or ideas you may have.

Best regards,

ENPI Info Centre team

European Neighbourhood Watch index

Issue 52 • September 2009

- Editorial by Michael Emerson: "Scrapping the missiles - a tipping point?"
- US President on "Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe"
- NATO Secretary General: "NATO and Russia: A new beginning"
- Russian MFA on speech by NATO Secretary General
- US President remarks at UN General Assembly
- Russian President address at UN General Assembly
- EU Presidency statement at UN General Assembly
- Address by Russian President to Ukrainian President
- Letter of Ukrainian President to Russian President
- EU Commission-IFI-Ukraine agreement on reform of the Ukrainian gas sector
- EU Declaration on the appointment of a Moldovan Government
- Report of Fact-Finding Mission on the Georgian conflict
- EU Declaration on Russian PM Putin's visit to Abkhazia
- Armenia-Turkey Protocols on normalization of bilateral relations
- EU Presidency statement on the joint statement by Armenia and Turkey
- Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey
- Transatlantic Trends 2009
- CEPS Publications:
 - Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia

Issue 51 • July 2009

- Editorial: "Russian Games with the WTO and the International Order"
- Russian President Medvedev on WTO accession
- Russian PM Putin on WTO accession
- Foreign Policy Priorities of the Swedish Presidency
- EU Council Conclusions on Georgia
- EU Council Conclusions on extension of EUMM mandate
- UN to continue engagement in Georgia
- Javier Solana remarks on "Helsinki Plus"
- Interview with Kalman Miszei, EUSR for Moldova
- Mediterranean Migration: 2008-2009 Report
- EU Council Conclusions on Enlargement
- EU Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Council
- CEPS Publications:
 - Lost Voters: Participation in EU elections and the case for compulsory voting
 - Business and Trade Relationships between the EU and Central Asia
 - The EU and Central Asia: Commercialising the Energy Relationship
 - Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: Greater compliance or resilient self-confidence?

- The EU and Uzbekistan: short-term interests versus long-term engagement
- Central Asia and the Global Economic Crisis
- The EU's approach to the development of mass media in Central Asia

Issue 50 • June 2009

- Editorial: "Islam, Obama and Europe"
- US President Obama Speech at Cairo University
- Israeli PM Netanyahu Speech on Palestinian state
- EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East
- Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean relations
- EU Presidency Conclusions on the ENP
- EU Council Conclusions on relations with Moldova
- EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue
- Speech: The EU and Belarus - Moving closer together?
- 13th EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council
- EU Declaration on termination of UNOMIG
- Gas Coordination Group Meeting
- EU Council adopts Common Code on Visas
- BRIC Group summit press statement
- CEPS Publications:
 - Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean relations
 - Readings in European Security, Volume 5

Issue 49 • May 2009

- Editorial: "Do we detect a neo-Finlandisation in the Eastern neighbourhood?"
- Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit
- Press Conference following EU-Russia Summit
- EU press release ahead of EU-Russia Summit
- Declaration on the Southern Corridor
- EU Presidency on Council of Europe's response to post-electoral developments in Moldova
- EUMM in Georgia on incident prevention mechanisms meeting
- EU statement on suspension of negotiations on OSCE presence in Georgia
- EU-Ukraine visa facilitation agreement works well
- Solana-Biden Joint statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina

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